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ABSTRACT
CAPITALISM IN POST-COLONIAL INDIA: PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION
UNDER DIRIGISTE AND LAISSEZ FAIRE REGIMES
MAY 2010
RAJESH BHATTACHARYA, B.Sc., PRESIDENCY COLLEGE
M.A., CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professors Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff

In this dissertation, I try to understand processes of dispossession and exclusion within a
class-focused Marxian framework grounded in the epistemological position of
overdetermination. The Marxian concept of primitive accumulation has become
increasingly prominent in contemporary discussions on these issues. The dominant
reading of “primitive accumulation” in the Marxian tradition is historicist, and
consequently the notion itself remains outside the field of Marxian political economy.
The contemporary literature has de-historicized the concept, but at the same time missed
Marx’s unique class-perspective. Based on a non-historicist reading of Marx, I argue that
primitive accumulation—i.e. separation of direct producers from means of production in
non-capitalist class processes—is constitutive of capitalism and not a historical process
confined to the period of transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism. I understand
primitive accumulation as one aspect of a more complex (contradictory) relation between
capitalist and non-capitalist class structure which is subject to uneven development and
which admit no teleological universalization of any one class structure. Thus, this
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dissertation claims to present a notion of primitive accumulation theoretically grounded
in the Marxian political economy.
In particular, the dissertation problematizes the dominance of capital over a
heterogeneous social formation and understands primitive accumulation as a process
which simultaneously supports and undermines such dominance. At a more concrete
level, I apply this new understanding of primitive accumulation to a social formation—
consisting of “ancient” and capitalist enterprises—and consider a particular conjuncture
where capitalist accumulation is accompanied by emergence and even expansion of a
“surplus population” primarily located in the “ancient” economy.
Using these theoretical arguments, I offer an account of postcolonial capitalism in India,
distinguishing between two different regimes—1) the dirigiste planning regime and 2)
the laissez-faire regime. I argue that both regimes had to grapple with the problem of
surplus population, as the capitalist expansion under both regimes involved primitive
accumulation. I show how small peasant agriculture, traditional non-capitalist industry
and informal “ancient” enterprises (both rural and urban) have acted as “sinks” for
surplus population throughout the period of postcolonial capitalist development in India.

Keywords: primitive accumulation, surplus population, postcolonial capitalism
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an intervention in the contemporary debate on the “violence” of
capitalism—a debate animated by concerns over dispossession, exclusion and
marginalization of poor and vulnerable laboring people all over the world, but especially
in developing countries. The present work is an attempt to understand whether these
processes of dispossession, exclusion or marginalization can be theoretically analyzed
within a class-focused Marxian framework. Therefore, this dissertation constitutes —
partly, of course—a Marxian response to the questions posed before Marxian theory in
these debates1. Such a response is generally to be expected in the context of all debates in
the society in which Marxists participate or are drawn into, but more so in the present
case, since many of the participants in the debate specifically make use of certain
Marxian concepts. One such concept, the Marxian concept of “primitive accumulation”,
is the theoretical object of analysis in this work. The dissertation originates in the claim
that a new meaning and a new significance, different from those in circulation, can be
attached to the Marxian notion of “primitive accumulation, if we employ a different
epistemology (overdetermination) and a distinct Marxian entry point (class) for
theoretical analysis.

1

Questions are not always posed before theoretical traditions, as open critiques. Often, the theoretical
tradition rises up to the questions that it wants to face, in other words, poses the question before itself, for
itself. The contemporary debates I refer to have not generally questioned the relevance of Marx in
understanding the phenomenon under study. On the contrary, participants in the debate have often invoked
Marx to offer interesting analyses. It is the use of Marxian theoretical categories that makes it easier for one
to enter the debate via formulation of specific questions to which one claims to provide specific Marxian
answers in contention with non-Marxist as well as other distinct Marxist theoretical positions.
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The traditional understanding of Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation is that of a
historical process—or more precisely, a convergence of many different processes— that
results in the dissolution of the unity of direct producers with means of production. This
history of dispossession precipitates an encounter between owners of money capital on
the one hand and dispossessed, i.e. “free” laborers—“freed” of means of production and
of non-capitalist class relations—on the other hand, and thus the basic conditions of
existence of the capitalist class process are created. Once the capitalist class relations
come into being, the capitalist class structure can secure its conditions of existence
through economic processes (market mechanisms, real subsumption of labor, alienation
etc.) without involving primitive accumulation. Therefore, in the dominant reading of
Marx, primitive accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capital; it ceases to exist once
the capitalist class relations are born.
One of the major contributions of the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation
is a reformulation of the concept as a process constitutive of the capitalist class process
rather than as a historical process related to transition from feudalism to capitalism2
Those writers who put forward this view argue that capitalism relies on primitive
accumulation for securing/renewing its conditions of existence (market, accumulation,
supplies of labor power, means of production etc.) and hence primitive accumulation is a
continuous process central to the reproduction of capitalism. My point of departure is this
new theoretical problematic, a conceptual terrain waiting for new questions to be posed.
To pose these questions is, however, not a simple act. It raises numerous conceptual
problems and remains open to epistemological overhauling. On epistemological grounds,
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In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I discuss the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation

2

this new problematic invites a notion of primitive accumulation that breaks away from
functionalist and essentialist explanations. A Marxian theory grounded in the
overdeterminist epistemology and employing class as an entry point offers such an
alternative and unique understanding of primitive accumulation. Yet, while a class
analysis enables a new meaning of primitive accumulation to emerge, at the same time,
the introduction of this new concept of primitive accumulation in the class-focused
theoretical space induces changes in the meaning of other established concepts like
transition, social formation, dominance of capital and interaction between class
structures. In short, the ontology of capitalism gets reconstructed. This dissertation thus
belongs to the new problematic that recent rethinking of primitive accumulation has
opened up to the discerning (class-trained) eyes.
In this dissertation, I accept overdetermination. I accept Althusser’s reading of Marx that
Marx’s Capital is seared through by contradictions between an essentialist and a nonessentialist mode of theorizing (Althusser, 2006). Althusser opposes two distinct possible
readings of Marx’s Capital—one which he variously refers to as idealist, philosophical or
teleological and the second which he calls aleatory materialist. Althusser argues that the
organization of the text of Capital exemplifies the former (semi-Hegelian and hence
idealist) position of Marx while the exposition of Marx’s theory forces him to “take into
account what the order of exposition requires him to bracket out” (Althusser, 2006: 39).
Here, Althusser mentions the chapters on working day, the labor process, and primitive
accumulation—those chapters, which, according to him, “stand outside ‘the order of
exposition’.” (Althusser, 2006: 40). It is in these chapters that aleatory materialism creeps
into or forces itself into Marx’s analysis.
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They have confronted commentators with a formidable problem: why this leap from theory
to history, from abstraction to the concrete, without the least justification? And, ultimately:
what is Marx’s real object? ‘The capitalist mode of production and exchange in its ideal
average’, as Capital incessantly repeats, or the concrete history of the conditions of class
struggle that precipitate the Western bourgeoisie into capitalism? But if it is the latter, then
we are at the very heart of ‘the concrete’, for primitive accumulation and the expropriation
of (rural and urban) workers’ means of production and conditions of reproduction, which
produced the capitalist mode of production, have nothing to do with any abstraction or
‘ideal average’ whatsoever” (Althusser, 2006: 40).

The distinction between the two readings should not be thought in terms of a simplistic
abstract/concrete opposition; rather the distinction Althusser draws attention to, is one
between the given-ness of the abstract versus the openness of the concrete, or in other
words, between essentialism and overdetermination as alternative epistemological
positions.
The historicist understanding of primitive accumulation, following from the teleology of
historical materialism and the assumption of “full or closed totality”, has the following
theoretical implication—the theory of capitalist accumulation is constituted by the
analytics of capital that Marx lays out in the three volumes of Capital whereas primitive
accumulation lies beyond — i.e. behind, in so far as it constitutes the pre-history — the
theoretical plane of Capital. As, Perelman observes, “Marx’s presentation of primitive
accumulation had the unfortunate consequence of divorcing primitive accumulation from
political economy” (Perelman, 2000: 32). Thus the theoretical categories of Marxian
political economy seem to enable an understanding of capitalist accumulation. It is
otherwise with primitive accumulation, which is related to the coercive state, force and
violence. But “force” and “violence” are not categories of Marxian political economy.
Thus, in the dominant reading of Marx, the theoretical (class) categories of Marxian
political economy can make sense of capital, but not the arising of capital.
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I argue that this particular understanding of primitive accumulation suffers from the
“origin” problem. The British physicist Stephen Hawking (1988) wrote that the origin of
the universe cannot be explained by the laws of Physics, since the laws of Physics came
into existence at the moment of origin of the universe. The origin is the pre-history of the
being and therefore also belongs to the pre-analytic history of the being—i.e. it lies
beyond the analytics of the present, the being. Thus, the class-based theoretical categories
related to the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor can explain the
capitalist social formation, but when it comes to the moment of transition to the capitalist
social formation, class-based categories are replaced by non-Marxian categories like
violence and force (“extra-economic processes”).
In this dissertation, I differ from the dominant reading in the following sense. The notion
of transition is understood from a non-teleological, i.e. aleatory materialist perspective. I
understand any social formation to be comprised of multiple class structures. A capitalist
social formation is one where capitalist and different non-capitalist class structures are
present and where the capitalist class structure is dominant, where dominance itself is
theorized in class (i.e. surplus) terms. Class structures in a social formation are always
changing—the change being overdetermined by all other processes occurring in the
society. One possible direction of change in a social formation is transition to the
dominance of a different class structure—and this possibility is always present.
Dominance of any class structure in a social formation—in my understanding—is a
provisional and contingent outcome, always threatened by its own unraveling. If Marxian
categories can capture the provisional dominance of a class structure in a social
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formation, they can also be used to construct the history of that dominance, including the
arising of that dominance.
The different class structures are forever changing, being subject to the contradictory
pulls and pushes exerted by all other processes in the society which are themselves
continuously changing. In particular, a class structure changes because i) its fundamental
and subsumed class processes interact to produce those changes, ii) its interaction with
other class structures produces those changes and iii) ever-changing non-class processes
in the society produce changes in each class structure. Since these class structures
overdetermine each other, changes in any one also imply changes in the others—but in a
contradictory way, in the sense that, each class structure supports and undermines the
conditions of existence of other class structures at the same time. Thus, the capitalist class
structure reproduces and expands itself by providing conditions for expansion and
destruction of non-capitalist class structures at the same time. I offer a very thin
definition of primitive accumulation to refer to only one aspect of this overdetermined
relation between capitalist and non-capitalist class processes.
If we recognize the play of the aleatory at the heart of a social formation, there is no
notion of an “origin” that stands outside the theorized process of overdetermined change
in each of the existing class structures, including the dominant one. The same Marxian
theoretical categories employed in theorizing a capitalist social formation can also be
used to account for its emergence. Therefore, to understand history beyond history, i.e.
history beyond the analytic history of the being, we must question history itself, its
lawfulness, its rationality and its telos. We must ask why we take teleological, law-driven
change as the only intelligible history available to us. Only by questioning the Reason
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that drives our dominant writing of history can we bring back the “unthinkable” into the
domain of theory. This dissertation, therefore, accepts a different historiography—a
writing of aleatory history that recognizes contingency as an intelligible form in which
history can be written. Primitive accumulation becomes a Marxian theoretical category
in this realm of contingencies.
In this dissertation, I seek to establish primitive accumulation as a theoretical category,
rather than a concrete historical account. There is discursive violence to capital’s “others”
when one form in which capital and non-capital interact—i.e., primitive accumulation—
remains un-theorized. There is a devalorization of capital’s “others” when they are also
relegated to the outside of theory. Marxian theory has to learn to negotiate “violence”
associated with primitive accumulation on the calm surface of the Marxian theory and not
banish it outside its theoretical field. By historicizing “violence” and thereby not
theorizing it in terms of Marxian categories, Marxists end up valorizing capital, rather
than its victims.
In this dissertation, I claim to make the following contributions to the Marxian tradition.
First, I will try to offer a new understanding of primitive accumulation based on the
epistemology of overdetermination and employing class-as-surplus-labor as the entry
point. I claim that through this theoretical move, I introduce primitive accumulation as a
theoretical category in Marxian political economy. Specifically, I will use my
formulation of the notion of primitive accumulation to identify it as one aspect of a more
complex (contradictory) relation between capitalist and non-capitalist class structures
with no teleological outcomes. I will present a new understanding of primitive
accumulation as a condition of existence of the capitalist class process and hence a
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continuous-constitutive process. Second, I will develop the theoretical distinction
between primitive and capitalist accumulation as distinct processes that secure conditions
of existence of the capitalist class structure. In doing this, I claim to provide an answer to
the thorny problem of the distinction between capitalist and primitive accumulation that
plagues contemporary interventions. Third, I will use this new notion of primitive
accumulation to problematize and present a new notion of the dominance of capital. I
pursue the theoretical implications of this new understanding of the dominance of capital
in a social formation with heterogeneous class structures and a surplus population. In the
process, I will also advance a theoretically precise class-based notion of surplus
population, using the theoretical insights offered by the existing literature. Fourth, I will
present a Marxian theory of a capitalist social formation where I show how capitalist
accumulation and primitive accumulation may lead to a proliferation of ancient class
structures along with an expanding capitalist class structure and how the two class
structures may support and constrain each other. Finally, I will offer an account of
postcolonial capitalism in India using the simple “model” of a social formation with
ancient and capitalist class structures. I will show how a surplus population emerged in
the course of expansion of the capitalist class structure in India and how it has been partly
confined to the “ancient” economy at the same time that capitalist class structure
expanded in India. I will argue that the ancient economy effectively acted and still acts as
the “sink” of surplus population in India and further, that the dominance of capital in the
Indian social formation is supported and undermined at the same time by the specific
social outcome of primitive accumulation that provides one condition of existence of the
capitalist class structures.
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I end this introductory chapter with an outline of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I discuss
Marx’s understanding of the process of primitive accumulation, how it exemplifies his
use of class as an entry point, even though he presents a teleological-historicist notion of
primitive accumulation. I also engage with the contemporary debate to show how the
contemporary debate attempts to de-historicize the concept and admits an inescapable
“outside” of capital. But, at the same time, I argue that contemporary interventions
largely remain trapped within an essentialist problematic, particularly in the
capitalocentric notions of the “outside” that dominate contemporary debates. I further
argue that Marx’s unique class perspective is also lost in contemporary debates.
In Chapter 3, I advance a new notion of primitive accumulation using a new reading of
Marx produced by Resnick and Wolff (1987) and specifically building on the notion of
“encounter” and the epistemology of “aleatory materialism” (which, I identify as
overdetermination) presented in Althusser (2006). I attempt to make a clear distinction
between primitive and capitalist accumulation and show how they overdetermine each
other and how they both act as conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure. I
problematize the notion of dominance of the capitalist class structure in a heterogeneous
social formation in surplus terms and in presence of a re-theorized surplus population.
In Chapter 4, I analyze the dynamics of a social formation with only two class
structures—ancient and capitalist—where primitive accumulation and capitalist
accumulation produce a surplus population. I argue that conditions of production and
appropriation of surplus in the two class structures are transformed in the presence of a
surplus population. I also explore the contradictory effects on capitalist and ancient
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surplus in such a social context. This chapter also provides theoretical tools to make
sense of much of the struggles around dispossession of land.
In Chapter 5, I offer a new account of the postcolonial development of capitalism in
India. I distinguish between two different regimes or social contexts in India—
identifiable in terms of their unique economic, political and cultural conditions—the
dirigiste planning regime dominated by state capitalist enterprises and the laissez-faire
free-market regime dominated by private capitalist enterprises. I argue that both regimes
had to grapple with the problem of surplus population, as the development of both state
and private capitalism involved primitive accumulation. I also argue how agriculture,
traditional non-capitalist industry and informal “ancient” enterprises (both rural and
urban) have acted as “sinks” for surplus population—enabling and undermining capitalist
accumulation at the same time. I end with a concluding Chapter 6, where I briefly
articulate the political implications of the present work as well as future directions of
research based on the theoretical arguments advanced in the present dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND THE “OUTSIDE” OF CAPITAL: A
CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS
Introduction

Marx’s sparse writings on primitive accumulation contain elements of a unique Marxian
historiography that stands in sharp contrast to the dominant tendency—within classical
political economy—of writing universal history. Marx engaged with the notion of
primitive accumulation to contest the dominant “bourgeois” history of his times, which
sought to naturalize, eternalize and legitimize the emerging and consolidating capitalist
economy. Marx contested this “bourgeois” history from the perspective of class—
emphasizing the distinctiveness of the capitalist class process and arguing that the latter’s
rise to dominance in the West European social formations constituted a historical
discontinuity discernible as a class-transformation within those societies. This transition
required the dissolution of one type of economy based on the dominance of feudal mode
of production and the emergence of a different type of economy dominated by the
capitalist mode of production. Marx showed how contradictory developments within the
West European feudal social formations led to this transitional conjuncture.
However, Marx also argued—in his writings on primitive accumulation—that this
historic transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism was neither spontaneous nor was it
achieved by ethical means; this entire reorganization of society required a protracted
period of violence, robbery and coercive state power to undermine existing non-capitalist
modes of production. Having historicized capitalism, Marx could then posit the
possibilities of historical transcendence of capitalism. Thus, Marx’s critique of the
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bourgeois notion of primitive accumulation is animated by his political vision of a future
beyond capitalism.

Marx’s Critique of the “Bourgeois” Notion of “Primitive Accumulation”
“Primitive accumulation” is a “bourgeois” 3 notion and it was through his critique of the
notion that Marx produced an entirely new history of the rise of capitalism. Just as Marx
took the category of “capital” from classical political economy and invested it with a
radically new meaning in terms of class relations, in the same way, he engaged with the
bourgeois notion of primitive accumulation—frequently referring to the “secret of the
“so-called” primitive accumulation”— and uncovered the history of class struggles that
remain invisible in the dominant texts of political economy. What Marx refers to as the
secret of primitive accumulation is the repressed narrative of class.
In classical political economy, the historical emergence of capitalism was never posed as
an object of theoretical analysis. There are vague references in Smith (1776) to a prior
accumulation of stock that enabled capitalists to employ workers in production.
As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them will
naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they will supply with
materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale of their work, or by what
their labour adds to the value of the materials. In exchanging the complete manufacture
either for money, for labour, or for other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to
pay the price of the materials, and the wages of the workmen, something must be given
for the profits of the undertaker of the work who hazards his stock in this adventure.
(Smith, 1776: 48)

Theories that explained profit as a return to abstinence4 implicitly or explicitly argued
that capitalists emerged out of people who saved money they earned with their labor and

3

I use the adjective “bourgeois” to refer to those views in Marx’s time, which provided ethical justification
of the class-position of the capitalists.
4
See Senior (1836)
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hence there is no exploitation when such capitalists employ workers out of the capital
(i.e. money) they have previously accumulated5.
At the abstract-theoretical level, Marx criticized this view for failing to understand the
distinctive class nature of capitalism.
Thus e.g. while the process in which money or value-for-itself originally becomes capital
presupposes on the part of the capitalist an accumulation—perhaps by means of savings
garnered from products and values created by his own labor etc., which he has
undertaken as a not-capitalist, i.e. while the presuppositions under which money becomes
capital appear as given, external presuppositions for the arising of capital—
[nevertheless,] as soon as capital has become capital as such, it creates its own
presuppositions, i.e. the possession of the real conditions of the creation of new values
without exchange, by means of its own production process…..That is, individual capitals
can continue to arise e.g. by means of hoarding. But the hoard is transformed into capital
only by means of the exploitation of labor. The bourgeois economists who regard capital
as an eternal and natural (not historical) form of production then attempt at the same time
to legitimize it again by formulating the conditions of its becoming as the conditions of
its contemporary realization; i.e. by presenting the moments in which the capitalist still
appropriates as non-capitalist—because he is still becoming—as the very conditions in
which he appropriates as capitalist. (Marx, 1973: 460, Italics in the original)

Marx clearly argued that primitive accumulation must be understood as a process that
produces conditions of existence of a very specific class relation—the productive
capitalist class relations—in which the capitalists’ profit originates in the sphere of
production through appropriation of the surplus value produced by wage-laborers. One of
the conditions of existence of the productive capitalist class structure is therefore the
presence of dispossessed laborers who are compelled to sell their labor-power as a
commodity in return for wages. Marx argued that capitalism could not have been born
5

Marx ridiculed the bourgeois view in the following words. “This primitive accumulation plays in Political
Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the
human race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long
gone by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal elite; the other,
lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of theological original sin
tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history
of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means essential. Never
mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to
sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite
all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly
although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the
defence of property” (Marx, 1912: 784-785)
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only with people with prior accumulation of wealth “who will naturally employ it in
setting to work industrious people”. For capitalist class relations to emerge, it was
necessary that there should exist a sizable population dispossessed of all property so that
they are compelled to accept wage-employment. Marx therefore emphasized the forceful
dispossession and proletarianization of the peasants and artisans as the central moment of
primitive accumulation. Further, the same processes of dispossession also implied
concentration of wealth and property in the hands of emerging capitalists.
At the concrete-historical level, Marx also contested the view that hoarding, saving or
abstinence explain the original accumulation of the capitalists. He argued that a whole
range of economic processes were responsible for the emergence of the capitalists.
Colonial plunder, the national debt, international credit system, taxation policies and the
protectionist trade policies were all instrumental in “manufacturing the
manufacturers”(Marx, 1912: 830). Similarly, Marx lays special emphasis on “enclosures”
in accounting for the creation of free wage-laborers. “Enclosures” refer to forcible private
or state acts of expropriation of the agricultural producers from their land, which was also
their chief means of production. The dispossessed laborers were then whipped into
factories through “bloody legislations” against vagabonds, beggars and robbers.
Eradication of holidays, game laws that closed hunting grounds to people for selfprovisioning, the attack on the “sloths” and wage-legislations were pressed into service
for the consolidation of the capitalist class-structure6. The nation-states played a crucial
role in the so-called primitive accumulation by adopting policies that facilitated the

6

See Perelman (2000)
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destruction of non-capitalist production units7 and consequent proletarianization of
independent producers and by helping the ascendant bourgeois amass massive wealth.
Thus, Marx located violence right at the heart of the historic process through which
capitalism was born out of feudalism.8
Critics of Marx explained the “industrial revolution” in Britain in terms of several
“exogenous” factors. For example, the European discovery of America and the
subsequent flow of precious metals (gold and silver) from America to Europe in the
sixteenth century led to a high rate of inflation and a consequent “profit-inflation” to the
advantage of the emerging capitalist class, to the extent that money wages grew at a
slower rate than commodity prices and the landlords’ rental claims remained relatively
fixed in nominal terms9. On the other hand, some critics of Marx pointed out that the
most important source of the industrial proletariat In England was rapid population
growth due to early marriage and larger families in the 18th century10.
For Marx, the rise of capitalism was a complex socially overdetermined process and
hence it was important to identify the social context within which capitalism emerged.
Marx argued that capitalist class structures emerged within a feudal social formation
whose contradictory developments led first to a disintegration of the feudal class
structures and the expansion of “ancient” production and then further dissolution of both
feudal and ancient class structures to give way to the prevalence of capitalist class
structures.11 That is why Marx laid greater emphasis on the process by which capitalism

7

See Marx (1912)
“Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one” (Marx, 1912: 824)
9
See Dobb (1947) for a discussion of this view
10
See Lazonick (1974) for a discussion of this view.
11
“Capitalism arises and develops historically amidst a non-capitalist society. In Western Europe it is found
at first in a feudal environment from which it in fact sprang—the system of bondage in rural areas and the
8

15

arose by dissolving other non-capitalist class processes—thus releasing means of
production and labor power employed in the latter—than on exogenous supplies of
laborers and money capital.
The essence of this primary accumulation is accordingly seen to consist, not simply in the
transfer of property from an old class to a new class, even if this involved concentration
of property into fewer hands, but the transfer of property from small owners to the
ascendant bourgeoisie and the consequent pauperization of the former. This fact, which is
so commonly ignored, is the justification of Marx’s preoccupation with the phenomena
like enclosures as the type-form of his “primitive accumulation”: an emphasis for which
he has often been criticized on the ground that this was one among numerous sources of
bourgeois enrichment. Enrichment alone, however, was not enough. It had to be
enrichment in ways which involved dispossession of persons several times more
numerous than those enriched. Actually, the boot of criticism should be on the other leg.
Those various factors in the process on which many writers have laid stress, such as
indebtedness, windfall profits, high rents and the gains of usury, could only exert a
decisive influence to the extent that they contributed to the divorce of substantial sections
of small producers from the means of production… (Dobb ,1947:185-186)

The emergence of the capital-labor relation requires both concentration of wealth in the
hands of emerging capitalists (transformed into money capital for investment as
productive capital) on the one hand and separation of a significant portion of the labor
force from means of production on the other hand. In Marx’s account of primitive
accumulation, therefore, there is an element of redistribution as well as separation. While
the classical Marxist writings on primitive accumulation have mainly emphasized the
aspect of separation, the contemporary debate—which I take up in the next chapter— on
primitive accumulation emphasizes the aspect of redistribution. Things get even more
completed when Marx includes within his notion of primitive accumulation processes as
diverse as wage-legislations, protectionist trade policies and public debt. This has
resulted in an extraordinarily varied application of the notion of primitive accumulation
guild system in the towns – and later, after having swallowed up the feudal system, it exists mainly in an
environment of peasants and artisans, that is to say in a system of simple commodity production both in
agriculture and trade. European capitalism is further surrounded by vast territories of non-European
civilisation ranging over all levels of development, from the primitive communist hordes of nomad
herdsmen, hunters and gatherers to commodity production by peasants and artisans. This is the setting for
the accumulation of capital.” (Luxemburg, 2003: 348)
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in latter Marxian literature. In our understanding, for Marx, “separation” of direct
producers from means of production constitutes the focal point of primitive
accumulation—but not because separation “explains” the emergence of capitalism.
Marx’s historical account clearly points to the many different processes that converged to
produce capitalism in England. Marx’s emphasis on separation is however consistent
with his unique focus on class relations in theorizing society—dispossession leads to
dissolution of existing non-capitalist class structures and the possible emergence of the
capitalist class structure.
In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as
levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but, above all, those moments when
great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and
hurled as free and “unattached” proletarians on the labour-market (Marx, 1912: 787)

At the same time, Marx’s use of class is non-essentialist, since class-effects of
dispossession alone cannot account for the rise of capitalism. That is precisely why Marx
refers to so many processes in accounting for the rise of capitalism. We understand his
extraordinary list of the “moments of primitive accumulation” as indicative of the
complexity of the overdetermined process of emergence of capitalism. It is regrettable,
however, that in referring to all the different identified processes—whose overdetermined
outcome was the emergence of English capitalism—as moments of primitive
accumulation, Marx sometimes appears to use the notion as standing for the process of
overdetermination itself rather than processes of dispossession which form only a subset
of the overdetermined totality.
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Marx’s Secret of the “So-called” Primitive Accumulation
Marx’s critique of primitive accumulation is centered on the notion of “dispossession”—
i.e. separation of direct producers from any property or control over means of production.
For Marx, this rupture of the unity of direct producers with means of production, under
certain conditions, precipitates an encounter between owners of capital on the one hand
and dispossessed, i.e. “free” laborers—“freed” of means of production and of noncapitalist class relations—on the other hand. This encounter is crucial for the emergence
of the capitalist fundamental class relation12
There are two sources of the proletariat—expropriation of direct producers from the
material conditions of independent production and differentiation among “ancient”
producers into wage-laborers and capitalists. The dispossession of direct producers could
take place due to market forces which lead to differential outcomes across a society of
“ancients” such that some lose out and turn into wage-laborers and others win and
emerge as capitalists. However, Marx focused more on dispossession due to forcible acts
of expropriation or separation, e.g. establishment of private property across commons,
eradication of customary rights or access to means of subsistence or creation of artificial
barriers to the union of direct producers and means of production. These instances of
expropriation or forced separation could be legal or illegal, backed by the state or purely
private actions. It could be also a direct or indirect, intended or unintended outcome of
economic policies of the state like taxation, public debt, protective trade policies etc. It
12

“The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process
which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms,
on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate
producers into wage-labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production.” (Marx, 1912: 786. Italics
mine)
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will be wrong to say that Marx considered “enclosures” as the only form of primitive
accumulation. Marx analyzed many different economic events and state policies in terms
of their effectivity on dispossession. For example, in the context of protectionist trade
policies, Marx writes that the “system of protection was an artificial means of
manufacturing manufacturers, of expropriating independent labourers, of capitalizing the
national means of production and subsistence….”(Marx, 1912: 830). The point is further
substantiated in the following quote from Marx where he discusses public debt and
taxation.
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As
with the stroke of an enchanter’s wand, it endows barren money with the power of
breeding and thus turns it into capital, without the necessity of its exposing itself to the
troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury…... As
the national debt finds its support in the public revenue, which must cover the yearly
payments for interest, &c., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement
of the system of national loans. The loans enable the government to meet extraordinary
expenses, without the tax-payers feeling it immediately, but they necessitate, as a
consequence, increased taxes. …. Modern fiscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on
the most necessary means of subsistence (thereby increasing their price), thus contains
within itself the germ of automatic progression………The destructive influence that it
exercises on the condition of the wage-labourer concerns us less however, here, than the
forcible expropriation, resulting from it, of peasants, artisans, and in a word, all elements
of the lower middle-class. (Marx, 1912:, 827-829)

The centrality of dispossession to Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation is
however best understood in the last chapter of Capital Vol.I, titled “The Modern Theory
of Colonisation” where Marx talks about the “secret discovered in the new world by the
Political Economy of the old world” (Marx,1912: 848). By colonies, Marx here refers to
USA, Australia etc. where immigrants colonized land, rather than people. In these
colonies, land was plenty and “every settler on it therefore can turn part of it into his
private property and individual means of production, without hindering the later settlers
in the same operation.”(Marx,1912: 842). Thus what was absent in the colonies was a
steady and secure supply of wage-laborers. New wage-laborers brought in as immigrants
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often quickly escaped the wage-relation and established themselves as ancient producers.
Thus, in the colonies, “property in money, means of subsistence, machines, and other
means of production, does not as yet stamp a man as a capitalist if there be wanting the
correlative—the wage-worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his own
free-will”(Marx, 1912: 839). Secondly, just as the separation of laborer from land is
incomplete, so is the separation of agriculture from industry. Social division of labor
cannot develop and neither can the internal market for capitalist products. Moreover, the
capitalists cannot depend on the production of the industrial reserve army to control
wages and impose discipline on the workers, since the laid-off worker, or even the illpaid worker may simply leave the labor market and establish his own private and
independent production. Thus a viable self-exploitative or ancient economy imposes
limits to the expansion or even emergence of capitalist production.
To ensure the supply of wage-laborers, this easy union of the laborer with the means of
production has to be dissolved or at least deferred. The “secret” of primitive
accumulation, suppressed in classical political economy13, is seen in all its nakedness in
the colonies, when, by Acts of the British parliament, the economy of the ancients in the
colonies is undermined by imposing an artificially high price on abundant land, defying
all laws of demand and supply. The high price of land forced the immigrant laborers to
work as wage-laborers for a long time before he could save enough money to buy a piece
of land and establish himself as an independent peasant. Thus the supply of wagelaborers was finally secured by undermining the non-capitalist mode of production.

13

“It is the great merit of E.G. Wakefield to have discovered, not anything new about the Colonies, but to
have discovered in the Colonies the truth as to the conditions of capitalist production in the mother
country”. (Marx, 1912: 839)
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Dispossession and the Conditions of Existence of the Capitalist Class Structure
Dispossession alone does not guarantee that the capitalist class structure will take hold.
Many other natural, economic, political and cultural conditions of existence are required
to stabilize capitalist production.14 For example, Marx argued that protectionist trade
policies were instrumental in securing the domestic market for emerging capitalists and
protecting it from competition with non-capitalist products in the market. But this point is
best substantiated with Marx’s discussion of legislations pertaining to conditions of
wage-labor in Britain during the emergence of capitalism. For capitalist production to be
viable, it is not only necessary that there exist dispossessed laborers, but that laborers are
subjugated to the extent that they yield surplus value for the capitalist.
It is not enough that the conditions of labour are concentrated in a mass, in the shape of
capital, at the pole of society, while at the other are grouped masses of men, who have
nothing to sell but their labour-power. Neither is it enough that they are compelled to sell
it voluntarily………………. The bourgeois, at its rise, wants and uses the power of the
state to “regulate” wages, i.e. to force them within the limits suitable for surplus-value
making, to lengthen the working day and to keep the labourer himself in the normal
degree of dependence. This is an essential element of the so-called primitive
accumulation. (Marx, 1912: 809)

Hence, Marx devotes considerable space to bloody legislations against labor including
laws related to wages as well as laws related to vagabondage. Perelman (2000) mentions
“Game Laws” in Britain that prevented the common people from hunting in the woods

14

“[E]xploitation cannot be reduced to the extraction of surplus value; it can be understood only if the
whole set of its concrete forms and conditions is treated as determinant. The whole set of these concrete
forms does indeed include the extraction of value, but it also includes the implacable constraints of the
labour process embedded in the process of production and, therefore, exploitation: the socio-economic
division and organization of labour; the length of the “working-day”, a notion peculiar to the capitalist
system, and therefore nowhere to be found before it; speed-up; compartmentalization; the material
conditions of the centralization of labour (the factory, the workshop); work-related accidents and illnesses;
the practice of forcing people to take jobs below or above their level of competence; and so on. And the
process of production must in turn (less one remain abstract) be conceived as a decisive moment in the
process of reproduction: the reproduction of the means of production, but also the reproduction of laborpower (family, housing, children, child-rearing, schooling, health, problems faced by the couple, by the
young people, etc.)—to say nothing of the other moment of the process of reproduction of labor-power,
which brings the state and its apparatuses (repressive, ideological, etc.) into play.” (Althusser, 2006:43-44)
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and thus securing any means of subsistence. E.P.Thompson (1967) brilliantly chronicles
the cultural interventions in the life of working people to orient them to the new work
regime under capitalism— symbolized in the ‘clock’ as the regulator and the measurer of
a new concept of work. While dispossession destroys alternative modes of subsistence for
the laborers and keeps them crucially dependent on wage-employment for securing their
necessities of life, yet further social processes are required for the creation of the new
class of wage-workers who could sustain the developing forces of production under
capitalism. A new subjectivity of labor has to be constructed such that
alienated/dispossessed labor not only accommodates the conditions of his
alienation/dispossession, but also over time, tend to view them as naturalized conditions
of labor, submitting to the compulsions of the same labor market which was created by
their expropriation from land.15 It is only then that the conditions for real subsumption of
labor16 are created.
Yet, dispossession has multiple effects in securing the conditions of existence of the
productive capitalist circuit, M − C − C′ − M′ —one of the reasons why dispossession
figures so prominently in Marx’s account of the rise of capitalism.
15

“Indeed living labour itself appears as alien vis-à-vis living labour capacity, whose labour it is, whose
own life’s expression [Lebensaussserung] it is, for it has been surrendered to capital in exchange for
objectified labour, for the product of labour itself. Labour capacity relates to its labour as an alien, and if
capital were willing to pay it without making it labour, it would enter the bargain with pleasure. Thus
labour capacity’s own labour is as alien to it—and it really is, as regards its direction etc.—as are material
and instrument. Which is why the product then appears to it as a combination of alien material, alien
instrument and alien labour—as alien property, and why, after production, it has become poorer by the life
forces expended, but otherwise begins the drudgery anew, existing as a mere subjective labour capacity
separated from the conditions of its life.” (Marx, 1973: 462-463, Italics in the original)
16
Marx makes a distinction between formal and real subsumption of labor. The immediate consequence of
primitive accumulation is formal subsumption of labor—separation allows the capitalists to unite
dispossessed labor power and means of production in an essentially unchanged labor process, but a
different fundamental class process. Real subumption of labor takes place when capitalists revolutionize
existing labor processes, requiring reorientation of the subjective relations of the workers to the conditions
of work. Marx identified formal subsumption with production of absolute surplus value and real
subsumption with production of relative surplus value and considered the latter to be the “true” capitalist
form.
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(Circuit of Productive Capital)

Dispossession—expropriation of peasants from their lands, establishment of private
property over commons, acquisitions of Church land etc.—directly enriched the emerging
capitalists through concentration of (landed) wealth, which could be converted into
profitable investment in capitalist industries. As a result of dispossession, direct
producers (peasants) divorced from means of production (land, primarily) become sellers
of that special commodity—labor power. On the other hand, once the peasants are
expropriated from the land, the agricultural raw materials which once served as means of
independent production now flow into the market as commodities sold by capitalist
farmers to the manufacturing capitalists. Thus, there is development and polarization of
the market for means of production and the market for labor power, which enables
transformation of capitalists’ money into constant and variable capital. Again,
dispossession directly creates the home market for V-goods produced by the capitalist
enterprises by robbing the direct producers of control or ownership over means of
production and hence means of independent subsistence. The subsistence of “freed”
laborers now depends on their employment in capitalist factories where they receive a
wage with which to buy their means of subsistence. The food items produced on land
from which they have been expropriated are now capitalist commodities, which they
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must purchase in the market. On the other hand, agriculture partly absorbs the products of
capitalist industry as C-goods in agricultural production. Thus emerges the home market
for the commodities produced in capitalist enterprises. Finally, dispossession creates the
dependence of the worker on the capitalist for subsistence. This dependence allows the
capitalists to impose their controls and disciplinary mechanisms on the workers,
transform the labor process and create conditions for real subsumption of labor.
The results of enclosures in England, which took place throughout the transition process,
were according to Marx, not only the creation of purely private property in agriculture,
but also the creation of a landless labour force, an expanded food supply to feed this
labour force, a home market for agricultural and manufacturing products, and the
concentration of landed wealth” (Lazonick, 1974: 5)

However, it needs to be emphasized, at the risk of repetition, that dispossession remains
central to Marx’s critique of primitive accumulation not because he thought it was the
only process by which the conditions of existence of the capitalist class process were
created, but because dispossession—though itself not a class process17— enables Marx to
inscribe class at the heart of primitive accumulation. This is of course a specific reading
of Marx, which animates the present work. Other readings are possible and exist within
the Marxian tradition. In later sections of this chapter, I will contrast my reading with
some of those alternative readings of Marx’s idea of primitive accumulation. Partly, the
proliferation of different readings is facilitated by the extraordinarily rich account of
primitive accumulation one finds in Vol.I of Capital. In contrast, the notes on “original
accumulation” in Grundrisse are restricted almost entirely to a theoretical elaboration of
the conditions of existence of capitalist production. Marx hardly deals with the concrete
history of primitive/original accumulation in Grundrisse, while he devotes considerable

17

By “class process”, we understand production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor. See
Resnick and Wolff (1987).
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space to conditions of existence—primarily forms of property relations—of non-capitalist
production, which have to be dissolved for capitalist production to prevail in any society.
I argue that if one reads Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation in Capital in
conjunction with his notes in Grundrisse, Marx’s own class-reading of primitive
accumulation emerges all the more clearly. Once we recognize class as the entry point for
Marx’s theoretical analysis, we can then understand how the complex interaction between
many different class and non-class processes—which Marx refers to as so many moments
of primitive accumulation in Capital—produced conditions of existence of capitalist
production on a considerable scale, while dispossession itself—partly determined by
those processes and partly determining them—constituted the moment of classtransformation.

An Essentialist Reading of Primitive Accumulation
I argued in the previous section that in his critique of the notion of primitive
accumulation, Marx contested the eternalized and naturalized representation of capitalism
in classical political economy. He achieved this by a) emphasizing the specificity of the
capitalist class process, distinguishing it from other non-capitalistic class processes
(ancient, feudal, communistic etc.) and b) historicizing and locating the rise to dominance
of the capitalist class process in a particular social formation, i.e. Britain, in the sixteenth
through the nineteenth century. In so doing, he criticized classical political economy for
failing to ‘see’ this transition from non-capitalism to capitalism in Western Europe18 and
18

“Political economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of private property, of which one rests
on the producers’ own labour, the other on the employment of the labour of others. It forgets that the latter
not only is the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on its tomb only. In Western Europe, the
home of Political Economy, the process of primitive accumulation is more or less accomplished……..To
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the class effects of primitive accumulation in such a transitional conjuncture. However,
several related epistemological issues can be raised in the context of an essentialist
reading of Marx.

The Teleology of Historical Materialism and the Universal Dominance of Capital

In historicizing primitive accumulation, Marx unfortunately also prepared the ground for
the subsumption of primitive accumulation to the Marxian theory of transition. The latter
is a product of essentialist Marxian historiography—which we know as “historical
materialism”—that periodizes history in terms of the dominant mode of production of a
society. In its most essentialist version, historical materialism claims that autodevelopment of the forces of production provides the motor force of history, forcing
those changes in relations of production and corresponding changes in the superstructure
that are best suited to the development of the forces of production. In its most teleological
version, historical materialism presents a certain law of linear succession of modes of
production culminating in communism—each succeeding mode of production being
more technologically advanced than the one before.
The dominant understanding of Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation, grounded in
historical materialism, runs as follows. Primitive accumulation precipitates an encounter
between owners of capital on the one hand and dispossessed laborers on the other hand.
Once created, capital reproduces this separation/ dispossession on an expanded scale. The
teleology inherent in the historical materialist framework leads to the conclusion that
this ready-made world of capital, the political economist applies the notions of law and of property
inherited from a pre-capitalist world with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction, the more
loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology”. (Marx, 1912: 838)
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primitive accumulation has a singular, irreversible outcome—it prepares the path for the
emergence of capitalism and the inevitable destruction of non-capitalist production based
on petty private property as well as communal property19. With the development of
capitalist production based on exploitation of wage-labor, with the real subsumption of
labor, the radical transformation of the labor process in capitalist production and
introduction of machinery, capitalist production creates the conditions for its final
victory.
Under these conditions the factory rules, and the days of handicraft, of independent
production, are numbered. What remains is carried on chiefly by unfortunates who cannot
find places in the factory system. (Kautsky, 1910: 17).

The assumption of continuous and irreversible development of forces of production
dictates that lower forms of production must yield to higher forms.20 Unlike an openended history of capital—which must recognize the contingency of any social
conjuncture—historical materialism presents a logical history of capital in which a) the
capitalist mode of production is superior to pre-capitalist modes in terms of the
development of the forces of production and therefore b) history is fated to unfold in
19

According to Marx, at the time of writing of Capital, in “Western Europe…the process of primitive
accumulation is more or less accomplished. Here the capitalist regime has either directly conquered the
whole domain of national production, or, where economic conditions are less developed it, at least,
indirectly controls those strata of society which, though belonging to the antiquated mode of production,
continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay.” (Marx,1912: 838)
20
“This [petty] mode of production pre-supposes parceling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of
production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation,
division of labor within each separate process of production, the control over and the productive application
of the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is
compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less
primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be…. “ to decree universal mediocrity”. At a certain stage of
development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. …….but the old social
organization fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the
transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of
the pigmy property of many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of people
from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful
expropriation of the masses of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital.” (Marx, 1912: 835,
italics mine)
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favor of capitalism so long as it supports the continuous development of the forces of
production. The historical journey through modes of production—rationally ordered by
developing forces of production—endows capital with a universal face. As a higher form
of production, capital is pre-destined to enfold the entire space of production by
dissolving the pre-capitalist “outside”.
If and whenever non-capitalist production appears within a capitalist social formation, the
dominant tendency within the Marxian tradition has been to treat it as a i) resilient precapitalist residue (in a conjuncture of ‘blocked’ transition), ii) a transitional feature or iii)
a non-capitalist articulation of the circuit of productive capital (for example, non-capital
as source of cheap labor-power and raw materials). Historical materialism does not
recognize radical differences at the level of the economic, or in other words, does not
admit any intrinsic limits of capital.

The Being-Becoming Distinction and the “Metaphysics of Full Presence”
In the scheme of historical materialism, primitive accumulation plays a very distinct role.
Primitive accumulation refers to those processes within a non-capitalist social formation
that produced the conditions of existence of the capitalist mode of production and thus
belongs to the pre-history of capital, or in Marx’s words, forms “the prelude to the history
of capital”. In so far as primitive accumulation is the condition of the arising or becoming
of capital, i.e. the historic presupposition of the capitalist class relation, it ceases to exist
once that relation has arisen.21
21

This Hegelian being-becoming distinction has dominated latter Marxist writings on primitive
accumulation. Marxists have generally tended to treat primitive accumulation as a concrete historical
process that has no theoretical bearing on the ontology of capital. The concept of “primitive accumulation”
has thus long come to be confined to the field of economic history, except occasional application in studies
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The conditions and presuppositions of the becoming, of the arising, of capital
presupposes precisely that it is not yet in being but merely in becoming; they therefore
disappear as real capital arises, capital which itself, on the basis of its own reality, posits
the conditions for its realization. (Marx 1973: 459)

According to this Hegelian understanding, primitive accumulation is the becoming of the
capitalist mode of production, which once become, can secure its conditions of existence
by itself, in accordance with its immanent laws. That is, capital-as-being is self-positing
(the profits of capital constitute new funds for investment), self-reproducing (expanded
reproduction based on mutual interaction between Departments I and II) and selfsubsisting (its natural, economic, political and cultural conditions of existence are secured
through payments out of the expanded surplus value possible in capitalist production).
Marx’s treatment of primitive accumulation is thus fraught with what Cullenberg and
Chakrabarty calls the “metaphysics of full presence”, i.e. a notion of capital as a “closed
totality” fully comprehensible in and by itself. Capital can exist and reproduce itself
independent of its “outside”—i.e. non-capital has no constitutive determination on
capital. Let me give two examples from Marx.
In the chapter titled “The General law of Capitalist Accumulation” in Vol. I of Capital,
Marx introduces the notion of relative surplus population and industrial reserve army and
these concepts help him develop a “law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of
production” (Marx, 1912:692-693). Marx argues that the industrial reserve army provides
a crucial condition of capitalist accumulation by securing additional supplies of wagelaborers when accumulation leads to a sudden increase in demand for laborers. Capitalist
accumulation does not have to depend on natural population growth for its supply of

of capitalism in developing economies, and that too only because it is assumed that the history of the rise of
capitalism in the West is replicated in the developing countries experiencing capitalist development.
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laborers22. Neither does it have to depend on external supplies of laborers, i.e. it does not
require dispossession to “free” laborers from non-capitalist class processes. The industrial
reserve army makes available for capitalists any additional supplies of workers needed
for rapid accumulation. The industrial reserve army itself is periodically replenished by a
rise in the organic composition of capital, which in turn is related to capitalist
accumulation and competition among capitalists. Thus capital-as-being secures its labor
power in accordance with its immanent laws of self-expansion. It is in this sense that the
industrial reserve army belongs “to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at
its own cost” (Marx, 1912: 693). It is otherwise during the transitional conjuncture.
Capital-in-arising secures its supplies of “free” proletariat from the “outside”—by
dispossessing direct producers in non-capitalist class structures.
Similarly, the “metaphysics of full presence” also pervades the distinction between
primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation in the Marxist literature. Capitalist
accumulation is the capitalization of surplus vale created in the capitalist fundamental
class process. In terms of the productive capitalist circuit M − C − C′ − M′ , the profit of the
capitalist is equal to M′ − M . When a part of this profit is converted into additional
constant and variable capital—thus leading to expansion of capitalist production—
capitalist accumulation takes place. Primitive accumulation, on the other hand, is
appropriation of existing means of production (say, land) previously employed in noncapitalist production. Thus, capital-as-being creates its own wealth once it is born, while
capital arises by appropriation of wealth outside it, i.e. by fraud and robbery.

22

“Capitalist production can by no means content itself with the quantity of disposable labor-power which
the natural increase of population yields. It requires for its free play an industrial reserve army independent
of these natural limits” (Marx, 1912: Pg 696).
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One consequence of this essentialist reading of Marx is that the notion of primitive
accumulation is exorcised from Marxian political economy, since Marxian theoretical
categories are not deployed in producing an understanding of the notion. In so far as
primitive accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capital, it has no bearing on the
ontology of capital. It belongs to the dark realm of force, which is not a category of
Marxian thought. Though the notion of primitive accumulation was deployed by Marx to
bring in class in the writing of a history of capitalism, the notion itself is not constituted
by the categories of class. This is the symptom of an essentialist reading—the cause is
always untainted by the effect.

The Return of the Primitive: Contemporary Debates, Contested Meanings
In this section, I engage with the contemporary debate on primitive accumulation, which,
I argue, makes significant theoretical departures from the classical Marxian position on
primitive accumulation. To identify the theoretical significance of the contemporary
debate, I strategically engage with the essentialist Marx, portraying it as the Marx. In this
section, I emphasize the distinctiveness of contemporary positions vis-a-vis the
essentialist Marxian position on primitive accumulation and articulate the theoretical
issues posed in the contemporary debate within the essentialist problematic of primitive
accumulation. However, the very formulation of the problems—the way I formulate it,
even if within the essentialist problematic—is purposive. It is meant to produce nothing
less than a rupture in the essentialist problematic, making way for the emergence of a
non-essentialist understanding of primitive accumulation, which I put forward in the next
chapter.
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The contemporary debate23 on primitive accumulation has rescued the notion from its
marginal position in the Marxian discourse and placed it right at the heart of
contemporary capitalism. But more importantly, the contemporary debate has also
displaced the notion from its familiar terrain and posed new theoretical problems—partly
articulated, partly latent—before the Marxian tradition. Let us take a last look at the
classical terrain of primitive accumulation before we leave it. Primitive accumulation
belongs to the transitional conjuncture that produces capitalism. It is a historical
convergence of many different processes, out of which emerges the system of capitalist
production—most importantly, the incipient social classes of capitalists and wagelaborers themselves. The crux of primitive accumulation—what Marx referred to as the
“secret” of primitive accumulation—was the processes of dispossession that produced
“free” laborers on one side and enriched the ascendant capitalists on the other. By
dissolving the unity of direct producers with the means of production, by enabling the
transformation of means of production and labor-power into commodities and finally by
enabling the transformation of these commodities into elements of constant and variable
capital, dispossession created the essential conditions of existence of the “productive”
capitalist class relation. Once capitalist production has socially consolidated itself, it
23

My engagement with the contemporary literature is selective. See Footnote 26. I leave out some
traditions of critical thought that have direct or indirect bearing on the Marxist discourse on primitive
accumulation. For example, I leave out—given the scope of the present essay—the feminist deployment of
the concept of primitive accumulation. Feminist critics have pointed out the transformation of women into
house-wives as an act of primitive accumulation by which women are “separated from their work and
production means, their culture, their knowledge, and their skills, and from control over their own labor and
even their bodies because of their reproductive capacities” (Werholf, 2000: 731). See Mies (1986), Federici
(2004) and Glassman (2006). Another critical tradition—the post-development school (Sachs, 1992;
Latouche, 1993; Escobar, 1995; Rahneman and Bawtree, 1997)—has increasingly brought attention to what
they call development-induced displacement. Escobar (2004) equates “displacement” with modernity per se
and identifies “development” as the exemplary project of modernization. Development projects in the third
world, including construction of dams, highways, power plants etc. by the government involved large-scale
displacement and eviction of traditional communities. See Perspectives (2008) for such displacement in
India.
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maintains and expands the “separation” of the direct producers from means of
production, by dissolving the pre-capitalist outside and conquering the terrain of social
production. The notion of “primitive accumulation” applies to the initial24 separation of
direct producers from means of production on a scale large enough for capitalism to
emerge and involved private and state acts of violence and coercion. Primitive
accumulation thus belongs to the pre-history of capital in so far as it secures “initial”
conditions of existence for capitalist production, while the latter, once born, can secure
the same conditions through normal economic processes peculiar to capitalism itself,
without involving force or any extra-economic state power.
Marx—as well as those after him, who more or less confined themselves to the classical
context of primitive accumulation25—bequeathed a notion of primitive accumulation that
is historicist (primitive accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capital) and a notion of
self-subsistent capital that is autonomous of its “outside” (capital can fully secure its
conditions within itself). The contemporary debate on primitive accumulation26 breaks
new grounds within the Marxian tradition in two ways. First, some of the contemporary
Marxists view primitive accumulation as an ongoing process and not as a process limited
to the transitional conjuncture leading to the establishment of capitalism. According to
these Marxists, primitive accumulation is a process that secures crucial conditions for the
reproduction and expansion of the capitalist mode of production. Second, some of the
Marxist authors explicitly reject the idea of a purely internal reproduction of the capitalist
24

De Angelis (2001) calls it ex novo separation.
See Kautsky (1910, 1925), Lenin (1967), Dobb (1947), Lazonick (1974).
26
See Niggle (1995), Perelman (2000), Werlhof (2000), De Angelis (2001), Harvey (2003, 2006), Arrighi
(2004) Glassman (2006), Andreasson(2006), Sanyal (2007), Basu(2007), etc.. In particular, see the
September, 2001 issue of The Commoner (available at http://www.commoner.org.uk/index.php?p=5). Also
see Historical Materialism, 14(4), 2006, especially the contributions by Robert Brenner, Sam Ashman,
Alex Callinicos and David Harvey.
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system. Instead, they argue that capitalist production requires a non-capitalist space
outside it for its reproduction—an “outside” that is marked by the violence of primitive
accumulation. Despite these important theoretical contributions, in my reading,
contemporary interventions largely fail to escape the essentialist logic or to retain the
class-perspective that Marx uniquely brought to bear on the study of capitalism.
The contemporary literature on primitive accumulation can be read in many different
ways. The reading I offer is of course motivated by the theoretical objective of this
dissertation—to produce a non-essentialist (class) focused Marxian notion of primitive
accumulation. This purposive reading enables me to identify the two distinct ‘departures’
mentioned above—namely, the understanding of primitive accumulation as an ongoing
process and the recognition of an “outside” of capital. Once we accept primitive
accumulation as an ongoing process within capitalism, we have to further specify how
primitive accumulation is related to the process of accumulation of capital. Similarly,
once we recognize an “outside” of capital, we must investigate how capital is related to
this theoretical “outside. Therefore, I locate various contributions to the contemporary
debate as distinct theoretical positions on these two questions.
Accumulation and Dispossession
The first departure constitutes a novel intervention in Marxian political economy because
it locates primitive accumulation right at the heart of the dynamics of capitalism. The
contemporary debate constitutes a “break” from the Marxian tradition which understands
primitive accumulation as a historical process and which, therefore has, so far, restricted
all reference to primitive accumulation to capitalist development in the third world
where, it was argued, the transition to capitalism is yet to be “completed”. In contrast,
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contemporary critics argue that primitive accumulation takes place even in social
formations where the capitalist class process has long been dominant.27 To substantiate
their view, these authors draw from Marx’s rich analysis of primitive accumulation in
Capital Vol. I. In particular they draw attention to the many different processes Marx
referred to as moments of primitive accumulation and conclude that ‘[a]ll the features of
primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within
capitalism’s historical geography up to now’ (Harvey,2003: 145).
According to these authors, privatization—which has been vigorously unleashed in
developed as well as developing countries in the last three decades of “neoliberal”
capitalism—is considered an outstanding example of primitive accumulation. The
significant presence of the state in production and distribution of economic goods and
services, supported by particular political institutions and cultural norms that were
erected in welfare-states of richer countries, had created social “commons” that are now
being destroyed by commoditization and privatization under what is referred to as
“neoliberal capitalism” (De Angelis, 2001; Harvey, 2003, 2006)28. Outside the developed
world, the integration of former Soviet Bloc countries and China to global capitalist
relations constitutes an act of “primitive accumulation” in the classical sense in so far as
huge assets are transferred from the state sector to the (global) private capitalist sector
(Harvey, 2003). Basu (2007) draws a direct parallel between English enclosures of the
27

“The disadvantage of these assumptions [in the traditional understanding of primitive accumulation] is
that they relegate accumulation based on predation, fraud, and violence to an ‘original stage’ that is
considered no longer relevant or, as with Luxemburg, as being somehow ‘outside of’ capitalism as a closed
system.” (Harvey, 2003: 144)
28
“The rolling back of regulatory frameworks designed to protect labour and the environment from
degradation has entailed the loss of rights. The reversion of common property rights won through years of
hard class struggle (the right to a state pension, to welfare, to national health care) into the private domain
has been one of the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of neoliberal
orthodoxy. All of these processes amount to the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the
private and class-privileged domains”. (Harvey ,2006: 153)
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17th and 18th century and forcible acquisition of farmland by the Indian government for
setting up of Special Economic Zones in the last decade29. However, Harvey (2003,
2006) argues that novel forms of privatization emerged and consolidated under
neoliberalism.
The corporatization, commodification and privatization of hitherto public assets has been
a signal feature of the neoliberal project. Its primary aim has been to open up new fields
for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to the calculus of
profitability. Public utilities of all kinds (water, telecommunications, transportation),
social welfare provision (social housing, education, health care, pensions), public
institutions (such as universities, research laboratories, prisons) and even warfare (as
illustrated by the ‘army’ of private contractors operating alongside the armed forces in
Iraq) have all been privatized to some degree throughout the capitalist world (Harvey,
2006: 153)

Similarly, Andreasson (2006) points to an expanding sphere of dispossession based on an
extension of private property regimes not only by traditional means, but also, and
increasingly so, by more sophisticated and novel means like “intellectual property
rights”30.
Harvey’s influential and provocative account of “accumulation by dispossession” —a
term he prefers to “primitive accumulation”— remains at the center of the contemporary
debate. In Harvey’s understanding, the operations of “accumulation by dispossession”
exceed the sphere of privatization. For example, the operations of financial markets—
characterized by speculation, fraud and predation—facilitate large-scale redistribution of
wealth in favor of global corporate capital.

29

These SEZs are literally described as “foreign territory” outside the purview of the laws of the country.
Business enterprises in SEZs are exempt from tax and other financial payments to the state in the same way
that owners of enclosed land in England were spared all their obligations to the state. Further, labor laws
are relaxed in these SEZs to allow increased exploitation of labor—enhancing coercive power of the
capitalists vis-à-vis workers and constituting new versions of “bloody legislations” against labor.
According to Foreign Trade Policy (2004-09) of India,, ‘SEZ is a specifically delineated duty free enclave
and shall be deemed to be foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations, duties and tariffs’
(Government of India, 2004: §7.1).
30
Also see Harvey (2006), Basu (2008). Boyle (2002) refers to "the enclosure of the intangible commons of
the mind" as the “new kind of enclosure movement”.
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Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset
stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency
that reduced whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt
peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension
funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock
manipulations – all of these became central features of the capitalist financial system
(Harvey, 2006: 154)

Further, the “neoliberal” state itself engages in redistributive policies— from lower
income to upper income social classes as also from public to private domains—through
privatization but also through tax incentives and subsidies to business coupled with a
reduction in social expenditure. Internationally, carefully manipulated debt traps (Latin
American countries in the 1980s and 1990s) and financial crises (Asian crisis in 19971998) have resulted in transfer of wealth from poorer to richer countries. Crises lead to
devaluation of assets, which are subsequently seized by corporate capital. Nation-states
and international organizations like World Bank, IMF etc. work in tandem to enable
“accumulation of dispossession” through careful management of crises.
These authors, who argue that primitive accumulation is an ongoing process integrated to
the processes of accumulation of capitalism, have taken up a variety of theoretical
positions. Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation combined both the aspects of
redistribution (enrichment) and dispossession (separation). However, for Marx, in the
context of classical transition, the emphasis was on enrichment as a means of separation.
Contemporary positions can be distinguished on the basis of relative emphasis placed on
either of these two aspects of primitive accumulation. De Angelis (2001), for example,
argues that “separation” of the direct producers from the means of production is a central
category of Marx’s theory and pervades the entire space of capital. According to De
Angelis, both capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation can be understood in
terms of the category of separation. Primitive accumulation is the ex novo production of
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the separation while capitalist accumulation is the reproduction of separation on a greater
scale. The crucial point De Angelis emphasizes is that capitalist accumulation is, in the
final analysis, a reproduction of capital-labor relation itself—on an expanded scale. For
capitalist accumulation, it’s crucial not only to maintain initial “separation”, but also raise
it to a higher degree. De Angelis goes on to say that “the difference between
accumulation and primitive accumulation, not being a substantive one, is a difference in
the conditions and forms in which this separation is implemented” (De Angelis, 2001: 5).
Harvey’s concept of “accumulation by dispossession” focuses more on the “enrichment”
aspect than on the “separation” aspect—prompting Brenner (2006) to argue that Harvey’s
position is closer to Smith’s (“enrichment” or previous accumulation of stock) than
Marx’s (“separation” or creation of “free” labor power). In fact, Harvey seems to focus
more on separation as a means of enrichment, contrary to Marx.
If the main achievements of neoliberalism have been redistributive rather than generative,
then ways had to be found to transfer assets and redistribute wealth and income either
from the mass of the population towards the upper classes or from vulnerable to richer
countries. (Harvey, 2006: 153)

A position somewhat similar to Harvey’s but with a rather distinctive theoretical
articulation is found in Basu (2007, 2008). Basu argues that through primitive
accumulation, global capital acquires exclusive control over markets, resources of
production etc. By virtue of these exclusive property rights, global capital occupies the
position of a landlord (or any monopolist owner of conditions of production) who earns
“ground rent” by providing access to such monopolized item. Dispossession does not
necessarily imply an expansion of capitalist class structure. Capital might well leave
production outside itself while securing ground rent from such a non-capitalist production
space by providing access to monopolized means of production used in it.
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Sanyal (2007) articulates a third position in the context of postcolonial capitalist
development. He argues that capitalist accumulation includes the moment of primitive
accumulation. But primitive accumulation may not lead to an exploitative relation—
capitalist class exploitation based on appropriation of surplus value from wage-laborers—
but to the emergence of a “surplus” labor force dispossessed yet excluded from the
capitalist class relations. Political conditions for continued capitalist accumulation then
require that the “surplus” population be addressed in terms of welfarist governance—
which takes the form of specific interventions to ensure livelihoods for the excluded labor
force and requires a flow of surplus from the domain of capital to its outside to re-unite
excluded labor with means of production in subsistence economic activities. Thus
conditions of existence of capitalist accumulation are secured through two simultaneous
and contradictory processes—primitive accumulation, which enables a flow of means of
production from the non-capitalist space to the capitalist space, and welfarist governance
that necessitates a flow of surplus31 in the reverse direction. In Sanyal, both the aspects of
enrichment and separation are important because together they account for a basic
inescapable dualism in the postcolonial economy—the dualism between the capitalist and
the non-capitalist sub-economies. However, both enrichment and separation are
contradictory moments in Sanyal. Redistribution of means of production in favor of
capitalists—the substance of primitive accumulation— is contradicted by the transfer of
surplus value from the capitalist to the non-capitalist economy enabling the latter to gain
31

From a class-analytic point of view, strictly speaking, there cannot be a flow of surplus from one classstructure to another. What Sanyal means is that surplus value appropriated by the capitalists may be taxed
by the state to provide some of the conditions of existence of non-capitalist class processes and the noncapitalist appropriators of surplus then receive such benefits from the state as non-class revenues.
Alternatively, the capitalists may themselves use a part of the surplus value appropriated within the
capitalist fundamental class process to provide certain conditions of existence of non-capitalist enterprises
without involving the state.
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some access to means of production. The dispossession of non-capitalist producers—the
effect of primitive accumulation—is contradicted by the subsequent re-unification of
dispossessed producers with means of production, within the non-capitalist economy,
under welfarist governance.
The dominant32 tendency in the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation is to
emphasize the predatory as opposed to the (class) exploitative face of capital. Predatory
capital seizes the resources that act as means and conditions of non-capitalist production,
whereas (class) exploitative capital seizes the dispossessed non-capitalist producers and
transform them into wage-laborers in order to pump surplus value out of them. According
to the classical Marxian position, primitive accumulation creates the institution of wagelabor market, which is a condition of existence of the capitalist fundamental class
process. The contemporary literature points to a new problematic—how primitive
accumulation can be understood independent of its labor-market effects.

The Limits of Capital
Let us now turn to the second critique of the traditional notion of primitive accumulation
thrown up in the contemporary debate. What emerges in the contemporary debate is
recognition of the “limits of capital”—the constraints on the self-reproduction of capital.
Central to the contemporary debate on primitive accumulation is the notion of the
“outside”33. The “outside” is the non-capitalist social space (economy, politics and
culture) in a capitalist social formation. There are at least three different notions of the
“outside” in the contemporary literature. First, there is the given “outside” of capital—for
32
33

Exceptions are De Angelis (2001), Kawashima (2005), Chandra and Basu (2007) etc.
Harvey (2003), De Angelis (2006), Sanyal (2007)
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example, non-capitalist production spaces based on surviving traditional community
rights over means of production and subsistence, the peasants’ continued attachment to
land etc. Second, there is the “outside” that is a product of resistance to capital. This
notion of a resistant “outside” includes state welfare institutions created under public
pressure to provide direct use-values to the citizens, “commons” created by radical
communities, squatter settlements or slums in urban metropolises that are also production
hubs of mainly self-employed producers, legal barriers to exploitation achieved through
militant workers’ movements etc34.
The third notion of “outside” is more complicated—since it requires us to recognize that
capital may actively produce this outside as a result of its own development. Capital may
not be able to secure its conditions of existence internally. Capital may require a
facilitative “outside” to stabilize itself, particularly in moments of crisis of reproduction.
In this sense, capital may even manufacture it, “create” the “outside” at one point only to
destroy it at another point when capital hits its own limits. As Brenner observes, “ what
makes the primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession such essential
concepts is precisely the implied recognition that capital is powerfully limited in the
degree to which it can create the conditions for its own expansion”(Brenner,2006: 99100, Italics mine). This “outside” itself provides conditions for capitalist accumulation.
According to Harvey (2003),

34

“The entitlements and rights guaranteed by the post-war welfare state for example, can be understood as
the institutionalisation in particular forms of social commons. Together with high growth policies, the
implementation of full employment policies and the institutionalisation of productivity deals, the welfare
state was set to accommodate people's expectations after two world wars, the Soviet revolution, and a
growing international union movement. Therefore, the global current neoliberal project, which in various
ways targets the social commons created in the post war period set itself as a modern form of enclosure,
dubbed by some as “new enclosures” (DeAngelis, 2001:19).
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capitalism necessarily and always creates its own ‘other’. The idea that some sort of
‘outside’ is necessary therefore has relevance. But capitalism can either make use of
some pre-existing outside…….or it can actively manufacture it…….capitalism always
requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of
overaccumulation. If those assets, such as empty land or new raw material sources, do not
lie to hand, then capitalism must somehow produce them (Harvey (2003: 141,143),
italics mine)

In Harvey’s analysis, capitalism in advanced countries has been undergoing a crisis of
profitability since the 1970s. The dominant strategy to overcome the crisis, according to
Harvey, has been primitive accumulation because “[w]hat accumulation by dispossession
does it to release a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some cases
zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn
them to profitable use” (Harvey, 2003: 149). In contrast, Sanyal argues that Marxist
theorists have generally located the articulation of capital with its “outside” at the level of
the economic. Instead, he argues that the “outside” may simply be non-functional for the
economic reproduction of the capitalist economy. The logic of the articulation of capital
and its “outside”, in that case, has to be located at the level of the political and the
ideological/cultural.
There is a long lineage of all three notions of “outside” in the Marxist literature.35 Rosa
Luxemburg’s under-consumptionist theory of the capitalist mode of production famously
argued for the necessity of a non-capitalist space for the realization of the surplus
component of the value of a capitalist commodity. Though her theoretical arguments
have been challenged and contradicted by latter Marxists, her idea that a purely internal
reproduction of capital is impossible remains influential. Lenin’s theory of imperialism
provided another role of the “outside” as the absorber of ‘surplus’ capital of the

35

See Bradby (1975) for a detailed discussion of the various Marxist positions mentioned here.
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imperialist countries— where ‘surplus’ capital refers to a situation where it is relatively
unprofitable to invest within the capitalist economy due to a falling rate of profit, thus
necessitating an outward flow of capital to non-capitalist colonies36. Some writers like
Meillassoux (1972) and Wolpe(1972) argued that a non-capitalist “outside” is required to
cheapen the value of labor power in so far as a part of the reproduction costs of labor
power is borne by the “outside”.
Irrespective of whether the “outside” is resistant, facilitative or both at the same time, the
resilience of the “outside” gives primitive accumulation its enduring character. Primitive
accumulation is unleashed either i) to overcome the resistance the “outside” poses to the
reproduction of capital or ii) to secure the conditions of reproduction and expansion of
capitalist class processes by appropriating the space of the “outside”, whenever it is
impossible to do so internally. It is in this sense that primitive accumulation is crucial not
only for the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, but also in securing the
conditions of its reproduction. The recognition of a resilient “outside” forces the Marxian
theorist to accept the inescapable and indissoluble heterogeneity of the economy. At the
same time, the notion of universal capital that underpinned classical Marxian ontology of
capital makes way for a notion of capital that must negotiate with its “outside” in order to
secure its conditions of reproduction. The theoretical challenge before the Marxian
tradition is, therefore, to produce an understanding of primitive accumulation that
accounts for the reproduction of both capital and its “outside”.

36

Harvey’s use of the notion of “outside” takes as a point of departure the Luxemburg thesis, though he
locates the problematic of the “outside” in the context of over-accumulation of capital rather than the
under-consumption problem. In this sense Harvey’s argument is closer to Lenin’s.
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The contemporary literature has helped clear a new theoretical field for situating the
problem of primitive accumulation, even if the delineation of the field remains
ambiguous. I have so far placed and pitted contemporary positions against the classical
Marxian view, showing how the boundaries of the essentialist Marxian problematic are
stretched and strained by contemporary interventions and how the cracks in the walls
allow us a peek into what lies beyond. In this section I offer a critical reading of the
debate from a non-essentialist Marxian standpoint. Specifically, I try to identify the
elements of continuity and discontinuity between the classical and the contemporary
views on primitive accumulation.

The Essentialist Trappings of the Contemporary Debate
The contemporary debate brings together quite a number of disparate theoretical
positions on primitive accumulation. Given the limits of the present dissertation, it is not
possible to bring out the nuances of all the different theoretical positions. What is of
interest to us, however, is to understand to what extent contemporary interventions break
away from the essentialism of the classical view of primitive accumulation. Some of the
positions, Harvey’s and Sanyal’s in particular, problematize the process of reproduction
of capitalism. In my understanding, their main contribution is the foregrounding of the
notion of an inescapable “other” or “outside” of capital, which allows them to theorize
primitive accumulation as a process constitutive of capitalist production. Does this
theoretical move—the recognition of an inescapable “outside” of capital—constitute an
exit from the essentialist ontology of capitalism? Before I answer this question, I must
make clear what I mean by an essentialist ontology of capitalism.
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As I have already argued, the essentialist framework of historical materialism consists of
a chain of reductionist arguments. All non-economic aspects of the society are reduced to
the economic, the economy itself is reduced to the class structure and the class structure
is reduced to the forces of production—which, in the last instance, is the essence of all
processes. Particular manifestations of reductionist arguments abound in the essentialist
Marxian literature. In Chapter I, I have already uncovered strains of essentialist thinking
in Marx’s own writings. Here I try to understand how the “outside” is accommodated
within the essentialist problematic.
Historical materialism breeds an image of universal capital. Since the capitalist mode of
production enables and pre-capitalist modes of production constrain further development
of forces of production, the former is pre-destined to dissolve the latter on the basis of its
economic superiority. Historical materialism thus predicts a teleological dissolution of
the pre-capitalist “outside”.37 Marxian theories, when they do recognize the heterogeneity
of the economy, often tend to view such heterogeneity as functional to the reproduction
of the prevalent (capitalist) class structure. In these capitalocentric38 theories noncapitalist class relations may be reproduced alongside capitalist class relations within a
social formation, where the reproduction of the non-capitalist “outside” is explained by
the particular roles it plays in the reproduction of capitalist mode of production. For
example, it is argued that the non-capitalist “outside” exists because it cheapens the value
37

It is often assumed that such dissolution has been completed in developed countries. Thus developed
countries (Japan, West European countries, North American countries etc.) are predominantly represented
as fully capitalist. Societies in developing countries, on the other hand, are yet to achieve full and universal
capitalism even where capitalist mode of production is dominant. It is quite possible that non-capitalist
modes of production may survive or even emerge in these social formations. However the existence of noncapitalist production is explained by lower rates of accumulation of productive capitalist accumulation in
these societies (Baran (1957). In course of time, if capitalist accumulation picks up and continues long
enough, the developing societies will also achieve universal capitalism. Thus, the development of the
economy is reduced to the development of the forces of production.
38
See Gibson-Graham and Ruccio (2001) for a critique of “capitalocentrism”.
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of labor power, reinforces the “reserve army of labor”, acts as vent for over-accumulated
capital etc39. In this view, the capitalist mode of production is not constituted by its
“outside”—it unfolds according to principles of change internal to it, i.e. the development
of the capitalist mode is purely endogenous. However, the capitalist mode of production
constitutes the “outside”; i.e., the “outside” develops in response to ‘capital’s needs’.40
The capitalist class structure then serves as the essence of a social formation and other
class structures in the social formation are “explained” as its effects. Capital serves as the
cause of itself and its “outside”, in other words, the social formation itself. These theories
often also admit the theoretical possibility—even the inevitability, in the long run—of a
“full” capitalism41. Any deviations from “full capitalism” are then explained as effects of
the capitalist mode of production itself. What is important for us to note is that the
economy, in this case, is reduced to the prevalent capitalist class structure.
I have argued before that the essentialist logic of historical materialism endows the
capitalist mode of production with its self-subsistent character. Self-subsistent capital is
explained by the essence of history—the developing forces of production. If developing
forces of production render pre-capitalist modes of production obsolete and their
dissolution inevitable, then capitalist mode of production has to be self-subsistent in order
to supersede pre-capital. Thus, full transition logically requires that capital be selfsubsistent. This logocentric notion of capital—an image of capital untainted by its
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The “outside”, according to this theoretical position, exists because capital “needs” it, either to secure
markets for final products or sources of means of production (Luxemburg, 2003), or new fields of
profitable investment (Lenin, 1916; Harvey, 2003), or a reserve army of labor (Kawashima, 2005; Chandra
and Basu, 2007), or sources of cheap labor power (Wolpe, 1972; Meillasoux, 1972).
40
See Sanyal(2007) for a critique of ‘capital’s need’-based arguments.
41
See the discussion of Pierre-Philippe Rey in Bradby (1975).
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outside, the idea of capital as a pure and full category—holds that capital can secure its
conditions of existence by itself, independent of its “outside”.
The argument that capital needs an “outside” for its reproduction does not undermine the
notion of self-subsistent capital. It is important to recognize that the notion of selfsubsistent capital is compatible with the notion of a resilient “outside” as long as the
“outside” is structurally subsumed to the needs of capital. Self-subsistent capital can
secure its conditions of existence in a world of difference. For example, capitalocentric
Marxian theories hold that non-capitalist modes of production are created, maintained or
dissolved by the capitalist mode of production in accordance with its specific needs. Such
an “outside” is a derived “other” of the capitalist mode of production and hence belongs
fully to the latter. A classic example of such an “outside” is the reserve army of labor,
which is outside the capitalist class structure and yet fully subjugated to the rhythms of
the latter. As I have argued in Chapter I, the “reserve army of labor” is considered by
Marx to be the product of self-subsistent capital.42 In fact, it is the “reserve army of
labor” that makes capital self-subsistent with respect to its requirements of labor-power,
since capital does not have to depend on natural increase in labor force or non-capitalist
economies for its requirements of labor power. Capitalocentric theories retain the notion
of self-subsistent capital. Going further, I argue that the notion of self-subsistent capital
serves as the basis of capitalocentric explanations of the social totality.
A stronger version of self-subsistence holds that the capitalist mode of production, once it
has taken hold, can reproduce itself entirely at the economic level, independent of extraeconomic (political or cultural) interventions. Reproduction and expansion of the
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Sanyal (2007) argues this point extensively.
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capitalist mode of production are fully secured in and through economic processes like
production and distribution of surplus value, exchange processes, investments in new
technology, accumulation and competition, etc. Neither force nor coercion, particularly
that exercised by the state, are required for expanded reproduction of self-subsistent
capital. It is otherwise during the arising of capital, when violence and coercion was
instrumental in securing the ascendance and prevalence of capital. Thus, it is fairly
common among Marxists to distinguish primitive accumulation (which applies to the
arising of capital) as an extra-economic process and capitalist accumulation (which
applies to self-subsistent capital that has already arisen) as an economic process.
I now take up three different authors who, in their contemporary works on primitive
accumulation, have offered the notion of an inescapable “outside” of capital. An
inescapable “outside” resists any final dissolution and is thus a constitutive site of
capitalism. This notion of the “outside” stands in contrast to the historicist notion—precapitalist modes of production—prevalent in the Marxian tradition. Secondly, the
inescapability of the “outside” also signals the impossibility of universal capital. I now
pose the following question—how far does this theoretical move go in inscribing radical
differences on the economic?
Harvey’s notion of the “outside”—as I have already pointed out—belongs to the strand of
Marxian thought that stresses the inherent obstacles to a purely internal reproduction of
capital43. For Harvey, the impossibility of internal reproduction of capital stems from
what he considers the fundamental problem of capitalism—the tendency towards
overaccumulation of capital (Harvey (2003). For valorization of overaccumulated capital,
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See Luxemburg (2003) and Lenin (1916).
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new areas of profitable investment have to be secured. This is where “accumulation by
dispossession” comes in. Accumulation by dispossession enables overaccumulated
capital to secure “cheap” assets from the “outside” and use them as productive or
unproductive capital to generate profits. But since surplus capital can be profitably
employed only by producing/appropriating greater surplus, the problem of
overaccumulation keeps coming back. This is because, “if surplus capital moves from A
to B in a desperate search for profitable outlets, then at some point B will become a
producer of surplus capital”(Harvey, 2006:162). Therefore, capitalism continuously
needs to create its “outside” in order to overcome the problem of overaccumulation.
There are two instances of reductionist arguments here. First, the contradictory process of
reproduction of the capitalist class process is reduced to a single aspect of the
contradiction—namely, overaccumulation. Second, Harvey contests the idea of universal
capital, but presents a capitalocentric notion of the “outside” and hence retains the notion
of self-subsistent capital, in the sense I have discussed before. Capital creates its
“outside” in order to dissolve it in moments of overaccumulation. Thus the “outside” is
subsumed to the laws of capitalist mode of production. Therefore, the far-reaching
theoretical implications of positing an “outside”, which is constitutive of the capitalist
class process, are lost on Harvey as soon as he subscribes to a capitalocentric concept of
the “outside”. The centered social totality in Harvey’s analysis—centered on the notion
of self-subsistent capital—ultimately reinforces the hegemonic representation of
capitalism as a social system fully subsumed to the imperatives of capital; what gets
suppressed is that other notion of capitalism as a social formation fractured by the
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contradictions between a capitalist economy and its radical outsides44. Hence, in
Harvey’s analysis, anti-capitalist resistance becomes an external intervention, bereft of
any materiality in the body economic.
Sanyal (2007) dislodges the notion of primitive accumulation from the transition
framework, confronting, in the process, the underlying Hegelian categories of being and
becoming. Sanyal argues that in the Hegelian reading of Marx, capital in being is selfsubsistent capital. However, Sanyal criticizes the Marxian tradition for embracing an
economistic notion of self-subsistence—i.e. the notion that capital becomes selfsubsistent when it can secure its economic conditions of existence internally. Sanyal
argues that political and cultural conditions of existence45 are left outside the definition of
self-subsistence—the implicit assumption being that “when capital’s economic conditions
of existence are created and can be reproduced, the political and ideological conditions of
existence are automatically ensured” (Sanyal, 2007:59). According to Sanyal, it is quite
possible that capital is self-subsistent at the economic level and yet fails to be so at the
political and cultural levels. Postcolonial capital in India can secure its political-cultural
conditions of existence only by positing a non-capitalist “outside” and thus “ceases to be
self-subsistent even though it is capable of creating and reproducing its economic
conditions of existence on its own” (Sanyal, 2007:59) 46. However, as soon as the
“outside” is constituted, as soon as means of production get ‘locked’ in non-capitalist
44

See Gibson-Graham, J.K. and David Ruccio (2001) for the politics of decentering capitalism.
Sanyal poses the question in the context of postcolonial India, where he argues that the political and
cultural conditions of existence of capital have to be secured within a functioning formal democracy and
within a cultural space dominated by discourses of “human rights” and “basic needs”.
46
In Sanyal’s understanding, the non-capitalist “outside” emerges in order to meet political-cultural
exigencies of primitive accumulation. To distance his position from capital’s needs-based arguments,
Sanyal makes a careful distinction between those non-capitalist production units tied to the circuit of capital
through subcontracting and putting-out relations (“informalization within the accumulation economy”) and
those that are constituted by “developmental governmentality”. He considers the latter to be the “outside”
of capital.
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production, the economic conditions of existence of capitalist production are constrained.
This necessitates fresh bouts of primitive accumulation and the whole process is repeated.
The lack of self-subsistence at the political-cultural level gives rise to its lack at the
economic level, necessitating primitive accumulation, which in turn destabilizes the
political-cultural conditions of existence and so on. Primitive accumulation reflects the
endless becoming of capital. Thus, in Sanyal’s analysis, the process of becoming of
capital forecloses the possibility of its self-subsistent being—“the postcolonial capital
never becomes in the Hegelian sense” (Sanyal, 2007: 61). He urges Marxists to go
beyond the Hegelian categories of being and becoming and understand that capital’s
“arising is never complete, its universality never fully established, its being is forever
postponed” (Sanyal, 2007: 61).
In Sanyal’s understanding, the non-capitalist “outside” of capital is a product of welfarist
governmentality, deeply anchored in the problematic of the political and cultural
reproduction of capital’s dominance. 47 Sanyal, like Harvey, retains a capitalocentric
notion of the “outside”. Harvey subsumes the “outside” to economic reproduction of
capital, while Sanyal subsumes it to its political-cultural reproduction. Contrast this with
an alternative non-essentialist reading, in which the very process of becoming of capital
is also the process of becoming something other than capital; the latter overflows and
exceeds the reach of governmentality. What gets suppressed, in Sanyal’s reading, is the
possibility that the reproduction of capital may engender non-capital as a pure externality,
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This has led Basu (2008) to argue, with some justification, that Sanyal’s characterization denies the
“outside” its anti-capitalist political face. To be fair to Sanyal, his objective is to problematize the social
reproduction of capital in a decentered economic space—to show how capital negotiates differences in a
way that neutralizes or appropriates such anti-capitalist resistance through governmentality.
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it being impossible for capital to contain within itself or internalize fully, economically or
politically, the contradictory effects of its own development. It is unfortunate that, in
Sanyal’s otherwise highly complex, innovative and illuminating analysis, non-capital is
reduced to the political conditions of existence of capital and hence to a capitalocentric
“outside”.
Though I have so far presented Sanyal’s arguments in terms of the Marxian categories of
capital and non-capital, he himself uses a pair of distinct but related categories—the
“accumulation-economy” and the “need-economy” respectively. The “accumulationeconomy” is roughly equal to the “formal” capitalist sector in developing countries
consisting of relatively larger capitalist enterprises. It is governed by the logic of
accumulation and engages in primitive accumulation to secure its conditions of
accumulation. The “need-economy” refers to that part of the “informal” or “unorganized”
economy—de-linked from the “accumulation-economy”— which “holds” the victims of
primitive accumulation in different fundamental class processes (non-accumulating
ancient and tiny capitalist enterprises) and is mainly driven by the economic motive of
self-sustenance. The “need-economy” is a product of exclusionary expansion as well as
governmentalized intervention of the “accumulation-economy”.
Behind any capitalocentrism lurks the centered notion of capital. In Sanyal, accumulating
capital is reduced to productive capital; other unproductive forms of capital and their
effectivity on class processes—particularly noncapitalist class processes—are ignored.
This centered notion of capital then acts as the centering notion of the entire economy. In
a chain of causal relations, accumulation of productive capital necessitates primitive
accumulation; primitive accumulation requires welfarist governance to address the social
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problem of exclusion; governmentalized interventions create an “outside” of capital. The
entire economy gets structured by the accumulation of productive capital.
In my understanding, accumulation of capital cannot be reduced to accumulation of
productive capital and hence primitive accumulation is not the only form of expansion of
the “accumulation-economy”. In a capitalist social formation, merchant-capitalists and
money-capitalists may be subsumed to both capitalist as well as fundamental class
processes. Unproductive capitalists may provide conditions of existence of non-capitalist
fundamental class processes, irrespective of the economic, political and cultural
requirements of productive capitalist class process. Accumulation of unproductive capital
may take place on the basis of non-capitalist production. Thus the “accumulationeconomy” may both support and destroy the non-capitalist economy at the economic
level. While Sanyal’s contribution is important because he departs from the economism
of Marxian theories, his analysis suffers from an insufficient theorization of the economy
due to his deployment of a centered notion of capital.
De Angelis’s notion of the “outside”, contra Sanyal and Harvey, is a non-capitalist space
constituted by radical social practices and political struggles48. De Angelis avoids the
capitalocentrism of both Harvey and Sanyal in so far as his “outside” is not subsumed to
the economic, political or cultural conditions of existence of capital; rather, De Angelis’s
“outside” is brought into life by “value practices” in opposition to and distinct from that
which sustains the capitalist economy and as a social alternative to it. Like Sanyal, De
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“When we reflect on the myriad of communities struggles taking place around the world for water,
electricity, land, access to social wealth, life and dignity, one cannot but feel that the relational and
productive practices giving life and shape to these struggles give rise to values and modes of doing and
relating in social co-production (shortly, value practices). Not only, but these value practices appear to be
outside correspondent value practices and modes of doing and relating that belong to capital” (De Angelis,
(2006: 1).
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Angelis (2006) argues that primitive accumulation may produce a mass of dispossessed
producers who are excluded from the capitalist class relations—De Angelis calls it the
detritus, a term he picks up from Chari (2005).
The outside thus turns from the object of expropriation into, to use Chari’s term, the
detritus, which I understand to be a space in which the problematic of social reproduction
is uniquely in the hands of the dispossessed, and dramatically depends on the
effectiveness, organisational reach and communal constitution of their struggles and
ability to reclaim and constitute commons (De Angelis, 2006: 6-7).

This detritus is also the site of the flowering of Deleuzian desires, and some of these
desires “do not reproduce the reality of the circuits of capital” (De Angelis, 2006: 13).
Instead, they produce the reality of “social commons” and communities as subjects. De
Angelis essentializes politics in theorizing his “outside”49.
The “outside” created by struggles is an outside that emerges from within, a social space
created by virtue of creating relational patterns that are other than and incompatible with
the relational practices of capital. This is our outside that is the realm of value practices
outside those of capital and, indeed, clashing with it. The value practice of Indian women
defending an African’s family (and thus contributing to the creation of a common and the
reformulation of identities) versus the value practices of a debt collector evicting another
African family in the name of “respect of property, rule of law and contract.” Our outside
is a process of becoming other than capital, and thus presents itself as a barrier that the
boundless process of accumulation and, in the first instance, processes of enclosures,
must seek to overcome. (De Angelis, 2006: 3-4)

Implicitly, De Angelis also seems to accept an essentialized notion of capital, dominated
by the drive to maintain the “separation of the direct producers from the means of
production”—of which capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation are only two
forms—and hence always destructive of any “outside” which supports association of
direct producers with means of production. Thus, De Angelis, like Sanyal, reduces capital
to its productive form. His “outside” is a pristine outside of capital—forged in radical
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“Thus, struggles against intellectual property rights opens up the questions of knowledge as commons.
Struggles against privatization of water, education and health, opens the question of water, education and
health as commons. Struggles against landlessness open up the question of common land. Struggles against
environmental destruction open up the question of environmental commons. In a word, struggle against
actual or threatened enclosures opens the question of commons. . . .” (De Angelis, 2003: 7-8)
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opposition to it and resisting any determination by it. De Angelis pits two autonomous
and independent social spaces against each other, without any mutual determination or
constitutivity50. In effect, he pits two essences against each other—the essence of capital,
i.e. separation of direct producers with means of production, versus the essence of the
“outside”, i.e. the communitarian ethics and politics constitutive of the “commons”.

A Class-Critique of the Contemporary Debate
In preceding sections, I argued that, despite the essentialist and historicist strains in his
writing, Marx maintained a class-based understanding of primitive accumulation.
Contemporary Marxist interventions, on the other hand, have generally avoided Marx’s
historicism, but have often failed to retain the class perspective in their analyses. Marx
applied the notion of primitive accumulation to an extraordinarily wide range of
processes and, at the same time, focused the notion on the process of “separation”. I
argue that this apparent contradiction can be resolved if we understand the expanse of the
notion to be indicative of the complex overdetermination of the process of emergence of
capitalism and its focused-ness to reflect the partisan class-standpoint of Marx. In
rethinking primitive accumulation as an ongoing process, the contemporary literature has
often seized on the expanse rather than the focused-ness of Marx’s notion. The
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Commons and communities do not necessarily designate a space that is free of class-exploitation,
capitalist or non-capitalist, in the Marxian sense of the term. Communist class relations, on the other hand,
may thrive on commons and communities, but do not necessarily follow from the latter. Similarly, nonseparation of direct producers from means of production may be a condition for communist class process,
but is not a necessary condition. On the other hand, unity of direct producers with means of production may
be a condition of existence of exploitative class relations. It should be clearer from the next chapter how my
understanding of primitive accumulation and “outside” differs from De Angelis’s. .
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consequent broadening51 of the notion of primitive accumulation has the unfortunate
consequence of foreclosing its class-based understanding.
This is most clearly seen in the way primitive accumulation or accumulation by
dispossession is so often identified with the great drive towards privatization that
accompanies the current (neoliberal) regime of capitalism. From the class point of view,
this leads to unfortunate results when, for example, privatization of public sector
enterprises and destruction of independent (ancient) farmers are both clubbed together as
accumulation by dispossession in Harvey’s influential analysis (Harvey, 2003). From a
Marxian class standpoint, privatization of state capitalist firms in many countries is a
transfer of property rights, not a change in the class process, which remains capitalist
through the change of property regime. This has been noted by several authors.
Ownership doesn’t indicate the nature of class process in enterprises and similarly all
forms of dispossession do not constitute primitive accumulation.
Another instance of the same phenomenon of restructuring is provided by the
privatisation of what used in Britain to be called the nationalised industries. British Steel
and Telecom and Rail and the National Coal Board were organized as large capitalist
enterprises, with managerial hierarchies, multi-branch structures, and workforces largely
composed of subordinate wage-labourers, despite being publicly owned. Their financial
autonomy from the Treasury varied; some competed in national and global markets (for
example, the first and last corporations listed), others enjoyed national monopolies (that,
in the case of telecommunications and rail in Britain, have still only partially been
dismantled). Whatever has changed with such corporations’ privatisation, it is not that
they have moved from being ‘outside’ capital to becoming part of it. They have moved
from being state to private capitals. As such, this is a sideways move, from one form of
capitalism to another, as with the collapse of the former USSR. (Ashman and Callinicos,
2006: 122-123)

In a similar way, dispossession occurs within the capitalist economy as a consequence of
capitalist accumulation. For example, in the process of monopolization, capital gobbles
up smaller firms or drives other firms out of business. However, that is within the space
51

Ashman and Callinicos note “how broadly Harvey casts the net of accumulation by dispossession, to the
detriment of more precise analysis” (Ashman and Calllinicos, 2006:121)
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of capital and releases means of production and labor power from smaller capitalist units
to larger capitalist units. This kind of dispossession is distinct from primitive
accumulation, which destroys non-capitalist class processes, as in the case of destruction
of independent farmers who are employed in ancient class processes. It is interesting to
note that Part VIII of Capital Vol I, which contains Marx’s chapters on primitive
accumulation, also includes a chapter where Marx writes about concentration and
centralization of capital. He argues that while expropriation of ancients leads to the
emergence of capitalist enterprises, capitalist accumulation in turn may lead to the
expropriation of many small capitalists by a few large enterprises—a process which he
refers to as the centralization of capital. However, this chapter is titled “Historical
Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation” (Italics mine) and he is clearly distinguishing the
processes of centralization of capital from primitive accumulation. Thus not all
redistributive processes are considered as primitive accumulation by Marx. Contrast
Marx’s position with Harvey’s when the latter argues that “speculation, predation, fraud
and thievery” (Harvey, 2006: 154) in financial markets—which constitutes a large-scale
redistributive process—is one of the more prominent acts of primitive accumulation in
recent times. Yet, as some critics (Brenner (2006), Ashman and Callinicos (2006) etc.)
pointed out, such redistribution, to a significant degree, takes place between capitalists
themselves and to refer to it as primitive accumulation would erase the class-specificity
of the concept.
I would like to emphasize two aspects of contemporary interventions of Harvey’s kind.
First, class is often understood in property terms. Thus, privatization of state or public
sector enterprises—those that are, in our understanding, state capitalist enterprises—is
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often understood as a movement from the “outside” to the interior of capitalist
production. This is distinct from the surplus-based concept of class—put forward most
clearly in Resnick and Wolff (1987)—which I use in this dissertation. Second, primitive
accumulation is understood more in terms of enrichment than separation. To the extent
separation matters to this understanding, it matters as a means to enrichment. This is in
sharp contrast to Marx’s understanding, which I have argued, focuses on enrichment as a
means to separation, where separation itself is understood in its class-transformative
aspect. Theoretical positions leaning on the “enrichment” aspect tend to emphasize the
redistributive role of primitive accumulation, rather than its class-transformative role.
One particular form of “enrichment” through primitive accumulation, that has been
emphasized in the contemporary literature, is based on “enclosures” as a means of
earning (ground) rent.52 We will engage with Basu (2008) as the representative work.
Primitive accumulation creates private property rights over resources required for
production; wherever such privatization creates monopolized access to those resources, it
generates ground rent. Basu calls this “global capital’s “feudal plunder”(Basu, 2007:
1283). The feudal character of capital is manifested in its ability to secure a part of the
surplus produced in the society solely on the basis of exclusive control over “scarce”
resources for production. Rent is a type of subsumed class payment. Like merchants and
banks that get a share of the surplus produced within a fundamental class process,
monopoly owners of certain conditions of production earn ground rent by providing
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See Basu (2007, 2008) who uses the Marxian category of ground rent in offering a new understanding of
primitive accumulation. See Resnick and Wolff (1987:127-128) for a discussion of the Marxian notion of
ground rent and its general applicability covering monopoly. Also, this form of primitive accumulation is
most often associated with intellectual property rights; See Boyle (2002), Evans (2005), Andreasson
(2006), Harvey (2003, 2006).
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access to them. When capitalist enterprises earn ground rent by “enclosing”, they act like
landlords.
Rent-extracting enterprises may be subsumed to capitalist as well as non-capitalist
fundamental class processes. Basu (2008) clearly recognizes this.
[F]or extracting rent using the ownership of these resources it does not matter whether
these inputs are employed in capitalist enterprises or cooperative enterprises or peasant
agriculture.
The point to be underlined is that there is no reason why global capital should invest in
the project of expanding the borders of capitalist production to include all productive
activity, when it can well appropriate surplus from other forms of production
organization (Basu, 2008:82).

Basu talks of peasant agriculture, cooperative enterprises and self-employed as noncapitalist forms of production from which rent is extracted by “global capital”. This is an
illustration of separation as a means of enrichment. In fact, separation is not even the
rationale of primitive accumulation in Basu’s analysis. According to him, it might be in
capital’s interest—in certain conjunctures—to co-exist with the unity of direct producers
with means of production in non-capitalist enterprises as long as “capital dominates noncapitalist enterprise and uses such dominance to extract part or whole of the surplus
produced by them as rent” (Basu, 2008:83). Thus separation is followed by its reversal,
i.e. union, but under transformed conditions, such that “free” union gives way to
“conditional” union, where rent payments are necessary to secure the conditions of
union.53 The fundamental class process may even stay the same, while its conditions of
existence are altered, requiring a new kind of subsumed class payment that didn’t exist
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Both Basu and Sanyal view capitalism as a complex social formation whose reproduction does not
involve teleological dissolution of non-capital. Basu’s position is different from Sanyal’s in two respects.
First, Basu posits the articulation of non-capital with capital at the economic level whereas Sanyal locates it
at the political-ideological level. Second, Basu emphasizes the extractive role of capital, while Sanyal
highlights its exclusionary face.
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before.54 This form of primitive accumulation does not constitute a moment of transition
from non-capitalist to capitalist fundamental class process; rather, it facilitates the
transformation of a fundamental (capitalist) class position into a subsumed (landlord)
class position. In Basu’s definition, primitive accumulation is any process of
dispossession that enables extraction of ground rent by otherwise capitalist enterprises—
hence, he talks of rent disguised as profit.55 In his analysis, “separation” does not indicate
a moment of transformation in fundamental class processes, i.e. of class exploitation.
This is different from Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation as a process that
enables capitalist class-exploitation of labor.
Basu’s intervention is very important since it criticizes the theoretical tradition within
Marxism for privileging productive capital in its representation of capitalism. He does
this by highlighting the position of the “landlord” contra the productive capitalist. Yet,
since the position of the “landlord”, i.e. the extractor of ground rent, is not classspecified, Basu’s use of the notion of primitive accumulation is also not class-specified,
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This is different from Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation where separation is understood in its
class-transformative aspect. In fact, Resnick and Wolff make this point in the very context of ground rent.
Marx argues that exclusive private ownership of land effectively denies to proletarians
the access that would enhance their option to cease being proletarians; second, that
exclusive ownership also limits capitalists’ access to land……………
To gain access, that is, to induce the subsumed class [landlords] to control access in
particular ways, capitalists distribute a portion of their extracted surplus value to
landlords in the form of capitalist rent payments” (Resnick and Wolff, 1987:127, Italics
mine)
Thus, according to Resnick and Wolff, the function of the landlord—as induced by the subsumed class
payments by the capitalists—is to constrain the possibilities of non-capitalist union of direct producers and
means of production, even if that involves constraints on capitalists’ own access to its conditions of
existence. Here is the contradiction. Rent is a deduction from the surplus value appropriated in capitalist
enterprises and, in that sense, there is a conflict between the interests of the landlord and productive
capitalists. At the same time, landlords maintain the separation of direct producers from their means of
production and thus ensure the existence of dispossessed wage-laborers for the capitalists.
55
“But to my mind, any extension of private property rights which furthers future (capitalist rent extraction
disguised as) profit accumulation through the working of the market, warrants being treated as primitive
capital accumulation” (Basu, 2008:100). For example, Basu considers the establishment of monopoly
control over market as a process of primitive accumulation (Basu, 2008:42).
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in the Marxian sense. The “landlord” may occupy a subsumed class position with respect
to both capitalist as well as non-capitalist enterprises as well as a non-class position vis-àvis individuals. The revenues that accrue to the “landlord” in his non-class position do
not constitute ground rent since the “landlord” does not provide any conditions of
existence of production in a fundamental class process. For example, when monopolycapitalist enterprises charge a price above the value of wage goods, they extract non-class
revenue from productive and unproductive workers. Such non-class revenue is, however,
considered by Basu to be a form of ground rent. According to Basu, the securing of
exclusive control over markets, land, knowledge etc. is considered as primitive
accumulation, irrespective of the varied class and non-class implications of such
monopoly. 56
Conclusion
Let me now conclude this section by noting that the contemporary literature goes a long
way in displacing the notion of primitive accumulation from the classical narrative of
transition. To the extent it succeeds, contemporary interventions release the notion from
the grip of the telos that informs historical materialism. By arguing against any
teleological dissolution of non-capitalist production, contemporary interventions
problematize the reproduction of capital by acknowledging a resilient “outside” of
capital. Yet, contemporary positions often retain essentialized notions of the “outside”,
56

Contrast Basu (2008) with Resnick and Wolff (1987) who also provide a decentered notion of the profits
of a capitalist firm. According to Resnick and Wolff, the profits of a capitalist commodity-producing firm
may include not only the surplus value appropriated from its productive laborers net of its subsumed class
payments (rent, interest etc.) but also subsumed class receipts from other capitalist and non-capitalist firms
as well as non-class receipts. For example, if a capitalist commodity-producing firm sells monopolized
means of production commodity to other capitalist or non-capitalist firms, the board of directors of the firm
enjoying monopoly power receives ground rent as a subsumed class payment. If the same firm sells
monopolized wage commodities to workers, the board of directors receives a non-class revenue.
See Resnick and Wolff, 1987: 156-158, 207-216, 326, n. 53.
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including its capitalocentric versions. The problem of a resilient “outside” of capital lends
to primitive accumulation its enduring character. Primitive accumulation belongs to the
relation of capital to its “outside”, but primitive accumulation itself is underspecified with
respect to class. Thus, the contemporary literature creates possibilities for, even as it itself
falls short of—for its essentialism and lack of surplus-based-class notion—a Marxian
intervention—that is non-essentialist and class-focused—in the emerging theoretical
problematic.
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CHAPTER 3
PRIMTIVE ACCUMULTION AND THE (CONTINGENT) DOMINANCE OF
CAPITAL: A NEW THEORETICAL PROBLEMATIC

Introduction: The Two Readings of Marx
The great transformations in West European societies over the long period from twelfth
to the nineteenth century involved a series of political, economic and cultural changes.
Marx’s unique contribution lies in tracing the class-dynamics through those changes. Of
particular importance was the so-called transition to capitalism—however incomplete or
localized it was. Marx broached the problem of dispossession in the context of classtransformations that produced capitalism. In other words, his objective was to identify the
class-effects of dispossession; in fact, he focused on dispossession only to the extent its
class-effects can be ascertained. I retain this distinctive focus on class throughout the
essay.
However, I argue that Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation carries marks of
essentialist thought. According to Althusser, Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation
in Capital are exemplary instances of anti-essentialist philosophy that Marx brought to
the study of political economy—and thus stand outside the formal essentialist
architecture i.e. outside the “fictitious unity”, of Capital. Yet, I argue that those chapters
of Capital are split through by the same contradiction between an open-ended historical
analysis on the one hand and a teleological historiography on the other hand— or in
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Althusser’s words, between “an historico-aleatory” position and an “essentialistic and
philosophical57” one—which characterizes the rest of Capital. 58

A Historico-Aleatory Reading of the Colonial Problem in Capital
In the last chapter, I pointed out the historicism in Marx’s writings on primitive
accumulation. However, a different, non-essentialist philosophical position can be read
into Marx’s chapter titled “the modern theory of colonization”, to which we have already
drawn attention in the last chapter. Marx’s application of the notion of primitive
accumulation to the problem of capitalist development in the colonies has far-reaching
theoretical consequences. First, in the colonies, primitive accumulation is dislodged from
its traditional context of historical transition from feudalism to capitalism. In the colonies,
capitalism emerges not in a social formation dominated by a non-capitalist class process,
but in a social “vacuum” created by conquest of land and annihilation of original
inhabitants. Into such a social “vacuum”, the capitalist class process is literally imported
from the mother country. But the conditions of the “vacuum” are such that the capitalist
process falls to pieces as abundant land is easily converted into private plots for “ancient”
production by wage-workers who easily leave the labor market.59 It is the viability of the

57

Althusser uses the adjective “philosophical” here to refer to those writings motivated by the
philosophical quest for the Origin (and the End) within a model of rational abstraction. This is what he
refers to as “traditional philosophy of the idealist tendency, the ‘philosophy of the philosophers’”.
(Althusser, 2006:271).
58
“Thus, Althusser draws a line of demarcation within Marx’s corpus not between the early and late Marx,
as he so famously did earlier, but between two divergent materialisms at work in Marx’s writing: a
materialism of the event or the encounter versus a materialism of teleology and necessity.” (Read, 2002:
30)
59
“Mr. Peel, he [Wakefield] moans, took with him from England to Swan River, West Australia, means of
subsistence and of production to the amount of £50,000. Mr. Peel had the foresight to bring with him,
besides 3,000 persons of the working class, men, women, and children. Once arrived at his destination,
“Mr. Peel was left without a servant to make his bread or fetch him water from the river.” Unhappy Mr.
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“ancient” economy that undermines one of the conditions of capitalist class process—the
existence of a wage-labor market. But, this “ancient” economy is not a pre-capitalist
mode of production; rather it emerges simultaneously with the arrival of capitalist
production to the colonies. Thus, the teleology of historical materialism, which predicts a
fated journey from ancient to capitalist via primitive accumulation, is suspended in the
colonies and is replaced by a more open-ended dynamics between ancient and capitalist
class processes.
[In the colonies] the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance
of the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to
enrich himself, instead of the capitalist. The contradictions of these two diametrically
opposed economic systems, manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them
(Marx, 1912: 838, italics mine).

It is obvious that, in the colonies, the development of the forces of production cannot
impose its iron laws on historical development. The “dull compulsions of economic
relations” cannot guarantee the dissolution of non-capitalist class processes or the
automatic dominance of the “higher” mode of production. In fact, capitalist production
dissolves in the presence of ancient production. The inevitability of a pre-destined
historical journey is replaced by the contingency of a transitional conjuncture where
different class processes are vying for dominance in an emerging social formation.
Second, the epistemological notion of self-subsistent capital, which underlies the beingbecoming distinction in Marx, falls apart too. With it falls the idea that primitive
accumulation is confined to the pre-history of capital. Capital that has already arisen, has
already fully assumed its being in the mother country, is transplanted in the colonies. Yet,
the immanent laws of capital fail to assert themselves; “being” relapses into “becoming”.
Peel who provided for everything except the export of English modes of production to Swan River!”
(Marx, 1912: 839-840).
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It would appear that the “self-sufficiency” of capital is provisional and open to
subversion. When capital cannot create its own supply of labor-power, it turns
primitive—it resorts to dispossession; for example, in the colonies, exclusionary land
regulations were passed to enforce the separation of direct producers and means of
production. Primitive accumulation is not limited to the origin of capitalism; it comes into
play whenever the conditions of existence of capitalism start unraveling. Extending it
further, we can say primitive accumulation is constitutive of capitalism.
The colonial problem points to the possibilities of a non-essentialist notion of primitive
accumulation. It is this possibility that is explored in this essay. Marxian tradition has
been overwhelmingly dominated by the first, i.e. the essentialist reading of Capital. I now
turn to those works within the Marxian tradition that self-consciously break away from
this essentialist reading of primitive accumulation in Marx.

“Encounter of Contingencies”: Social Conjuncture and Primitive Accumulation
In the rest of this chapter I explore the new ontology of capital that a non-teleological,
non-logocentric notion of primitive accumulation promises to produce. To catch a
glimpse of this new theoretical terrain—the sight of which is obstructed by the
essentialist architecture of prevalent Marxian theories—I turn to those authors (Althusser,
2006; Negri, 1996, 1999; Deleuze-Guattari, 2004)60, who have located the problem of
primitive accumulation in the realm of radical contingency, beyond any history governed
by telos.

60

See Read (2002)
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The Contingency of the “Encounter”
Primitive accumulation is a concept born out of retrospective gaze61. It is the present, i.e.
capital, that fixes the meaning of its past, i.e. its primitive accumulation—the present
projected backwards, beyond its history as presence, to another history, a history of its
non-being, its absence—i.e., its pre-history.
The analysis [of primitive accumulation] is therefore retrospective…….. insofar as it
depends on knowledge of the result of the movement. ………The analysis of primitive
accumulation is therefore, strictly speaking, merely the genealogy of the elements which
constitute the structure of the capitalist mode of production (Althusser and Balibar, 1970:
279, Italics in the original).

Within an essentialist (and hence teleological) problematic, this history of primitive
accumulation becomes what Sanyal (2007) calls the “immanent history of capital”— read
backwards along the arrow of time, each moment circumscribing the ontology of the last
moment, by discursively limiting the historical possibilities of any process— by limiting,
for example, the outcome of overdetermined class contradictions in the pre-capitalist
social formation to the necessary emergence and victory of capitalist production. The
significance of this observation is best understood in the context of the distinction
Althusser draws between two different readings of Capital—a distinction between
historical materialism and aleatory materialism. The being-becoming distinction—which
ofzten underlies Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation— belongs to the first reading
of Capital. According to historical materialism, the auto-development of the forces of
production allows only one possible historical outcome—the emergence of that mode of
production conducive to further development of forces of production and the dissolution
61

Also see Read (2002) and Sanyal (2007) who make the same point. “These elements of dissolution, such
as usury, often stem from the margins and pores of the old society, and only begin to occupy center stage in
terms of their effects—the effects of constituting a new economy and a new mode of production. Whatever
intelligibility or unity they have is produced after the fact when they retroactively become the conditions of
the capitalist mode of production.” (Read, 2002: 32).
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of those modes of production which act as fetters on the free development of the same. In
this view, primitive accumulation is the necessary moment in the transition from lower
(non-capitalist) to higher (capitalist) modes of production. The notion that becoming
(primitive accumulation) is governed by historical laws of necessity (auto-development
of forces of production)—the necessity which dictates its fruition into the being
(capitalist mode of production)—implies that the being is already assumed in the
becoming. This is a mark of any teleological reading—that becoming already
presupposes its result, the being. Contrast this with Althusser’s own reading grounded in
aleatory materialism.
If we must therefore say that there can be no result without its becoming (Hegel), we
must also affirm that there is nothing which has become except as determined by the
result of this becoming—this retroaction itself (Canguilhelm). That is, instead of thinking
contingency as a modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as
the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies. (Althusser, 2006: 193-194)

As, according to aleatory materialism, there is no notion of being prior to its becoming,
there can be no telos that governs the becoming, i.e. becoming must be thought instead as
a series of “encounters” with all their attendant possibilities and uncertainties. An
“encounter” is the coming together of elements of a formation. We can think of the
“encounter”, in the context of society, as a social process (e.g. the capitalist class process)
in formation, a social process becoming as a convergence of the various determinations of
all other social processes. An encounter takes place in a “void” in the sense that nothing
from the past pre-figures the “encounter”—i.e. in a “void” created by the absence of any
telos. The notion of the encounter emphasizes the inherent openness of any social process
in terms of its possible historical developments, i.e., the encounter itself, having occurred,
in turn pre-figures nothing of its possible future. The encounter may not take place, may
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not “take hold” even if it takes place, and may subsequently come undone even if it has
“taken hold”.
Thus, for example, the rise to dominance of the capitalist mode of production in Western
Europe from sixteenth century onwards was neither pre-destined to occur nor survive.
This historical event required a coming together of many elements necessary for the
capitalist class process to “take hold”—an “encounter” or a series of “encounters” leading
to a capitalist social formation that happened to stabilize itself, however provisionally.
However, this coming together of elements must be thought of as a historical contingency
itself. These elements were not fated to come together, since they “do not exist in history
so that a mode of production may exist, they exist in history in a ‘floating’ state prior to
their ‘accumulation’ and ‘combination’, each being the product of its own history, and
none being the teleological product of the others or their history” (Althusser, 2006: 198).
As opposed to the necessity or inevitability of the encounter, Althusser emphasizes its
contingency62.
In Althusser’s reading, the historical processes that produced the conditions of existence
of the capitalist class structure constitute parallel and plural histories63; parallel, in so far
as they are not united by any governing telos; plural, because each process is uniquely
overdetermined by all other processes and cannot be reduced to any other process. The
parallelism, in our understanding, does not preclude overdetermination; rather, it
emphasizes the contradictions unique to each overdetermined process such that none can
62

See Deleuze and Guattari (2004). “The only universal history is the history of contingency.” (Deleuze
and Guattari, 2004: 244). Negri, too, makes the same point. “A fundamental feature of aleatory materialism
is the destruction of every teleological horizon—therefore, the positive assertion of a logic of the event”
(Negri, 1996: 61).
63
Althusser (2006:168-169) draws analogy with the Epicurean rain of “atoms falling parallel to each other
in the void”—prior to the infinitesimal swerve—the clinamen—that breaks the parallelism and brings forth
the “encounter” or the chain of encounters which results in the formation of the world.

69

be collapsed into others. In Altusser’s reading, therefore, the pre-history of capital
fractures into multiple and particular histories.
Let us take the “encounter” between owners of money and dispossessed laborers, the
principal process at the heart of Marx’s class-reading of primitive accumulation. The
emergence of the industrial capitalist was a complicated process spanning several
centuries and undergoing several temporary as well as long-term reversals64. Marx
mentions at least two different paths of this transition in the English context.. The
“revolutionary” path is the transformation of petty producers into capitalists through a
process of differentiation such that accumulation of capital by some and pauperization of
others leads to capitalist production based on wage-labor. The second path is the
transformation of merchant or money-capitalists into productive, i.e. industrial capitalists
by accumulation of money through colonial plunder, monopoly rights over long distance
trade, government debts, taxation etc. (Marx, 1909:393)
The dispossession of the laborers in England, on the other hand, was partly a result of the
process of differentiation of the peasantry, but more importantly was related to an entirely
different set of processes including “disbanding of feudal retainers, the dissolution of the
monasteries, the enclosures of land for sheep-farming and changes in methods of tillage”
(Dobb, 1947: 224).
The historical independence of the processes, whose mutual effectivity on each other
produced the capitalist social formation in England, also implies that the ‘encounter’
between owners of money and dispossessed laborers is not a necessary outcome of
history.

64

See Dobb (1947) for an account of the thwarted rise of capitalism in Netherlands, Germany and Italy.
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The encounter might not have taken place, with the free workers and the money-capital
existing “virtually” side by side (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 245).

Althusser emphasizes the non-teleology of the process that produces the ‘encounter’,
exemplified in the English case by the ‘diversion’ of a peculiar development within the
feudal social formation to a capitalist outcome. For, the immediate result of expropriation
of rural peasants was great landed proprietors and not capitalists per se. Neither was the
expropriation intended to create wage-laborers for capitalist enterprises. The most
ostensible reasons for the great expropriations in England were creation of pasturage for
sheep farming or else, for creating extensive domains of hunting. The end–result of the
process—a mass of dispossessed laborers—“was promptly diverted from its possible,
presumed end by ‘owners of money’ looking for impoverished manpower” (Althusser,
2006: 199).
This diversion is the mark of the non-teleology of the process and of the incorporation of
its result into a process that both made it possible and was wholly foreign to it.
(Althusser, 2006: 199, italics in the original)

Moreover, the “encounter” between dispossessed laborers and owners of money is not
sufficient to give rise to the capitalist class process unless other conditions are present.
Althusser himself argues that such an encounter might have taken place elsewhere and in
earlier times— he mentions thirteenth and fourteenth century Italy— yet the encounter
didn’t “take hold” in the absence of other conditions (e.g. domestic markets for capitalist
products). Dobb (1976:195) argues that the “sweets of foreign trade and foreign loan
business” diverted Dutch capital into unproductive uses, thus thwarting the process of
emergence of capitalist industries in Netherlands, “[despite] the precocious flowering of
Capitalism in this early stronghold of the cloth industry”. A significant part of the
accumulated merchant-capital and money-capital in Netherlands was invested in
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speculative activity in the London stock market in the eighteenth century, while Dutch
foreign trade merchants subverted the conditions for emergence of Dutch industries in the
face of British competition—by resisting any protective industrial policies. Similarly, in
the English context, even when provincial merchant capitalists showed signs of
transformation into productive capitalists—with merchants engaging in production and
effecting a change in the methods of production—this did not automatically guarantee the
consolidation of the capitalist class structure. This section of merchants-turnedproductive capitalists along with ancients-turned-capitalists had to struggle against
another class of merchants—namely, those with monopoly powers over trade, especially
foreign trade, who exploited both producers and consumers, restricted the volume of
trade for a higher profit margin and hindered the extension of market for capitalist
commodities (Dobb, 1947: 161,193). Here lies the contradiction. The great monopolistic
trading companies opened up the foreign markets for the products of capitalist factories
and yet at the same time restricted the volume of trade in search of favorable terms of
trade. Hence, one of the historical conditions for the arising of capitalist manufactures in
England was that the power of the monopolistic merchant companies be undermined.
Secondly, the existence of dispossessed laborers may not lead to the emergence of
capitalist manufacturing units unless the monopoly of urban craft guilds is undermined
(Dobb, 1947: 161). Thus, various other economic conditions—even as we leave out of
discussion crucial political and cultural conditions— have to be created before capitalist
production based on wage-labor establishes its dominance in the economy65.
65

On other occasions, the encounter may simply end in its own negation, as in the case of ‘second serfdom’
in East Europe—“these free servants [Knechte] can also emerge, as e.g. in Poland etc. and vanish again,
without a change in the mode of production taking place” (Marx, 1973: 469).
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What therefore is required is not simply an encounter between owners of capital and
dispossessed laborers, but an entire social context (the political, cultural and economic
conditions) where such an encounter, when it takes place, leads to the consolidation and
prevalence of the capitalist class process. Deleuze and Guattari (2004:246) appreciate the
complexity of the encounter in the following words.
So many encounters for the formation of the thing, the unnamable!

The Stability of the “Encounter”
A second issue has to be confronted at this point. If the being is nothing more than the
result of the process of becoming, i.e. there is no notion of a being prior to its becoming,
what can we say about the result itself? Is it justified to speak of a “being” as opposed to
becoming, i.e. can we assume that the becoming as a process is suspended in what has
become? Can we assume that change governed by laws will finally take over and replace
the indeterminacy of the ‘encounter’? In other words, does the ‘encounter’ resolve itself
into an ‘essence’ that henceforth governs the process of change? The answer, according
to aleatory materialism, is no. Since the “encounter” takes place in a “void”, i.e. in the
absence of any governing telos, the existence, reproduction and stability of an
“encounter” is always provisional.
It will be granted that no law presides over the encounter in which things take hold. But it
will be objected, once the encounter has ‘taken hold’—that is, once the stable figure of
the only existing world (for the advent of a given world obviously excludes all the other
possible combinations), has been constituted—we have to do with a stable world in
which events, in their succession, obey ‘laws’. ……….Well, we are going to resist this
temptation by defending ….the idea, therefore, that the necessity of the laws that issue
from the taking-hold induced by the encounter is, even at its most stable, haunted by a
radical instability, which explains something we find it very hard to grasp (for it does
violence to our sense of ‘what is seemly’): that laws can change—not that they can be
valid for a time but not eternally……, but that they can change at the drop of a hat,
revealing the aleatory basis that sustains them, and can change without reason, that is,
without an intelligible end. (Althusser , 2006:194-96)
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If we recognize the contingent and overdetermined nature of the “encounter” that
produces the capitalist class process, it follows that “the different elements of a mode of
production—the social, technological, and political conditions—have independent
histories and relations, and this independence threatens any mode of production with its
dissolution or transformation” (Read, 2002: 29).
The development of many conditions of existence of the capitalist class process took
place as a by-product of class struggles (as well as other non-class economic, political
and cultural processes) within the feudal social formation. For example, the complex
struggles among fundamental and subsumed feudal classes created conditions, in Western
Europe, for development of non-feudal class processes. Initially, ancient class processes
rapidly expanded. A typical example of the contradictory development of the feudal
social formation is related to the peculiar role played by the merchants, one of the
subsumed feudal classes who supplied credit to feudal lords as well as engaged in longdistance trade. However, these merchants also provided crucial conditions of existence of
ancient producers like commuted peasants and craft producers struggling to free
themselves from the feudal relations. In towns, petty producers and merchants aligned
themselves against urban guilds, feudal lords as well as monopoly merchant houses
controlling foreign trade. These complex struggles in turn created conditions for the
emergence of an entirely new class structure-the capitalist class structure. 66
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The ancient “enterprises”, in securing their conditions of existence, enabled the development of the
conditions of existence of a different class process—capitalist, in this case— which in turn changed the
pattern of development of ancient class processes, by hastening the process of differentiation among the
ancients and ultimately undermining the possibility of an ancient social formation.
[T]he very particular struggles of the petty producers and merchants against the feudal
lords eventuated in a social differentiation within each from which, in turn, emerged
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In general terms, the very moment of the initial conjuncture in Western Europe when the
feudal class process became dominant was also the very moment of its own set of
contradictions and thus changes toward, among several possibilities, a fundamentally
different class process and different class structure. (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 15)

In general, when we talk of a social formation, we talk of a contradictory totality whose
development is overdetermined by the different fundamental and subsumed class
processes as well as non-class processes in the society. Once born, the capitalist social
formation unleashes its own particular set of contradictions and is subjected to the
process of ceaseless change which produced it in the first place and which may in turn, as
a possibility, undermine it. In the capitalist social formation, the capitalist class process
coexists with other non-capitalist class processes. The particular contradictions of a
capitalist social formation, like its feudal counterpart, emerges out of the following
inescapable effect of overdetermination— in securing its conditions of existence, the
capitalist class process both undermines as well as creates conditions of existence of
other non-capitalist class processes. In this sense, capitalist class process does not
unidirectionally destroy rival class processes as in the classical narrative of transition; it

capitalist class relations. As noted previously, within the countryside some petty
producers (commuted to money rents) began to gain control over new lands, raised the
productivity of labor, and produced for exchange. Within the towns petty producers and
merchants sought new ways to invest their money in new forms of production. Here a
non-capitalist class process and a non-capitalist subsumed class process were transferred
into capitalist class processes. The vagaries of climate and market and tensions with the
feudal lords operated to intensify the intrinsic tendencies of the ancient class process to
separate large numbers of producers from their means of production. Increasingly, petty
producers in the countryside and even in the towns were dispossessed of the very means
that they had struggled, one way or another, to gain some control over. Dispossession
from the mean of production and the consequent concentration of those means in other
hands was itself one of the economic processes necessary for—i.e. a condition of
existence of—the capitalist class process. (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 18-19).
It’s the “aleatory at the heart of a mode of production”, rather than the relentless pressure of the developing
forces of production, that always threatens a mode of production it with its dissolution.
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might even support non-capitalist class process67. The reproduction of conditions of
existence of the capitalist class process alongside the development of the conditions of
existence of other non-capitalist class processes yields a contradictory totality and the
reproduction of any class process including the dominant capitalist class process becomes
problematic from the very beginning. Thus the material basis of the dominance of the
capitalist class structure in a social formation is itself always subject to the play of the
aleatory.
If we recognize the contradictory nature of change in a social formation, it becomes
meaningless to speak of the laws of capitalist development68 one so frequently encounters
in the essentialist Marxist literature—e.g. the final destruction of non-capitalist class
processes, the distinctive ‘capitalist’ law of population growth, the inevitable
transformation of competition into monopoly, the necessary emergence of the state as a
mere functionary of capitalists, the steady decline of feudal institutions, especially
religious ones and so on. These laws only make sense when we posit a being extricated
from the process of becoming, hence transcendental to the latter, standing above it and
even governing it. Instead, we must think of becoming as an endless process and “not a
simple transition from contingency to necessity” (Read, 2002: 29). Therefore we cannot
speak of the being even in the ex post sense, as an accomplished fact, a final product. The
67

One can point to the large and even growing presence of ancient class processes in capitalist social
formations like contemporary Germany, USA and Japan. This is also a very well-recognized phenomenon
in all developing countries, including those experiencing rapid capitalist growth, e.g. India.
68
“In untold passages, Marx—this is certainly no accident—explains that the capitalist mode of production
arose from the ‘encounter’ between ‘the owners of money’ and the proletarian stripped of everything but
his labor-power. ‘It so happens’ that this encounter took place, and ‘took hold’, which means that it did not
come undone as soon as it came about, but lasted, and became an accomplished fact, the accomplished fact
of this encounter, inducing stable relationships and a necessity the study of which yields ‘laws’—tendential
laws, of course…….What matters about this conception is less the elaboration of laws, hence of an essence,
than the aleatory character of the ‘taking-hold’ of this encounter, which gives rise to an accomplished fact
whose laws it is possible to state” (Althusser, 2006: 197).
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capitalist social formation as a product of history is no more stable, no more governed by
laws than the historical process itself, whose product it is. The radical instability that
haunts capitalism—and all totalities provisionally structured or stabilized to the extent
that their reproduction is possible—also underlines the impossibility of any
representation of capital as a self-sufficient entity. To argue that capital is capable of
securing its reproduction internally—i.e. by itself and in accordance with its immanent
laws—is to deny the overdetermined nature of capital. According to the logic of
overdetermination, the reproduction of the capitalist class structure depends on all other
processes occurring in the society; the conditions of reproduction are literally brought
into existence by all other processes in the society, including the non-capitalist class
processes. Thus, capital is overdetermined, in a contradictory way, by its “outside”—noncapital. From the epistemological standpoint of overdetermination, we also have to reject
the position that capital-as-being can secure its conditions of reproduction and expansion
internally, by economic means, whereas capital-in-arising requires extra-economic force
to secure its conditions externally from within the space of non-capital. The traditional
Marxian view which holds that primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation are
historically separated—the former belonging to the pre-history and the latter to the
history of capital—can no longer be sustained once we recognize that the “encounter”
never escapes the original realm of contingency. The reproduction of capitalism requires
that the “encounter” take place continuously in a heterogeneous social formation whose
contradictory development always stands to threaten the dominance of capital. Hence, we
understand primitive accumulation as a process constitutive of capitalism.
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The New Understanding of Primitive Accumulation
The following theoretical problems confront us at this stage. How can we think of
primitive accumulation as a category of Marxian political economy rather than a
historical event? What theoretical significance can be attached to the notion of primitive
accumulation, once it is extricated from the context of transition and further, the notion of
transition itself is released from its historicist, teleological trappings? What are the
consequences of such a theoretical move, given that the introduction of a new category in
a theoretical field necessarily induces changes in the meanings of other established
categories? How will the new theoretical concept of primitive accumulation relate to
other categories of the Marxian political economy, specifically the Marxian concept of
capitalist accumulation? In the rest of this chapter I seek to present a new class-based
understanding of primitive accumulation and its theoretical significance in Marxian
political economy.

A Non-Essentialist Notion of Primitive Accumulation
The new non-essentialist notion of primitive accumulation that is advanced in this thesis
retains Marx’s emphasis on separation of the direct producers from means of production.
Primitive accumulation is defined as the set of processes associated with the reproduction
and/or expansion of the capitalist class processes by which the direct producers in noncapitalist class processes are effectively separated from means of production.
Our definition differs from both the traditional Marxian notion of primitive accumulation
as well as some contemporary reformulations of the concept. In the traditional
understanding of the notion, primitive accumulation is the historical process of the rise of
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the capitalist fundamental class relation. According to our interpretation, primitive
accumulation is a process associated with the reproduction and/or expansion of the
capitalist fundamental class relation. This theoretical move, more than anything else,
displaces the notion of primitive accumulation from the terrain of historical analysis and
into the realm of Marxian political economy. Secondly, our definition, at the same time,
reasserts the class-character of the Marxian theory by directly identifying the moment of
primitive accumulation with dispossession of the direct producers engaged in noncapitalist class processes. Thus, our concept of primitive accumulation belongs to the
theoretical space of interaction between capitalist and non-capitalist class processes and
emerges as a Marxian category particularly useful in theorizing capitalist social
formations. This second element of our definition contrasts with some recent
reformulations where the notion of dispossession has been expanded to include a host of
economic phenomenon related to transfer or redistribution of property rights in general.
Several qualifying comments are required at this point to bring out the substantive
content of our concept of primitive accumulation. First, effective possession includes
private proprietary rights, usufruct as well as private but not exclusive access to
communal means of production and even illegal access to means of production. Such
access may be juridically i.e. legally protected or customarily enforced by conventions.
For example, in European feudal formation, though the feudal lords had property rights
over lands, the peasants enjoyed various degrees of effective possession (“titles” of use)
of means of production due to the particular cultural and political conditions of existence
of the feudal class process which often made it difficult to estrange peasants from means
of production. Similarly, numerous petty production activities in today’s urban slums in
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developing countries are not based on proprietary rights over means of production—
often they involve illegal encroachment on public land— but they enjoy moral sanction
of the society as sources of livelihood of the poor.
Effective possession of means of production is not however a necessary condition for
either non-capitalist or capitalist appropriation of surplus labor. The processes of
production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor are distinct from processes by
which producers gain or lose effective possession of means of production. However,
presence or absence of effective possession of means of production does affect class
processes. For example, dispossessed non-capitalist producers, who have lost their
possession of means of production can still continue to engage in the same non-capitalist
fundamental class process, but only by gaining access to such “separated” means of
production by making various new subsumed class payments—ground rent, interest,
license fee etc. The introduction of such subsumed class payments does affect the
conditions of accumulation or even reproduction of labor power of the direct producers in
non-capitalist class processes. In so far as access to means of production—with or
without involving effective possession—is a general condition of existence of all
fundamental class processes, conditions of access to means of production have important
consequences for the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor.
Primitive accumulation, as defined above, refers to processes that alter conditions of
access to means of production for non-capitalist class structures through effective
dispossession of non-capitalist producers from their means of production.
Primitive accumulation has traditionally been understood as a process that dispossesses
and “frees” direct producers from the non-capitalist class processes for exploitation by
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capital. However, I want to emphasize that dispossession may not necessary lead to
capitalist exploitation of the dispossessed—i.e. proletarianization of the dispossessed—
rather, dispossession may alter the conditions of existence of the non-capitalist class
processes with such consequences as may undermine non-capitalist class structures even
as they expand and secondly, may simultaneously enable and undermine the dominance
of capital in such a heterogeneous social formation.
In essentialist and teleological readings of history in the Marxian tradition, developing
forces of production make final dissolution of non-capitalist class structures historically
inevitable and this telos makes Marxists blind to the real heterogeneities that inhere in the
social formation. However, when we step outside the teleological narrative of historical
materialism—outside the fated journey through the stages—we uncover a different
problematic in which primitive accumulation is an important process that has
consequences for the way a social formation changes over time—with heterogeneous
class structures unevenly developing and in a contradictory manner. More specifically, I
want to explore how primitive accumulation affects the non-capitalist class processes by
modifying their conditions of existence, specifically access to means of production,
without assuming the necessity of any final dissolution of non-capitalist class structures,
and how the changed conditions of existence of non-capitalist class structures in turn
influence capitalist class structures. The purpose of this study is to introduce primitive
accumulation into Marxian studies of social formations that emphasize heterogeneity and
eschews all teleological dissolution of such heterogeneity.
Our definition of primitive accumulation does not include processes like centralization of
capital (dispossession of small capitalists), privatization of nationalized state-capitalist
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industries (transfer of property rights from the state to the private capitalists) or
redistribution of wealth among capitalists as well as from working class, state and other
economic groups to the capitalist class (inequality-enhancing processes ) that are often
emphasized in the contemporary debates on primitive accumulation. We locate primitive
accumulation in the space where capital meets non-capital.
We also conceptually differentiate primitive accumulation from dispossession taking
place due to other reasons. For example, differentiation among petty producers may lead
to separation of large number of producers from means of production; competition
between communities over limited economic resources may erupt in ‘clan’ warfare
leading to the separation of a whole community from their means of production; natural
calamities may destroy means of production and dispossess direct producers. Such
processes do not count as primitive accumulation for us.
Contrary to the traditional reading, our notion of primitive accumulation does not involve
functionalist arguments that seek to explain primitive accumulation by the conditions of
existence it presumably secures for the capitalist class process. For example, we do not
see primitive accumulation as functional to the existence of the capitalist class process
because it creates free propertyless wage-laborers for capitalist factories. Rather, we
understand primitive accumulation in terms of its disruptive effect on the unity of direct
producers with means of production, irrespective of whether separated direct producers
are exploited by capital or not. Further, primitive accumulation is not the only outcome of
the interaction between the capitalist and non-capitalist class processes. As I have argued
before, the adequation of the conditions of existence of the capitalist class process may
both support and undermine those of the non-capitalist class processes at the same time.
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The capitalist social formation is a contradictory totality. By the Marxian notion of
contradiction, we understand the inescapable “unity of opposites”, such that primitive
accumulation represents just one side of this opposition. The other side is represented by
the creation or expansion of non-capitalist class processes resulting in a reversal of
dispossession. Therefore, a Marxian analysis of a capitalist social formation involves a
concrete analysis of the particular forms of the primitive accumulation occurring in the
given context as well as the creation and/or expansion of specific forms of non-capitalist
class processes.

Reproduction of Capital and Primitive Accumulation
Since we have dissociated our notion of primitive accumulation from the “origin”
problematic in which it has been traditionally located, we must offer a notion of primitive
accumulation that is i) constitutive of and constituted by productive capital and ii) distinct
from the concept of capitalist (value) accumulation.
We will first seek to show how productive capital and primitive accumulation mutually
constitute each other. Let us revisit the circuit of productive capital.
M − C − P[LP, MP] − C′ − M′

Each constituent part of the circuit has natural, economic, political and cultural conditions
of existence. Securing such conditions of existence may involve processes that lead to the
separation of direct producers from means of production in non-capitalist class processes.
The capitalist begins the circuit by securing means of production and labor power. The
capitalist may purchase means of production and labor power as commodities in the
market. Means of production may be capitalist as well as non-capitalist commodities; in
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the latter case, the capitalists create a market for and hence provide a condition of
existence of non-capitalist production. But capitalists may also acquire such noncapitalist means of production as use-values through extra-economic means—such as
forcible acts of expropriation—which lead to a dissolution of non-capitalist production.
Primitive accumulation becomes particularly significant when some means of production
(land) are presumedly in ‘limited’ supply to the society as a whole. In such a case,
reproduction of productive capital may involve appropriation of non-capitalist means of
production. Capitalists may secure supplies of commoditized labor power from the
natural increase of the labor force, from labor force retrenched by capital itself or by
dispossessing non-capitalist producers. What is essential for productive capital is a supply
of labor power without access to means of production; primitive accumulation is only one
mode of securing such supply. Further, whenever primitive accumulation is involved,
capitalists may secure labor power minus the means of production from which it has been
separated or secure means of production minus the labor power separated from them.
Let us now enter the realm of capitalist production. We have already seen how separation
is one condition of existence of capitalist surplus value. Separation from means of
production forces direct producers to produce surplus value for the capitalists.
Conversely, the performance of surplus labor in the capitalist fundamental class process
may lead to separation of direct producers from means of production in non-capitalist
fundamental class processes. Dispossession is simultaneously the cause and effect of the
production of capitalist surplus value and thus they mutually constitute each other. One
such mechanism involves “production externalities”—e.g. ecological changes including
pollution and depletion of natural resources (DeAngelis (2004)). Production of “industrial
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waste” may lead to devaluation and/or destruction of means of production of direct
producers outside the capitalist enterprises. The numerous natural processes (chemical,
biological, geological etc.) occurring together with the labor process in the capitalist class
process may erode means of production in non-capitalist class processes. This
conceptually amounts to a transfer of means of production from non-capitalist to
capitalist class process to the extent that capitalist enterprises do not pay non-capitalist
enterprises for such “use” of their means of production. The rate of surplus-value may be
positively related to the rate of such unrecorded “dispossession”.
Further, recognition of the ecological impact of capitalism in the face of a growing
environmental movement leads to legislations that legally ban certain methods of
production. Many production units have to be shut down if they do not conform to the
environmental standards. In the changed situation, many small non-capitalist production
units who are unable to make such expensive transformations in the labor process are
shut down, even when their net contribution to such ecological damage is insignificant
and even when the means of production causing pollution may themselves be capitalist
commodities. This has the peculiar effect of “gentrification” of production and
consumption—akin to the “clearing of the estates” in 18th century Britain. The point is
not to deny the environmental problem, but to add a particular class-perspective to the
effects of such desirable environmental legislations. Conservation of forests and wildlife
has in fact been one of the biggest instances of primitive accumulation all over the world
involving the abrogation of community rights over forest products69.
69

In India, perhaps the single biggest act of primitive accumulation was not an act of privatization but
rather its opposite—the establishment of state control over forests—first in the name of “scientific forestry”
during the British rule and later in the name of “wildlife conservation” in independent India. Forests
comprise one-fourth of the geographical area of India—and ninety-five per cent of the forest area is legally
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The sale and consumption of capitalist commodities requires certain natural, economic,
political and cultural conditions. Advertisement of capitalist products may erode the
market of non-capitalist commodities through cultural devaluation of the latter. Similar
cultural devaluation of non-capitalist commodities may occur in other ways too. For
example, one of the cultural conditions of existence of capitalism is the exalted status of
“science” in popular imagination maintained through the educational system, media and
the state. One of the hallmarks of modernism is the idea of a sharp divide between the
“age of science” and the “age of faith”—the divide coinciding often with the historic
divide between pre-capitalism and capitalism. According to this idea, for example,
traditional non-capitalist health commodities are devalued because they do not involve
“scientific” analysis standardized by modern educational institutions and giant corporate
health enterprises. One effect of such a cultural discourse is to destroy the market for
non-capitalist health products leading to the progressive devaluation and “erosion” of
non-capitalist means of production. It is altogether a different story that traditional noncapitalist products may subsequently reappear as capitalist products—in the wake of a
growing criticism of modern medicines and appreciation of traditional solutions to health
problems. It is much like the weavers’ spindles Marx talks about—the weavers having
lost their spindles find the same waiting for them inside a capitalist factory (Marx, 1912)
The consumption of capitalist commodities—the process of consumption itself—may
have “consumption externalities” which have similar effects as production externalities.
The proliferation of capitalist commodities—whose consumption produces “waste”— has

owned by the state (Perspectives, 2008: 37). This act of appropriation of the forest land resulted in the loss
of traditional livelihood of forest dwellers and local communities who were crucially dependent on the
forests for their means of subsistence and production.
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negative ecological outcomes including those that erode the means of production of noncapitalist enterprises. The particular culture of consumption associated with capitalism
accelerates the production of such waste. Consider the peculiar cultural process of
individuation of entertainment under capitalism—the same TV program is watched
privately by millions of individuals involving millions of separate electrical connections
and TV sets etc. The individuation of consumption—which is the same as expansion of
the market for capitalist commodities—also expands the production of consumption
“waste”. Moreover, the multiplication of capitalist commodities require a particular
expansion of the space for consumption—shopping malls, residential spreads, exclusive
private parks and resorts, gated communities, roads for geographically dispersed
consumption. All these require infrastructure and power, the expansion of which may
lead to expropriation of direct producers from their means of production, most
importantly, land.
At this point, I must hasten to point out, at the risk of repetition, that a commitment to the
Marxian notion of contradiction forces me to recognize that each of the constituent parts
of the productive capitalist circuit might as well support the conditions of existence and
even expansion of non-capitalist production. The point of the preceding analysis is not to
prove that the reproduction of the capitalist class process necessarily involves
dispossession, but rather to identify the moments of dispossession, when it does—having
accepted at the very outset that reproduction of capital is a contradictory process
involving both expansion and destruction of the non-capitalist outside.
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Capitalist Accumulation and Primitive Accumulation
The distinction between the Marxian concepts of primitive accumulation and capitalist
accumulation has been the bone of much contention in the contemporary debate. In our
understanding, both primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation are conditions of
existence of the productive capital, yet a conceptual distinction exists between the two.
At the very outset, we reject any distinction that harks back to any of the following
traditional oppositions between
i)

being of capital versus becoming of capital

ii)

economic versus extra-economic forces

iii)

market versus state

In the dominant reading, the first and the second terms in each of the oppositions serve as
the markers of capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation respectively. In
contrast, in my understanding, each term can be identified with both primitive and
capitalist accumulation and hence the dichotomy cannot be sustained. Let us take the first
opposition. In the dichotomous understanding, primitive accumulation belongs to the
becoming of capital, whereas capitalist accumulation comes into play when capital has
arisen. However, capitalist accumulation itself hastens the conditions of the arising of
capital. For example, in Marx’s “revolutionary path to transition”, the initial process of
differentiation of petty agricultural producers into capitalist farmers and the agricultural
wage-laborer leads to accumulation by the nascent capitalist farmer with further
dissolution of petty agricultural production and the final emergence of capitalist
agriculture. On the other hand, capitalist class structure—fully arisen in England— falls
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apart when transported to the settler-colonies and requires primitive accumulation to
reproduce itself.
Let us consider the second opposition between economic and extra-economic processes.
Capitalist accumulation implies capitalization of surplus value produced in a capitalist
class process involving increase in constant and variable capital. But, securing additional
means of production may involve primitive accumulation when, for example, means of
production are diverted from non-capitalist enterprises by force involving the state and
secured through SSCP payments to the state. Conditions of capitalist accumulation may
involve big infrastructural projects like power plants, dams and highways etc. which
involve dispossession of non-capitalist producers. Political processes like legislations
(Industrial Acts) may be required for capitalist expansion projects—e.g. Land Acquisition
Acts may be invoked by the state to acquire land under the “eminent domain” clause for
the industrial project. Economic processes of distributing surplus value to the state are
undertaken to secure these extra-economic (i.e. political) processes of dispossession.
Similarly, cultural processes like advertisement, which introduce new lifestyles by
displacing existing modes of consumption (thus, possibly undermining the markets for
non-capitalist commodities) are necessary for capitalist accumulation. Therefore,
conditions of capitalist accumulation are secured in many different ways, possibly
involving extra-economic processes of dispossession. On other hand, economic processes
may themselves lead to dispossession. Consider land as a scarce means of production. If
the capitalist surplus is higher than the non-capitalist surplus, the capitalists can pay
higher ground rent to the landlord and thus bid away land from non-capitalist producers
and block their access to an essential means of production. These arguments also show
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why the third opposition between the state and the market is similarly not sustainable
when drawing the distinction between primitive accumulation and capitalist
accumulation. The state provides certain conditions of existence/expansion of the
capitalist surplus value and is thus involved in capitalist accumulation. The market may
devalorize non-capitalist means of production and thus facilitate primitive accumulation.
Our commitment to overdetermination forces us to recognize that both capitalist
accumulation and primitive accumulation, like all other process in the society, are
overdetermined by all other economic, political, cultural and natural processes occurring
in the society. They cannot be distinguished by the prevalence of any particular type of
process. Moreover, capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation are not to be
thought in isolation but in terms of their mutual effectivity on each other. The task of the
Marxist theoretician is to posit the conceptual distinction between primitive accumulation
and capitalist accumulation precisely to ascertain and identify the instances of their
mutual constitutivity.
Primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation cannot be distinguished by the nature
of processes involved (economic or extra-economic etc.), unless a class-angle is imposed
on it. Capitalist accumulation is one condition of existence of the capitalist fundamental
class process, involving investment of appropriated surplus value. Primitive accumulation
is another condition of existence of the capitalist fundamental class process, involving the
separation of non-capitalist producers from means of production. While capitalist
accumulation belongs to the internal conditions of existence of the capitalist enterprise
(production of surplus value and its distribution for accumulation), primitive
accumulation belongs to the external conditions of existence of the capitalist enterprise
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(involving interaction with non-capital). Capitalist accumulation leads to a scaling up of
the productive capitalist circuit and hence accelerates all those processes of dispossession
that are associated with securing the conditions of the circuit in general.

Dominance of Capital and Primitive Accumulation: A New Theoretical Problematic
To inaugurate a new theoretical problematic—in the Althusserian sense—is to pose
questions which cannot be articulated within the old problematic. The question that is
invisible in the old Marxian problematic, and therefore the posing of which also signals
the emergence of a new Marxian problematic, namely reproduction of capitalism, is itself
called forth by the new understanding of primitive accumulation developed in the present
essay. We can present the question in the following form—how does the capitalist class
structure prevail in an economy with a resilient and autonomous non-capitalist “outside”?
In historical materialist interpretations, the prevalence or dominance of capital is ensured
by the teleological dissolution of capital’s “outside”. In capitalocentric views, such
dominance is a non-problem since the existence of the “outside” is an effect of capital’s
dominance itself. If, in contrast, we admit a radical “outside” of capital, which is a
product of contradictory and uneven development of the capitalist social formation and
which is not subsumed to the reproduction of capital, we must, then, theorize capital’s
dominance over such a social formation where everything is possible, including the
dissolution of capital’s prevalence. The theoretical problem of dominance emerges as
soon as we recognize the uniquely overdetermined nature of the non-capitalist
“outside”—the overdetermination of capital being different from the overdetermination
of its “outside”—which makes the latter relatively autonomous and independent of
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capital and hence potentially subversive of capital’s dominance. If primitive
accumulation belongs to the relation between capital and its “outside”, that relation needs
to be further specified in terms of dominance of capital over its “outside” in the context
of a capitalist social formation, i.e. in a social formation where the capitalist class
structure prevails.
Capital, and not capitalism, constitutes the traditional Marxian theoretical problematic.
The historical rise, durability and eventual demise of capitalism are fore-ordained by the
auto-development of the forces of production. The latter is the essence of historical
materialism and thus, like all essences, stands outside the theoretical problematic itself.
Within the traditional Marxian problematic, there is no theory of a capitalist social
formation70—i.e. a theory of the dominance of capital in a social formation. The
teleology of historical materialism forecloses the emergence of the problematic by
positing pre-destined dissolution or subsumption of non-capital by capital. The moment
we reject historical materialism, we must lay bare what we mean by a capitalist social
formation. Not only do we need a Marxian theory of capital, we need a Marxian theory of
the dominance of capital in a social formation.
In our understanding, a capitalist social formation is constituted by many different class
structures—capitalist as well as non-capitalist (feudal, ancient, communist and so forth),
each with its associated conditions of existence. The capitalist social formation is a
contradictory totality with each class process—overdetermined by all other processes in
the society—subjected to “pushes and pulls” in contradictory directions. Further the
70

Capitalism is identified with the fullness of capital. Whenever such fullness or universal expanse of
capital does not exist, the social formation is considered to be less than capitalist. USA is capitalist since
non-capital is the “insignificant other” of full capital, while India is yet to be capitalist since non-capital
presents an obstacle to the fullness of capital. Such is the traditional understanding of capitalism. But see
Sanyal (2007) for an elaborate discussion and critique of this traditional understanding.
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development of any class structure has contradictory effects on other class structures—
undermining and supporting them at the same time. One effect of the contradictory and
overdetermined dynamics of a capitalist social formation is the “uneven development” of
different class structures.71 Such uneven development may take the classical form in
which capitalist production expands by dissolving spaces of non-capitalist production. On
the other hand, it’s quite possible that non-capitalist class structures proliferate faster than
capitalist class structures within a capitalist class formation. Moreover, such proliferation
of non-capitalist production may occur together with low as well as high rates of
capitalist accumulation. Furthermore, such social conjunctures may be transitional as well
as non-transitional.
Our notion of a capitalist social formation as a contradictory totality, characterized by
uneven development, recognizes the irreducible heterogeneity of any social formation
and does not “explain” such heterogeneity as an effect of any particular process—say, the
capitalist class process—which therefore acts as the essence of the social formation.
Neither does such a non-essentialist Marxian theory admit any teleological dissolution of
such heterogeneity. The act of naming such a contradictory totality is a theoretical gesture
by itself. Specifically, what do we mean by a “capitalist” social formation? Is this naming
conjunctural, in the sense that it is justified wherever we find overwhelming masses
engaged in the capitalist class process?
A conjuncture is the social formation at a specific time and place. When a conjuncture
involves the overwhelming masses of the population in one type of class relation, say
feudal, then the entire formation takes the name of the primary relation: a feudal social
formation. (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 10)

71

“Overdetermination implies uneven development” (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 10).
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Yet a different, more theoretical stance by the same authors makes use of the notion of
“prevalence” of a class process in a social formation.
What we call prevalence will be constructed differently depending on the analyst’s
theoretical framework. For us, it is possible for the majority of people in a social
formation to be engaged, say, in a noncapitalist fundamental class process and yet for a
capitalist fundamental class process to be prevalent by virtue of its effectivity upon the
non-class processes of that formation.” (Resnick and Wolff, 1987: 310).

If we accept prevalence/dominance as “effectivity” of a class structure, we can attach a
theoretical significance to primitive accumulation hitherto unarticulated in Marxian
theory and which at the same time provides a theoretical understanding of such
“effectivity”. The contradictory nature of the social formation is what we understand by
the play of the “aleatory”. Just as the “encounter” that produced capitalism was
complexly overdetermined by the entire historical context of the encounter, so is
“dominance” itself subject to the aleatory effects of its overdetermination. In other words,
both the “encounter” and the “dominance” such an encounter apparently resolves into,
are contradictory processes, always threatened by their own possible unraveling. Just as
the encounter may not have happened and may not have lasted, so is dominance itself a
provisional position forever open to subversion and reversal. The contradictory
development of a heterogeneous social formation may have the effect of creating
conditions for dissolution of the dominance of one class structure and the possible
ascendance of a different class structure. In our understanding, dominance itself is a
complexly overdetermined “encounter” between the dominant and other class structures.
In a capitalist social formation, primitive accumulation secures the “effectivity” for the
capitalist class structure in the face of this radical contingency. In other words, primitive
accumulation secures the conditions of the “dominance” of the capitalist class structure
through a series of non-teleological “encounters”. This, we emphasize, is a radically new
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understanding of primitive accumulation we present here. Contrary to the dominant
reading, we do not understand primitive accumulation as the process that enables the rise
to dominance of the capitalist class structure, while such dominance, once secured, is
self-reproducing by virtue of the essence of capital. Primitive accumulation, in our
understanding, is continuous processes that reproduces—and may simultaneously
undermine— this dominance of productive capital in a heterogeneous social formation.
Consider a capitalist social formation where the majority of the labor force is engaged in
non-capitalist class structures. The adequation of the conditions of reproduction of the
capitalist class structure may be constrained by that of non-capitalist class structures,
resulting in social tension that threatens to undermine the prevalence of the former. Since
each class structure has its unique conditions of existence and since in any given context,
the social space of reproduction of class structures is finite, there is always a conflict
between class structures over means of production, labor power, markets, credit etc.; over
the political space for power over formation of state policies; and over the cultural space
for construction of meanings and world-views. I hasten to add that development of
conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure may have the peculiar effect of
creating conditions of expansion of non-capitalist class-structures—and hence the
adequation of the conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure invariably leads
at the same time to the contested nature of such adequation .
Furthermore, the conditions of existence are arenas for, as well as targets of, class
struggles. This is part of what overdetermination means. Within and between all the
fundamental and subsumed classes of any social formation, complex contradictions
emerge and class struggles ensue over their respective economic, political and cultural
conditions of existence. Class struggles swirl around each aspect of the social formation.
Class struggles involve the taking and defending of economic and political positions as
well as religious, artistic and scientific positions. (Resnick aand Wolff, 1979: 11, italics
mine)
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How can we understand effectivity of the capitalist fundamental class process over other
class and non-class processes in such a social formation? By “effectivity” of a class
structure, we understand its ability to secure the conditions of its reproduction in a
contested social space. Such effectivity has to be secured at the economic, political and
cultural levels. At the political level, legislations are to be secured that favor the
reproduction of the capitalist class structure at the cost of other class-structures whenever
such a conflictual situation arises—e.g. land acquisition acts, intellectual property rights
etc. At the economic level, fiscal (taxation, subsidies etc.), monetary (interest rate,
inflation-targeting etc), trade (exchange rate regulation, protectionist or laissez faire
policies, etc) and infrastructure policies (highways, dams, power plants, railways etc.) are
manipulated to the advantage of the capitalist class processes and against rival noncapitalist class processes. At the cultural level, advertising, public as well as public
education, research and development, media discourses, state welfare projects help create
a representation of life that valorizes the capitalist class structure as the forces of
“Progress”.
Partly, these conditions of dominance are secured through subsumed class payments out
of the surplus produced in the capitalist class structure. From a class standpoint, the
dominance of the capitalist class structure depends crucially on the surplus commanded
by it relative to other class structures. While a theory of capital focuses on surplus
produced and appropriated within the capitalist class structure, a theory of capitalist
social formation must take into account the distribution of surplus between contesting
class-structures. The magnitude of surplus commanded by the capitalist class structure
determines its ability to secure prevalence over contested political, economic and cultural
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spaces. The different fundamental class structures struggle over conditions of existence
and their ability to succeed depends on the surplus produced and or secured by them. For
the dominance of the capitalist class structure in a social formation, what is required,
therefore, is a particular (unequal) distribution of surplus across class-structures such that
conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure are ensured at the expense of
others. This particular unequal distribution of surplus may obtain in many different ways.
First, capitalist production may enable a faster growth in technical and/or value
productivity of labor—and consequently higher rate of exploitation and possibly a greater
mass of surplus—compared to non-capitalist production. Such presumed superiority of
the capitalist fundamental class process vis-à-vis its non-capitalist counterparts is
premised on continuous and radical transformations in the labor process under capitalist
class relations, generalized commodity production leading to specialization under
capitalism, competition between capitalists, accumulation of productive capital that such
competition may occasion etc. This view underlies the classical belief in the inevitable
victory of capitalist over pre-capitalist forms relations of production.
Second, the capitalists may secure a flow of value from non-capitalist class processes
through unequal exchange and monopoly pricing. Variants of this view have dominated
the Marxian discourse on underdevelopment. When capitalist commodities meet noncapitalist commodities, the terms of trade may deviate from equal exchange price ratios.
Equal exchange between capitalist and non-capitalist commodities takes place when
terms of trade are such that each class structure as a whole exactly retains its appropriated
surplus. However, terms of trade may differ from such ideal exchange ratios, depending
on the bargaining power of capitalists vis-à-vis non-capitalist surplus appropriators. In
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case of unequal exchange, there may be a flow of value as subsumed class payments to
the capitalist enterprises from non-capitalist enterprises.72 A similar situation arises when
capitalist C-goods enterprises are monopolistic while non-capitalist enterprises buying
those capitalist C-commodities are competitive. Again, a part of the labor process
involved in the production of a capitalist commodity may be sub-contracted out to noncapitalist enterprises. Such non-capitalist enterprises may or may not be dependent, i.e.
tied to the parent capitalist enterprise, depending on whether the latter is the sole
purchaser of the non-capitalist product or not. In case of dependence, the capitalists may
be able to obtain value-flows from non-capitalist enterprises to which they subcontract
parts of their production process as subsumed class payments through unequal exchange.
Third, conditions of existence of non-capitalist enterprises may be so modified within
capitalism and as a result of reproduction of capitalist production itself that the
(expanded) production of surplus within the non-capitalist fundamental class processes
may be thwarted. This third case exemplifies the role played by primitive accumulation in
securing the dominance of the capitalist class structure in social formations. Primitive
accumulation leads to the separation of labor power from means of production in noncapitalist fundamental class processes. But such separation may not imply dissolution of
the non-capitalist class structures. Such separation may primarily take the form of a flow
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This was the basic idea behind Preobrazhensky’s (1926) notion of “primitive socialist accumulation” in
the context of industrialization in Soviet Russia. Resnick and Wolff (2002) argue that industrial enterprises
in Soviet Union were state capitalist enterprises. In the 1920s, when Preobrazhensky presented his
arguments, agriculture was largely ancient in Soviet Russia. In that context, the transfer of already
appropriated value from agriculture to industry constitutes a transfer of value from non-capitalist to
capitalist class structures as subsumed class payments. Also see Chaudhury, Chakrabarti and Das (2000)
for a theoretical model of how the “ancient” economy may actually end up losing its value to the capitalist
economy via the pricing mechanism. Further, see Chakrabarti and Cullenberg (2003)—a work that belongs
to the “overdetermination” school of Marxism—who define primitive accumulation as the transfer of labor
time from non-capitalist to capitalist class process. Although the present dissertation belongs to the same
school of Marxism, my differences with Chakrabarti and Cullenberg should be obvious.
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of means of production from the non-capitalist to the capitalist class processes, whether
or not capitalist accumulation absorbs the separated labor power. One effect of primitive
accumulation is thus a more difficult and precarious access of non-capitalist producers to
means of production. Hence, in so far as access to means of production is one condition
of production/expansion of surplus labor, primitive accumulation depresses non-capitalist
surplus. At the same time, by enabling capitalists to gain access to means of production,
primitive accumulation enables a higher production of capitalist surplus. Thus primitive
accumulation secures an unequal distribution of surplus across class-structures.
It is this significance of primitive accumulation that places it right at the heart of
reproduction of capitalism. This understanding of primitive accumulation is explored in
greater details in the rest of the thesis. It is clear that Althusser’s notion of the
“encounter” looms large in this particular understanding of primitive accumulation.
Reproduction of capital requires an “encounter” of elements in their constitutive
capacities—i.e. a coming together of constitutive processes—that reproduces the
conditions of existence of capital. Such “encounter” is contingent and open to subversion
by other “encounters” constitutive of something other than capital, i.e. non-capital.
Primitive accumulation is the process that partly contributes to the “encounter”
constitutive of capital by subverting “encounters” constitutive of non-capital—in other
words, primitive accumulation contributes to the “encounter” constitutive of the
dominance of capital.
The arguments presented so far in this chapter contribute to the production of a new
understanding of primitive accumulation that is very different from what prevails in the
Marxian tradition. In Chapter III, I will present a more elaborate exposition of the basic
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theoretical position presented here. However, I emphasize the following points regarding
this new understanding of primitive accumulation. First, primitive accumulation is
displaced from the context of transition and is re-conceptualized as a continuous process
constitutive of capitalism. Second, the problem of primitive accumulation is situated
within a theoretical framework that accepts overdetermination as the basic ontological
principle. Finally, we retain the unique Marxian perspective by focusing on the classeffects of dispossession and by problematizing the notion of primitive accumulation in
the context of class-dominance of capital in a social formation.

Capital, Primitive Accumulation and Labor
I have argued, in chapter I, that the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation
poses the following theoretical problem before the anti-essentialist Marxian tradition. It is
clear that to understand primitive accumulation as a continuous process, one must posit a
resilient “outside” of capital. Hence, one must identify the problem of primitive
accumulation, not as a moment of teleological dissolution of the “outside”, but as a
process that occurs alongside the reproduction of both capital and its “outside”. Of
course, the problem is not posed as such in the contemporary literature. What we read in
the contemporary literature is the difficult and uncertain emergence of the problem. Let
me emphasize what in my understanding constitutes the fundamental discontinuity
between the classical and contemporary views on primitive accumulation.
In the final analysis, Marx’s emphasis on dispossession/separation stems from his
specific views of labor (as a source of surplus value) and non-capital (as antithetical to
capital). First, for Marx, labor power in capitalist production is the source of surplus
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value. The capitalists purchase labor power as a commodity in the market and appropriate
surplus labor of the wage-workers as surplus value. This is the specific form of class
exploitation in capitalist production. The conditions of existence of the specifically
capitalist form of exploitation include i) commodity-producing labor and ii)
commodification of labor power itself. Second, the antithetical nature of non-capital is
understandable once we recognize that non-capital presents possibilities of
decommodification of labor-power, particularly when the non-capitalist space allows reunification of the laborer with means of production. For example, the ancients’ economy
in white settler-colonies (North America, Australia etc.) prevented the consolidation of
the wage-labor market.
In a specific reading of the contemporary literature—aligned with the theoretical
objective of this dissertation—I argue that contemporary thoughts on primitive
accumulation have displaced the notion of primitive accumulation from this classical
theoretical context. I have argued in the previous chapter that several of prominent
contemporary interventions have emphasized the “enrichment” aspect of primitive
accumulation. In doing so, they have often posited the non-capitalist “outside” as a
source of non-capitalist surplus labor—to be extracted as rent or other kinds of subsumed
class revenues by otherwise productive capitalist enterprises—or as a condition, in the
sense Luxemburg, Lenin, Harvey etc. understand it, for realization of expanded capitalist
surplus value. At the same time, the classical objective of primitive accumulation—the
creation of dispossessed proletarians—drops out of the picture. As my reading of Sanyal,
Basu and De Angelis shows, the social outcome of primitive accumulation, in certain
social conjunctures, is not the class of capitalist wage-workers, but a “surplus population”
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(Sanyal) or the detritus (De Angelis). The “surplus population” gets engaged in noncapitalist class structures—either as a result of welfarist interventions or through their
own political struggles. However may the non-capitalist space emerge, its emergence at
the same time makes it a target of primitive accumulation with similar consequences.
What we have, then, is a ceaseless dissolution and creation of a non-capitalist space while
the “surplus population” itself traverses the entire history of change. The problem before
the Marxian tradition is to present a new ontology of labor in capitalism that does not
essentialize its role as the producer of surplus value for the capitalists. In short, we have
to face the condition of the laborer in circumstances of her possible redundancy vis-à-vis
the capitalists.

The Reserve Army of Labor
Marx had a very specific approach to the problem of overpopulation in capitalism,
distinct from the popular Malthussian view on the subject. Contrary to Malthuss’s
universal and natural law of overpopulation, Marx asserted that, “[i]n different modes of
social production there are different laws of the increase of population and of
overpopulation” (Marx, 1973: 604). Marx’s writings on the problem of overpopulation or
surplus population—more precisely, his notion of a reserve army of laborers—
subsequently had an enormous impact on Marxian analyses of capitalism. For Marx, the
reserve army of laborers is a form of surplus population historically specific to
capitalism. In later Marxist theories, however, the reserve army came to be interpreted as
the only rather than a specific form of surplus population in capitalism. One consequence
of this theoretical displacement was an extremely capitalocentric notion of labor in
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capitalism. Marxists tended to subsume the labor force as a whole to capital. According
to this capitalocentric view, the active part of the labor force is exploited by capital, while
the inactive part of it—the reserve army of labor—provides certain conditions of
existence of such exploitation, by depressing wages to the level of the value of labor
power. Thus, the entire labor force is subsumed to the capitalist exploitative class
relations.
In Capital Vol. I, Marx’s use of the concept of surplus population or reserve army of
labor presupposes a steady dissolution of all non-capitalist class relations and the
universal spread of capitalist class relations over the social formation, so that Marx could
then talk of the labor force as entirely subsumed to capital in its active and inactive
forms. When such universalization of capitalist class relations is absent, the concept of
surplus population—in the specific manner Marx used it in Capital Vol.I—should be
understood in its abstractness in relation to capital and not in its concreteness in the
context of a social formation. In a capitalist social formation, both capitalist and noncapitalist class structures are present. The conceptualization of a surplus population—i.e.
a part of the labor force that is “surplus” relative to capital—becomes more difficult in
such a context. One dominant tendency within the Marxian tradition has been to subsume
a part or whole of the non-capitalist economy—along with the usual unemployed—to the
reserve army of labor. However, I argue that such a characterization of non-capital robs
the latter of its radical otherness, unless we transform the very meaning of surplus
population in the given context.
Marx considered three forms of surplus population—latent, stagnant and floating. The
“latent” relative surplus population is typically associated with capitalist transformation
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of agriculture. A part of the traditional non-capitalist agricultural labor force is rapidly
transformed into a redundant labor force in capitalist agriculture. This redundant labor
force is always looking to migrate to non-agricultural, primarily urban, employment. The
steady migration of laborers from rural to urban areas “pre-supposes, in the country itself,
a constant latent surplus-population, the extent of which becomes evident only when its
channels of outlet open to exceptional width” (Marx, 1912: 705). The “floating” form of
the relative surplus population is really the industrial reserve army of laborers—
periodically repelled and attracted by capitalist factories. Both the latent and floating
forms of surplus population exist as unemployed or under-employed labor force. As
unemployed, they are dependent for subsistence on the wages of the proletariat as well as
other subsumed class-incomes of the capitalist class-structure. As under-employed, they
may find occasional unproductive or productive employment in capitalist economy or
they may temporarily sustain themselves as ancients.
The “stagnant” part of the relative surplus population forms a part of the active labor
force. This labor force is typically active as home-based workers under sub-contracting or
putting-out relationship with capitalist manufacturers. Typically, a part of the labor
process in which capitalist commodities are produced, is contracted out to laborers
working outside the factory, within their household premises. Marx refers to “domestic
industry”—characterized by extremely irregular employment and inhuman workconditions—as the chief form of the stagnant part of the relative surplus population73.
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See Kay (1989). “This modern so-called domestic industry has nothing, except the name, in common
with the old-fashioned domestic industry, the existence of which pre-supposes independent urban
handicrafts, independent peasant farming, and above all, a dwelling-house for the labourer and his family.
That old-fashioned department has now been converted into an outside department of the factory, the
manufactory, or the warehouse. Besides the factory operatives, the manufacturing workmen and the
handicraftsmen, whom it concentrates in large masses at one spot, and directly commands, capital also sets
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Marx talks about domestic industries as the “last resorts of the masses made “redundant”
by Modern Industry and Agriculture” (Marx, 1912: 505).
The third category of the relative surplus-population, the stagnant, forms a part of the active
labour army, but with extremely irregular employment…….We have learnt to know its
chief form under the rubric of “domestic industry”. It recruits itself constantly from the
supernumerary forces of modern industry and agriculture, and specially from those
decaying branches of industry where handicraft is yielding to manufacture, manufacture to
machinery. (Marx, 1912: 705).

In class terms, domestic industry may include i) dependent labor force in putting-out
relationship with capitalist manufacturers ii) ancient producers in sub-contracting
relationship with capitalist manufacturers and iii) capitalist units in sub-contracting
relationship with parent capitalist manufacturers. All three cases are instances of
production within the household premises74.
Under putting-out relationship, the homeworker may or may not be required to provide
for her own instruments of labor while the capitalist supplies raw materials, specifies the
design and volume of the product, and pays an amount to the homeworker sufficient to
reproduce her labor power.
In the outside department of the factory, of the manufactory and of the warehouse, the socalled domestic workers, whose employment is at the best irregular, are entirely dependent
for their raw material and their order on the caprice of the capitalist, who, in this industry, is
not hampered by any regard for depreciation of his buildings and machinery, and risks
nothing by a stoppage of work, but the skin of the worker himself. (Marx, 1912: 524)

The homeworker in the putting-out relationship is neither a wage-laborer supervised by
managers within a factory nor is an ancient who has independent access to means of
production as well as the market for the final products and who thus can appropriate her
surplus value. The laborer in putting-out relationship is a hybrid of an ancient and a

in motion, by means, of invisible threads, another army; that of the workers in the domestic industries, who
dwell in the large towns and are also scattered over the face of the country”. (Marx, 1912: 504).
74
Sanyal (2007) discusses all these three cases as informalization within the circuit of capital and which
therefore, for him, belong to the accumulation-economy.

105

capitalist wage-worker and is often commonly referred to as “disguised proletariat”. In
the putting-out relationship, the capitalist appropriates the entire surplus product of the
home worker.
In case of ancient and capitalist sub-contractors, we have ancient and fundamental class
processes articulated to a third (parent) capitalist fundamental class process.
The lace finishing is done either in what are called “mistresses’ houses, or by women in
their own houses, with or without the help of their children. The women who keep the
“mistresses’ houses” are themselves poor. The workroom is in a private house. The
mistresses take orders from manufacturers, or from warehousemen, and employ as many
women, girls, and young children as the size of their rooms and the fluctuating demand of
the business will allow.(Marx, 1912: 510-511)

In case of ancient and capitalist sub-contractors, the parent capitalist enterprise often
secures a part of the surplus value appropriated by ancient and capitalist sub-contractors
as subsumed class revenue through unequal exchange, depending on the bargaining
power of the parent capitalists vis-à-vis ancient and capitalist sub-contractors. The ability
of the parent capitalist enterprises to secure subsumed class revenues from ancient and
capitalist sub-contractors depends on the nature of the sub-contracting relationship itself.
If the ancient and capitalist sub-contractors are dependent on orders from the parent
capitalist enterprises and do not have independent access to commodity markets and
hence the power to negotiate prices, they have to make a subsumed class payment to the
parent capitalist enterprise by selling their commodities below their values. It seems that
Marx did consider the dependent form of sub-contracting where employment was
extremely irregular and wholly subjugated to the “business model” (degree of vertical
integration, nature of technology, contracts with workers’ unions etc.) followed by the
parent capitalist enterprises. Other than these three categories of surplus population, Marx
mentions paupers and the “dangerous classes” of the society. The paupers include able-
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bodied adults, adults whose labor power are no longer suitable for capitalist employment,
“orphans and pauper children”, widows etc. The “dangerous classes” include vagabonds,
criminals etc.
Ignoring natural growth of labor force, there are two major reasons for the emergence of
a relative surplus population—the nature of capitalist accumulation and primitive
accumulation. Usually, capitalist accumulation with an increasing average organic
composition of capital (i.e. with technological improvement) reduces75 and capitalist
accumulation with a constant average composition of capital (i.e. on the same technical
basis) expands the productive labor force. On the other hand, primitive accumulation
dissolves non-capitalist enterprises and releases dispossessed producers who may swell
the ranks of the surplus population. It should be obvious that, for Marx, surplus
population is not equal to the unemployed or inactive part of the labor force. It also
includes a part of the active labor force in both agriculture and industry. Further, the
surplus population may be located in a variety of class and non-class processes. But, in
Marx’s presentation of the subject, the surplus population as a whole and in all its
heterogeneity is subsumed to capital.
First, the relative surplus population is subsumed to capital in the sense that it provides a
mass of laborers at disposal of the capitalists. The “floating” part of the relative surplus
population is directly subjugated to the dynamics of capitalist accumulation—being
recruited and retrenched periodically by the capitalist industries engaged in competition
and accumulation. The “latent” part of the relative surplus population is a product of both
75

“The positing of a specific portion of labor capacities as superfluous, i.e. of the labour required for their
reproduction as superfluous, is therefore a necessary consequence of the growth of surplus labor relative to
necessary. The decrease of relatively necessary labour appears as increase of the relatively superfluous
labouring capacities—i.e. as the positing of surplus population” (Marx, 1973: 609).
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capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation in agriculture and is “therefore
constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on
the look-out for circumstances favourable to this transformation” (Marx, 1912: 705). The
stagnant part of the surplus population, mainly homeworkers in “domestic industries”, is,
in effect, a dispersion of capitalist production and has no autonomous conditions of
existence other than that of the ‘parent’ capitalist industries. In this sense, the stagnant
segment of the relative surplus population “furnishes to capital an inexhaustible reservoir
of disposable labor-power” (Marx, 1912: 705). Finally, even the paupers are exploited by
capital at times of rapid accumulation76.
Both the latent and the segment of the relative surplus population have often been
assumed to be transitional in nature77. Industrial capitalist accumulation absorbs the rural
surplus labor power in the long run and the productivity of labor power under the factory
regime finally makes sub-contracting to “domestic industries” an inefficient business
model for capitalists. However, there is no necessity to assume that latent and stagnant
segments of the relative surplus population are transitional forms. Latter Marxian
scholarship on the so-called informal or unorganized sector in both developed and
developing countries has documented how domestic homeworkers and surplus rural
labor-power may co-exist and even expand with capitalist accumulation in the long run.

76

“One need only glance superficially at the statistics of English pauperism to find that the quantity of
paupers increases with every crisis, and diminishes with every revival of trade. Second, orphans and pauper
children. These are candidates for the industrial reserve army, and are, in times of great
prosperity….speedily and in large numbers enrolled in the active army of labourers……pauperism forms a
condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of wealth.” (Marx, 1912: 706-707)
77
See Nun (2000), Kay(1989) etc.
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The second sense in which the relative surplus population is subsumed to capital is that it
is maintained directly or indirectly by class and non-class incomes generated in capitalist
production78.
If the latter [the surplus population] is supported, then this comes not out of the labour fund
but out of the revenue of all classes. It takes place not through the labour of the labour
capacity itself—no longer through its normal reproduction as worker, but rather the worker
is maintained as a living being through the mercy of others; hence becomes a tramp and a
pauper; …..secondly: society in its fractional parts undertakes for Mr. Capitalist the
business of keeping his virtual instrument of labour—its wear and tear—intact as reserve
for later use. He shifts a part of the reproduction costs of the working class off his own
shoulders and thus pauperizes a part of the remaining population for his own profit (Marx,
1973: 609-10).

This aspect of subjugation of the surplus population to capital—i.e. its maintenance
through charity—becomes most visible in latter-day welfare-states, in which all class and
non-class incomes in the capitalist economy are taxed by the state to maintain and
reproduce the labor-power of the unemployed.
The subsumption of surplus population to capital presupposes either the ultimate
dissolution of non-capitalist fundamental class processes in the process of capitalist
accumulation or their subsumption to capitalist class processes. Once the surplus
population is thus subsumed to capital, its movements are solely determined by the
dynamics of capitalist accumulation.
The law, finally, that always equilibrates the relative surplus population, or industrial
reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets the labourer to
capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. (Marx, 1912:
709)

In these conditions, the reserve army of laborers and the surplus population are
synonymous—since the entire surplus population is maintained by capital as a reserve for
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This is not true for all categories of surplus population. For example, the ancient sub-contractor may earn
his subsistence through performance of labor. But in so far as her performance of labor is at the mercy of
the (parent) capitalist enterprise, she is dependent on capital for the maintenance of her labor power.
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use during rapid accumulation. The reserve army of labor is redundant at one point of
time and necessary at another point of time, for reproduction of capitalist fundamental
class processes. Strictly speaking, the reserve army of labor is not redundant / superfluous
with respect to capital—its redundancy at one point of time being a condition of its
necessity at another point of time. The reserve army of labor is thus a condition of
existence of the capitalist fundamental class process.

Surplus Population vs. the Reserve Army of Labor
The condition of redundancy of labor power with respect to capital implies that the
redundant surplus labor power is a condition of existence of something other than capital,
i.e. non-capital. This notion of a surplus labor power is more adequate in the context of a
capitalist social formation in which capitalist and non-capitalist fundamental class
processes co-exist. In such a social context, the reserve army of labor has to be
distinguished from surplus population and the latter has to be invested with a new
meaning. Such a distinction already exists—though not widely used—in the Marxian
tradition.
The Latin American “marginalist” school of thought79 has argued that developing
countries, particularly in Latin America, are characterized by a “marginal mass” of
laborers that is quite distinct from the traditional reserve army of labor. This distinction
has been most consistently held by Jose Nun (2000), according to whom the reserve army
of laborers is that part of the surplus population which is functional to the accumulation
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See Nun (2000), Quijano and Westwell (1983). See Kay (1989) for a discussion of the “marginalist”
theory.
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of productive capital, while the “marginal mass” is the “non-functional” part of the
surplus population.
[M]y marginal mass thesis was meant to question a left hyperfunctionalism, wherein even
the last landless peasant in Latin America (or Africa) was considered to be functional to the
reproduction of capitalist exploitation. On the contrary, I tried to show that in many places a
surplus population was growing that in the best of cases was simply irrelevant to the
hegemonic sector of the economy and in the worst of the cases endangered its stability. This
presented the established order with the political problem of managing such nonfunctional
surpluses to prevent them from being dysfunctional (Nun, 2000: 12, italics mine)

By the “hegemonic” sector, Nun refers to the technologically dynamic monopolistic
capitalist sector in developing countries while the marginal mass is composed of “(1) part
of the labour employed by competitive industrial capital; (2) the majority of the workers
who take refuge in low income activities in the service sector; (3) the majority of the
unemployed; and (4) all the labour force which is secured by commercial capital, thereby
lacking mobility” (Kay, 1989: 103).
Anibal Quijano’s earlier position closely resembles Nun’s, though in his latter writings he
regarded marginal mass as a particular form of reserve army of labor80 (Kay, 1989: 110).
Closely following Nun, Quijano maintains a distinction between the hegemonic and
marginal ‘poles’ of the economy. According to Quijano, the competitive industrial
capitalist sector will decline in the long-run due to the operations of monopoly capital and
the “marginal pole” will expand through an increase in the number of “marginal petty
bourgeois” (the self-employed) and the “marginal proletariat” (who get temporary and
irregular productive and unproductive employment in the lower circuits of the capitalist
sector). The marginal mass is not directly functional to the expanded production of
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Both Kay (1989) and Nun (2000) argue that Quijano’s use of the notion of marginal labor force in his
latter writings is close to Marx’s categories of stagnant surplus population.
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surplus value in the hegemonic sector, though they may play a role in the realization of
surplus value—i.e. as a market for commodities of the hegemonic sector.
Similarly, Sanyal (2007) argues, in the Indian context, that surplus population should be
emphatically distinguished from the reserve army of labor. The latter is internal to
accumulating capital, while the former constitutes the outside of accumulating capital.
The surplus population belongs to the “need-economy” in Sanyal’s analysis and they are
the victims of primitive accumulation and exclusion by the “accumulation-economy”.
Sanyal’s “need-economy” consists of both ancient and small non-accumulating capitalist
enterprises. The “need-economy” is redundant as far as the economic conditions of the
“accumulation-economy” are concerned, though it is crucial—in its role as a space for
rehabilitation of the surplus population—for political and cultural conditions of existence
of the “accumulation economy”.
It is interesting to see that two different theoretical positions, developed independently
and in the context of different social formations, converge so closely on a basic dualistic
understanding of the social formations in developing countries—the dualism captured
either in terms of a hegemonic/marginal or accumulation/need distinction. However, the
dualism in both cases is not class-specified. The marginal mass and the need-economy
are locations of heterogeneous class and non-class positions of the surplus population,
including those specific to capital. In my understanding, in both these theories, the
surplus population is defined in relation to accumulation rather than capital. One probable
reason for this is that these theoretical positions stress the non-functionality of the surplus
population with respect to accumulation in contrast to its functionality as stressed by
Marx.
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But, more importantly, what these theoretical positions point to is a non-capitalist—
predominantly ancient—location of the surplus population. Hence, one outcome of both
accumulation of productive capital and primitive accumulation is the emergence of new
non-capitalist fundamental class processes. The emergence of surplus population captures
the contradiction that inheres in the reproduction of the capitalist class structure—the
contradiction being that the reproduction of capital is at the same time the production of
conditions of existence of non-capital. In order to identify such contradiction, we
however need to understand surplus population in relation to capital rather than its
accumulation. Furthermore, in so far as we are concerned with the “outside” of capital
and the problematic of the “dominance” of capital in the presence of such an “outside”,
we define surplus population as that part of the labor force—rendered surplus by capital
relative to itself, i.e. in excess of a “notional” or “real” reserve army of laborers, through
both labor-saving accumulation of capital and primitive accumulation—which inhabits a
non-capitalist “outside” of capital.
The moment we posit a non-capitalist outside of capital, the problematic of primitive
accumulation arises. Surplus population is subsumed to capital in Marx and hence does
not constitute an “outside” of capital. Surplus population is literally a reservoir of labor
power maintained by the value created in the capitalist class structure and therefore
doesn’t belong to an autonomous non-capitalist production space
However, as soon as we understand non-capitalist class structures as locations of surplus
population, we admit that the surplus population is maintained by value (or use-values in
case of non-commodity production) created in non-capitalist class structures. Hence, we
have means of production united with labor power outside the domain of capital. But this
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is precisely the moment of the emergence of the problematic of primitive accumulation.
In Marx’s conceptualization, the surplus population belongs to the problematic of
capitalist accumulation, primitive accumulation having completed its historic role of
dissolving non-capital. In our understanding, the surplus population, by inhabiting a noncapitalist “outside”, inscribes primitive accumulation at the heart of the problematic of
capitalist accumulation. This is the difference between Marx’s notion of the surplus
population and the notion deployed here.
In the context of non-capitalist locations of surplus population, we can still talk of a
reserve army of laborers subsumed to capital, i.e. a part of the surplus population directly
maintained by capital as an inactive reserve army for its accumulation. This is possible at
particular conjunctures in capitalist social formations in richer societies, where a reserve
army of unemployed is maintained through official welfare policies, while the surplus
population—that is a part of the labor force rendered redundant by capital relative to
itself, i.e. in excess of the reserve army—belongs to the non-capitalist class structures.
Certain economic conditions must prevail for this social conjuncture to emerge. First, the
size of the capitalist surplus value must be such relative to the inactive unemployed labor
force as to make possible the maintenance of the latter through welfare policies81.
Second, the non-capitalist class structures must have a certain viability and hence pose a
certain barrier to capitalist accumulation, so that securing additional labor power or
means of production from non-capitalist class structures in times of rapid accumulation
becomes uncertain, thus forcing capitalists to maintain a reserve army at their own
expense. However, the subsumed class payments required to maintain the reserve army
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We make the simplifying assumption that unemployment benefits are funded by taxing surplus value.
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may be quite high in the presence of prosperous non-capitalist class structures, thus
threatening one or several conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure. In such
a situation, the capitalists may get rid of the welfare mechanisms and with it the
subsumed class payments associated with it. This action by capitalists gives birth to new
contradictions and problems for the capitalists, as discussed below.
In capitalist social formations of certain poorer societies—the kind considered by Nun or
Sanyal—the reserve army of laborers is purely “notional”. The potentially inactive labor
force is too large relative to the capitalist surplus value to be maintained as an actually
inactive labor force. Secondly, the potential size of the inactive labor force is larger than
the portion of it required as reserve laborers for accumulation. The costs of maintenance
of the potential inactive labor force exceed what is required to secure the conditions of
accumulation. This cost—to be defrayed as a subsumed class payment—will jeopardize
other conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure, including accumulation
itself. Therefore, it makes sense for capitalists to get rid of such costs by shifting the
weight of the inactive labor force to the non-capitalist class structures. Such an action by
capitalists has contradictory implications for their own reproduction. On the one hand, the
capitalists get rid of the subsumed class payments required for maintaining the inactive
labor force and thus expand the part of the surplus value available for accumulation. On
the other hand, the expansion of non-capitalist class structures as a result of an influx of
surplus population expands at the same time non-capitalist claims on means of production
and labor power and this may undermine the conditions of expansion of capitalist surplus
value, including the capitalists’ access to labor power and means of production.
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Therefore, reproduction of the capitalist surplus value via the production of a surplus
population has contradictory effects on the conditions of reproduction.
As my reading of Marx’s “colonial” problem illustrates, the presence of a prosperous
non-capitalist economy may deny the capitalists access to commodified labor power and,
I may add here, means of production (say, land). Just as the development of towns within
the feudal social formation led to a flight of serfs from the country-side, so might the
development of non-capitalist class structures—particularly of the non-exploitative
type—allow workers to escape capitalist exploitation. This is particularly possible if
workers see an opportunity in non-capitalist class structures to appropriate and control the
surplus they themselves produce. Hence, the reproduction of the capitalist class structure
in the presence of expanding non-capitalist class structures is possible and secure only if
the conditions of expansion of the latter are such as to depress the surplus produced
relative to the magnitude of subsumed class payments necessary for the existence of such
surplus, so that the reproduction of the entire non-capitalist class structure, including the
reproduction of the labor power of the direct producers, may be threatened. In such
circumstances the non-capitalist space ceases to present any effective barrier to the
commodification of labor power that is so crucial to the existence of the capitalist
fundamental class process. It is precisely here that primitive accumulation acquires
theoretical significance as one among several processes that may have such effectivity on
the non-capitalist surplus and hence may play a crucial role in securing the dominance of
capital.
As I have argued before, primitive accumulation may take the primary form of
appropriation of means of production from non-capitalist class structures without a
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proportionate absorption of the “separated” labor power, producing a surplus population
in the process. If we add to it labor-saving modes of capitalist accumulation, then noncapitalist class structures may expand at the same time that their access to means of
production is undermined by primitive accumulation. This is probably what prompts
Quijano to define the “marginal pole” of the economy as “a set of occupations or
activities established around the use of residual resources of production” (Quijano quoted
in Nun, 2000: 26). Thus the conditions of existence and prosperity of the non-capitalist
class structure are undermined by the very processes of primitive accumulation that
secure conditions of expansion of the capitalist class structure on the one hand and
produce a surplus population on the other hand. The surplus population itself continues to
belong to non-capitalist class structures with a more precarious access to means of
production than before, as a result of primitive accumulation. The pressure of the surplus
population on the non-capitalist class structures has the effect of depressing the
appropriated surplus relative to what is necessary for their reproduction and hence
undermines the ability of the non-capitalist appropriators of surplus to contest the
capitalists over political, economic and cultural conditions of existence.
The notions of primitive accumulation and surplus population thus enable us to theorize,
in class terms, the dominance of capital in social formations where expansion of capital
occurs alongside an expansion of non-capital, i.e. the dominance of capital over a
resilient “outside”.
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Conclusion
To sum up, I claim to make the following contributions to Marxian theory with the new
understanding of primitive accumulation advanced in this chapter. First, the notion of
primitive accumulation is de-historicized, defined in a new and precise sense (in classterms) and introduced to the field of Marxian economic theory. I claim that the new
notion addresses the conceptual problems, encountered in the contemporary literature, in
positing it as a continuous process constitutive of capitalism. Second, the distinction
between capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation—a thorny problem in the
contemporary debate— is clearly etched out in the new understanding. The idea that
capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation mutually constitute each other is a
departure within the Marxian tradition which has so far treated them as alternate modes
of expansion of capital. Third, the dominance of capital in a social formation is
introduced as a theoretical problematic and a new significance of primitive accumulation
is uncovered within this problematic. Fourth, a new perspective is developed for the
study of certain social formations with significant presence of non-capitalist class
structures and surplus population. In the process, a conceptual distinction between the
surplus population and Marx’s notion of the reserve army of laborers is delineated. The
concepts of surplus population and primitive accumulation are deployed together to
account for the dominance of capital in such a social formation.
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CHAPTER 4

PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION, SURPLUS POPULATION AND THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM: A MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF A
SOCIAL FORMATION WITH CAPITALIST AND ANCIENT CLASS
STRUCTURES
Introduction
Reproduction of capitalism is reproduction of dominance of the capitalist class structure
over a heterogeneous social formation. In Chapter II, I presented a new theoretical
understanding of primitive accumulation as a process, among others, that secures such
dominance. Primitive accumulation—itself not a class process—has crucial class-effects
that secure such dominance. There are as many forms of such dominance as there are
kinds of capitalism. Consequently, primitive accumulation itself takes different forms in
different capitalist social formations. Hence, the determinate class-effects of primitive
accumulation can be specified only in a concrete social context. I presented a general
theoretical analysis of the class-effects of primitive accumulation in a particular class of
social formations (e.g. certain postcolonial societies) characterized by a “surplus
population”. I argued that in such a social formation dispossession may not lead to any
final dissolution of non-capitalist class structures; rather, it may entail their ceaseless
destruction and creation. In such a scenario, the class-effects of primitive accumulation
can be theorized in terms of the latter’s peculiar effectivity on the surplus produced in
capitalist and non-capitalist class structures, namely, a skewed distribution of surplus
between class structures and in favor of the capitalists. Further determination of the classeffects of primitive accumulation requires specification of such a social formation in
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terms of its determinate class-structures, the specific class and non-class locations of the
surplus population and the particular modes of articulation of different class-structures.
In this chapter, I make an attempt to theorize, i.e. concretize further, the class-effects of
primitive accumulation in a social formation characterized by capitalist and ancient class
structures, and where the surplus population predominantly inhabits the ancient economy.
I consider the scenario where the ancient economy dominates in terms of labor force, but
the capitalist economy dominates in terms of surplus. Such a specification still rests at a
relatively abstract level, in so far as it assumes away other non-capitalist class structures
(e.g. feudal, communist, slave etc.) as well as other possible class and non-class (e.g.
state and non-state welfare) locations of surplus population. This abstraction enables me
to theorize a social conjuncture that has some general relevance in studying many
developing societies.
Once again Marx’s analysis of the “colonial problem” haunts and inspires the theoretical
endeavor in this chapter. To repeat, in my understanding, Marx’s colonial problem points
to the theoretical problematic of the dominance of the capitalist class structure over a
heterogeneous economy. For Marx, the prosperity of the ancients in the settler-colonies
undermined the conditions of dominance of the capitalist class structure. Primitive
accumulation played a crucial role in undermining the conditions of existence of ancient
enterprises and in the development of capitalism.
More generally, in surplus terms, the prosperity of the ancients depends on the production
and use of their surplus. In this chapter I theoretically argue how primitive accumulation
may undermine the prosperity of the ancients without their final dissolution. Like the
colonial problem in Marx’s Capital, here, I try to understand how the dominance of
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capital is reproduced in the presence of an economy of the ancients. Unlike the colonial
problem, I consider how such dominance is secured without any dissolution of the
ancient class structures. Thus the kind of capitalism I consider is different from that in the
colonies Marx talks about. Hence, the determinate class-effects of primitive accumulation
are different too. Despite such differences, Marx’s basic theoretical insight carries over to
the specific social context I choose to study.

A Capitalist Social Formation with Surplus Population
We consider a simple ‘model’ of a capitalist social formation with capitalist and ancient
enterprises embedded in an exchange economy. The ancient economy dominates in terms
of labor force. The capitalist economy dominates in terms of surplus value. We consider a
closed economy—i.e., international exchange of commodities as well as movements of
labor power and means of production is assumed away. To begin our analysis, let us
assume that the labor force or the total mass of labor power in the economy is constant,
i.e. growth rate of labor force is zero. Further, some indispensable means of production
are presumed to be in fixed supply to the economy as a whole. Let us give the name
‘land’ to such scarce means of production. Expansion of the capitalist output may require
additional supplies of either or both of labor power and means of production separated
from each other. Primitive accumulation takes place when the expanding capitalist
economy secures additional labor power or additional quantities of land by dispossessing
the ancients.
At this point, I distinguish between the terms “class structure”, “economy” and “social
formation” as they will be used in this study. A class structure is an ensemble of a
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specific fundamental class process and its unique set of subsumed class processes. A
social formation consists of different class structures subjected to uneven development,
ceaseless transformations and ubiquitous contradictions both within and between class
structures. When one class structure dominates in a social formation, the social formation
derives its name from the dominant class structure. In this model, the capitalist class
structure is dominant.
An “economy” is defined around a specific class structure, yet it is a broader concept. An
economy is a sub-set of the social formation organized around the value created in a
particular class structure. More precisely, an “economy” is the entire set of class and nonclass processes that are sustained by the total value-added in a particular class structure.
In our model, for example, the total value-added in all ancient enterprises sustains a
certain share of the total labor force in ancient fundamental and subsumed class positions
as well as non-class positions. Likewise, we can think of a capitalist economy. Therefore,
the simplified ‘model’ of the capitalist social formation we study here consists of a
capitalist and an ancient economy.
The value-added in an enterprise is the value of the commodities produced in the
enterprise minus the value of means of production used up in the production of the
commodities. When we aggregate the value-added of all enterprises with a specific classstructure, we get the total value-added in the specific class-structure.
For the ancient economy,
VA(A) = ∑ VA(Ai) = ∑ [W(Ai) – C(Ai)] = ∑ [V(Ai) + S(Ai)]=V(A)+S(A).
For the capitalist economy,
VA(K) = ∑ VA(Ki) = ∑ [W(Ki) – C(Ki)] = ∑ [V(Ki) + S(Ki)]=V(K)+S(K).
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The value-added sustains, first of all, the producers of value—the wage-workers in
capitalist enterprises and the ancients in ancient enterprises. Second, the value-added
sustains people in various subsumed class positions specific to each class structure—the
landlord, the money-lender, the shareholders, the managers etc. Indirectly, subsumed
class payments also sustain unproductive workers engaged in non-class processes
securing the conditions of the particular fundamental class process—for example, clerks
in merchant enterprises and banks. Third, the recipients of non-class and class payments
arising out of the value-added in the class-structure may in turn sustain other people—
e.g. receivers or appropriators of private value transfers within and outside family.
Therefore, an “economy” refers to a sub-group of the labor force sustained out of the
value-added in a particular class structure.
The distinction between class structure and the economy is useful to underline the social
effects of primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation in our ‘model’. For
example, when ancients are dispossessed, along with them, some unproductive laborers
also lose a part of their economic sustenance secured out of the value-added in those
ancient enterprises. The social effects of primitive accumulation are greater than the
dispossession of the ancients. At the same time, it is possible that productive capitalist
accumulation takes place without a corresponding expansion of the labor-size of the
capitalist economy. Coupled with the effects of primitive accumulation on the ancient
economy, such implosive growth of the capitalist economy may lead to the emergence of
what we understand as surplus population.
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The Location of Surplus Population
Let us now conceptually locate surplus population in such a social formation. Let the
total labor force be L. The labor force secures livelihood in various fundamental and
subsumed class as well as non-class processes. In this ‘model’, we consider four main
categories of livelihood. A part of the labor force is employed as productive workers in
capitalist enterprises. A second segment of the labor force is the unproductive labor force
in the capitalist economy. A third part of the labor force consists of ancient producers.
The remaining part of the labor force is constituted by other categories of unproductive
labor force in the ancient economy, excluding the ancients themselves.82 Let LKP , LKU ,
LA and LUA - A be the size of the labor force in the four categories respectively.

L = LKP + LKU + LA + LUA - A

L=

LK

+

LA

LK is the part of the labor force sustained out of the value-added in the capitalist
fundamental class processes VA (K). LA is the part of the labor force sustained out of the
value-added in the ancient fundamental class processes VA (A).
The absence of the category of “reserve army of labor” in the above equation reflects the
specificity of the social conjuncture analyzed here. As argued in the Chapter II, the
presence of a sizable non-capitalist economy allows the capitalists i) to shift the major
part of the economic burden of maintaining the reserve army of labor on to the former
and ii) thus undermine the conditions of accumulation and/or prosperity of the latter. In
these circumstances, the entire ancient economy acquires the character of the surplus
82

Here I adopt the definition of productive and unproductive labor presented in Resnick and Wolff (1987:
132-141). Productive laborers are workers in capitalist fundamental class processes. All other kinds of
labor are defined as unproductive. Unproductive laborers may occupy other (non-capitalist) fundamental,
(capitalist and non-capitalist) subsumed class positions and non-class positions.
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population. The ancient labor force acquires the character of the “latent surplus

population” Marx talks about in connection with agricultural labor force. Like the latent
surplus population, the labor force in the ancient economy is always on the point of
migrating to the capitalist economy whenever opportunities arise. It is not however any
intrinsic desire to be employed in the capitalist economy or any perceived superiority of
employment in the capitalist economy that drives such migration. Rather, the combined
processes of primitive accumulation and creation of surplus labor power undermines the
conditions of prosperity of the ancient class structure and thus destabilizes the
reproduction of labor power in various social processes in the ancient economy. Hence, a
significant part of the labor force in the ancient economy is always seeking secure
reproduction of their labor power in the capitalist economy.
In representing the ancients as surplus population, it appears that the present essay
espouses an extremely capitalocentric view of the ancients as victims of capitalist
accumulation. It might be argued that the growth of ancients is partly fuelled by the
desire of the producers to be independent and reject wage-slavery under capitalism. Yet,
such desires and class-consciousness are precisely what undermine the dominance of the
capitalist class structure in a social formation. What I propose to show is how primitive
accumulation secures the dominance of the capitalist class structure by undermining the
prosperity of the ancients and the formation of such desires.

In such a context, the category of the “reserve army of labor”—i.e. the unemployed labor
force maintained by the capitalist economy through poverty management—must give
way to the notion of surplus population. Let me restate the significance of the concept of
reserve army of labor in Marx’s theory. The reserve army is the mass of dispossessed and
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unemployed labor power which allows accumulating capitalist enterprises to secure
additional supplies of labor-power without being dependent on either the natural growth
of the labor power or primitive accumulation of labor power from non-capitalist
economy.83 The cost of maintaining a reserve army is a particular subsumed class
payment by the capitalists as a whole (generally through a state policy of unemployment
management, financed by taxing capitalist surplus value), each individual capitalist
shouldering a portion of the cost proportional to his or her profits. On the one hand the
reserve army of labor enables accumulation and hence acts as a condition of existence of
the capitalist class structure. In conditions of high rate of accumulation, as the reserve
army is exhausted, the direct costs of maintaining the labor power of the reserve army
vanish, though other costs persist, like the administrative costs of maintaining
unemployment bureaus, salaries of the personnel of the welfare state etc. In conditions of
low rate of accumulation, the costs of maintaining the reserve army may rise so much—
depending on the political and cultural context as well as the absolute size of the reserve
army— as to reduce the surplus value available for other subsumed class payments and
thus threaten one or several conditions of existence of the capitalist fundamental class
process.
In the present context, the capitalists either do not maintain a reserve army of labor so as
to unburden themselves of the costs of its maintenance out of their surplus value or the
capitalists cannot maintain it if the cost is prohibitively high relative to the capitalist
surplus value. In this case, the costs of maintenance of the reserve army are either borne
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The reserve army of labor also has a disciplinary effect on the capitalist work force and a depressive
effect on their wages and is thus a condition for expanded reproduction of the capitalist fundamental class
process.
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by the workers in the capitalist class structure—when reserve army is maintained by
taxing the wages—in which case the reproduction of their labor power is threatened. We
ignore this possibility assuming that workers in the capitalist enterprises are unionized
and thus are able to avoid such costs84. The other possibility is that the economic burden
of the surplus labor power falls on the non-capitalist economy (ancient, in this case)
whose conditions of existence are consequently threatened. We assume that the surplus
population enters the ancient economy as an active labor force. A part of the surplus
population sets up ancient enterprises and the remaining part populates other categories
of unproductive employment in the ancient economy. Thus, in our model, there is no
category of the labor force called “unemployed”. Rather we have what is commonly
referred to as the “working poor” in developing countries with surplus population. Later
in this chapter, we will try to understand how the ancient economy accommodates the
surplus population as an active labor force and what the consequences of such
accommodation are for both the ancient and the capitalist class structures.
Since the capitalists no longer have a reserve army of labor, how do they secure
additional supplies of labor power for accumulation? Either the capitalists have to depend
on the natural increase of labor force or secure additional labor power from the ancient
economy, with or without dispossession. We have assumed away the natural increase of
labor force at the very beginning. Therefore, the ancient economy is the only source of
84

Historically unionized workers have pushed the state for unemployment insurance programs for the
reserve army through taxation of wages, profits as well as subsumed class incomes flowing from capitalist
surplus value. However, I am considering a situation where the size of the surplus population is so large
that state welfare programs funded by taxes on profits or wages are resisted by both capitalists and
unionized workers. Presumably the standard of living of the unionized workers in capitalist industries is
above that given by the average value of labor power in the economy. The presence of a large surplus
population poses constant threats to a reduction in the standard of living of the unionized workers to the
average level, thus prompting them to resist taxation of their incomes for any large-scale state welfare
programs for the surplus population.

127

additional labor power in our model. The justification for such an assumption is provided
by the very understanding of the ancient economy as a location of surplus population. I
have argued that in such circumstances, the conditions of prosperity of the ancient
economy are undermined. The precarious and unstable reproduction of the mass of labor
power in the ancient economy implies that a portion of this labor power is always
available for employment in the capitalist economy.
But there is one more justification for assuming away natural rate of growth of the labor
force. Capitalist accumulation requires additional land which is presumed to be in fixed
supply. The supply of additional land to the capitalists as a whole must come from the
ancient economy. This requires separation of ancients from land. Such separation may be
voluntary or forced. For example, the poor peasant—unable to reproduce herself as an
ancient— may give up his land for immediate reproduction of her labor power. The same
peasant might also cling tenaciously to her land as the last means of independent
production and subsistence, however minimal the latter may be. In this case, force is
applied, which implies a certain cost of primitive accumulation for capitalists—
“enclosure” costs of expropriating the peasant, fencing and guarding the enclosed land
etc. The “enclosure” costs are a kind of subsumed class payments that secure one of the
political conditions of existence of the capitalist fundamental class process, namely
private property rights over means of production. Whatever the case may be, acquisition
of additional means of production for accumulation at the same time creates additional
supplies of labor power, irrespective of any demand from the accumulating capitalists.
Hence, reproduction of the capitalist economy, which requires primitive accumulation,
produces additional supplies of “separated” labor power, independent of the natural
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growth of the labor force. For all these reasons the ancient economy acts as a source of
additional labor power for accumulating capitalists. Therefore, to keep matters simple, I
have assumed a constant labor force in my ‘model’.
If labor force is constant, the sum of the growth rates of employment in all categories
must be zero. That is,

dL KP dL KU dL A dL UA−A
+
+
+
= 0 . Let the rate of primitive
dt
dt
dt
dt

accumulation, i.e. the rate of dispossession of the ancients be P. The rate of primitive
accumulation is positive when the rate of accumulation of productive capital (Ω) is
positive. In the traditional teleological understanding of primitive accumulation, P>0,
dL KP
dL A
dL KU
dL UA−A
> 0 and
< 0 (also
> 0 and
< 0 )—i.e. the ancient economy is
dt
dt
dt
dt

dissolved and unproductive laborers sustained by the ancient economy are transformed
into productive and unproductive laborers sustained by the capitalist economy. The
particular social conjuncture I study, however, is one characterized by following
conditions—P>0 and

dL A
≥ 0 . This is a situation where primitive accumulation and
dt

hence accumulation of productive capital is taking place without, however, a decline in
the number of ancients. This implies that new ancient enterprises are set up at an equal or
greater rate than that at which existing ancient enterprises are dissolved. Let us consider
the situation where this happens along with a stagnant or falling capitalist share of the
labor force, i.e.

dL KP dL KU
+
≤ 0 . Therefore, we have a particular kind of capitalist
dt
dt

accumulation associated with a stagnant or declining capitalist share of total mass of
labor power.
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Many Forms of Capitalist Accumulation

Let us look closely at capitalist accumulation itself to identify when such specific
conditions may prevail—i.e. Ω> 0 and

dL KP dL KU
+
≤ 0 . Capitalist accumulation is an
dt
dt

expansion of productive capital ∆K =∆(C+V). The rate of capital accumulation is defined
as Ω =

∆K ∆(C + V)
=
. An increase in total capital may or may not involve a change in
K
(C + V)

the organic composition of capital q =

C
. We may consider accumulation under
C+V

conditions differing with respect to organic composition of capital, productivity of labor
and intensity of labor. The technical productivity of labor (a) is the number of units of
use-value produced per labor hour. More productive labor power produces a larger
number of units of use-value per hour compared to less productive labor power. On a
daily basis, let UV be the number of use-values produced per day, h be the length of the
work-day and LKP be the number of productive workers.
UV
LKP.h
When technical productivity rises, the same quantity of living labor is distributed across
a=

greater number of units of commodities. As a result, generally, unit values of
commodities fall85.
Intensity (I) of labor—or the value-productivity of labor— is defined as value-added per
labor hour.

85

Whether unit value of commodities falls with rising technical productivity of labor depends on what
happens to the quantity of means of production (embodied labor) needed to secure such increase in
productivity (e.g. new machines, enhanced use of raw materials etc.). When, total (socially necessary
abstract) labor— the sum of living and embodied labor— rises less than proportionately with the number of
units of commodities produced, then unit value of the commodity falls.
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(V + S)
LKP.h
Intensity can be increased by drawing more labor out of a given labor power in a given
I=

work-day (through close monitoring, incentives, ‘speed-ups’ etc.). Intensification of labor
is similar to the lengthening of the work-day and is related to the production of absolute
surplus value. Intensity of labor has no effect on the unit-values of commodities. More
intensity leads to more units of use-values produced per labor hour, but also more
expenditure of living labor per labor hour and proportionately more quantity of embodied
labor (means of production). Thus, more units of use values incorporate more labor and
hence unit values remain same.
The distinction between technical or value productivity of labor can also be specified in
terms of their effect on value-added and the rate of surplus value. The total income, in
value terms, that sustains a class structure, is given by the value-added across all
enterprises with a specific fundamental class process. Capitalist value-added VA (K) is
the total living labor incorporated in capitalist commodities, divided between variable
capital and surplus value.
VA (K) = V (K) +S (K) = I.LKP.h
Value-added increases when either intensity, number of productive laborers or the length
of the work-day increases. If sk denotes the rate of capitalist surplus value and v denotes
hourly wage rate, then, we may rewrite the relation in the following way.
V(K) = v.LKP.h
S (K) = sk.V (K)
VA (K) = (1+sk) v.LKP.h
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When intensity increases, other factors remaining constant, the increased depreciation of
labor power requires more means of subsistence per unit labor power and hence hourly
wage rate increases. But the rate of surplus value may nevertheless increase if the greater
subsistence basket of the workers requires an increase in necessary labor, but the increase
in necessary labor is less than the increase in surplus labor.
↑ VA (K)= (1+ ↑sk)( ↑v. LKP.h )

Conversely, when intensity, number of productive laborers and the length of the workday remain constant, value-added remains constant, irrespective of changes in
productivity. If productivity increases, other factors remaining constant, nothing happens
to the value added. If productivity of labor increases in the wage-goods industry, the rate
of surplus value may increase (relative surplus value) if the necessary labor time is
shortened relative to surplus labor time, the length of the work-day remaining constant.
This is a change in the relative magnitudes of variable capital and surplus value—i.e. an
increase of surplus labor time relative to its necessary counterpart, the total living labor
and hence value-added remaining constant.
VA (K)= (1+ ↑sk)(↓v. LKP.h )
Or, (1 + sk)(

dv da
dsk da
. )(LKP.h) + ( . )(v.LKP.h.) = 0
da dt
da dt

We can capture the effects of increases in technical and value productivity of labor on
value-added, hourly wage rate, productive labor force and rate of surplus value and see
how capital accumulation may affect these variables under different conditions related to
technical or value productivity of labor.
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Case I: Accumulation with Constant Organic Composition of Capital, Technical
Productivity of Labor and Intensity of Labor
With accumulation, the organic composition of capital remains constant when production
is expanded on the same technical basis (e.g. replication of factories). Technical
productivity of labor is constant and consequently the rate of surplus value and the unit
values of commodities remain constant. If intensity and the length of the work-day
remain constant too (i.e. there is no increase in absolute surplus value), value-added in
the capitalist economy increases in proportion to an increase in the number of productive
workers.
dVA(K)
dLKP
= (1 + sk)(v.h)
dt
dt

This is typically the Smithian vision of capitalist accumulation86. Marx, however,
provides a more complicated analysis of capitalist accumulation.

Case II: Accumulation with Constant Technical productivity and Increasing Valueproductivity
There is another way in which the capitalist value-added may be increased and capital
can be accumulated on the same technical basis—by increasing the intensity of labor.
Intensification of labor requires an accumulation of both constant and variable capital—
the former because more living labor needs more means of production and the latter
because higher intensity involves greater wear and tear of labor power and hence more
means of subsistence for reproduction of labor power. Here, technical productivity and
unit values of commodities remain constant. The capitalist value-added increases because

86

Adam Smith (1776) envisaged a process of capital accumulation where the demand for laborers rises
faster than the supply, causing real wages to rise.
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intensification of labor generates more living labor. Also, as we have seen before, higher
intensity implies higher rate of surplus value and a higher hourly wage rate—the latter
varying inversely with the former.
dVA(K)
dLKP
dv dI
dsk dI
= (1 + sk)(v.
+ LKP. . )h + ( . )(v.LKP.h.)
dt
dt
dI dt
dI dt

The organic composition of capital may increase when additional means of production
required by more intense labor is greater than additional means of subsistence required
for compensating the laborer for the higher intensity of labor87. More importantly,
capitalist value-added may increase in this case while the number of productive laborers
may remain constant. In fact, the latter may well decline along with a rise in variable
capital—the decline in the number of workers being more than compensated by a more
intense performance of living labor by the remaining workers88.

Case III: Accumulation with Rising Organic Composition of Capital, Increasing
Technical Productivity and Constant Value-Productivity of Labor
The most frequently discussed case of capitalist accumulation involves a rising organic
composition of capital89, a rise in the capitalist rate of surplus value, a change in technical
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Intensification of labor does require an increase in means of production but some elements of fixed
capital (e.g. the factory building itself) need not increase.
88
“The number of labourers commanded by capital may remain the same, or even fall, while the variable
capital increases. This is the case if the individual labourer yields more labour, and therefore his wages
increase, and this although the price of labour remains the same or even fall, only more slowly than the
mass of labor rises. Increase of variable capital in this case, becomes an index of more labour, but not of
more labourers employed. It is the absolute interest of every capitalist to press a given quantity of labour
out of a smaller, rather than a greater number of labourers, if the cost is about the same. In the latter case,
the outlay of constant capital increases in proportion to the mass of labour set in action; in the former that
increase is much smaller. The more extended the scale of production, the stronger this motive. Its force
increases with the accumulation of capital” (Marx, 1912: 696-697).
89
A rise in the organic composition of capital occurs with accumulation, if i) both constant capital and
variable capital increase, the former increasing more than the latter, ii) constant capital increases while
variable capital remains same, iii) constant capital increases while variable capital declines, the decline

134

productivity of labor and a fall in the unit values of either or both C-commodities and Vcommodities90. If unit values of wage-goods fall, the value of labor power decreases and
the rate of surplus value increases in all industries. Change in capitalist value-added is
strictly proportional to the change in the number of productive laborers, intensity of labor
and the length of the work-day remaining constant.

dVA(K)
dLKP
dv da
dsk da
= (1 + sk)(v.
+ LKP. . )h + ( . )(v.LKP.h.)
dt
dt
da dt
da dt

Or,

Or,

dVA(K)
dv da dsk da
dLKP
= (1 + sk)(LKP.h) . + ( . )(v.LKP.h.) + (1 + sk)(v.h).
dt
da dt
da dt
dt
dVA(K)
dLKP
= (1 + sk)(v.h)
dt
dt
[ (1 + s k )(

dv da
.
)(L
da dt

KP.

h) + (

ds k da
.
)(v.L
da dt

KP

.h.) = 0]

Capital accumulation with rising organic composition of capital will lead to an increase
in value-added only if there is an increase in the productive labor force, intensity and
hours of labor remaining constant. Therefore, capital accumulation may take place and
the organic composition of capital may rise with an increasing, decreasing or constant
value-added and number of productive laborers.

being smaller than the increase and so that total capital increases. Rising organic composition of capital
with accumulation implies that ∆C> ∆V, where ∆V can be of any sign.
90
A rise in technical productivity of labor in C-goods industries may even lead to a fall in the organic
composition of capital if unit-values of means of production fall more than the increase in the volume of
means of production.
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Case IV:Accumulation with Rising Organic Composition of Capital, Increasing
Technical Productivity and Intensity of Labor
Intensity of labor may also increase along with productivity—for example, when new
machines that increase technical productivity of labor also enable intensification of
labor91. Value-added will increase relative to Case III, because intensification leads to
more living labor spent on producing more values. However, the productive labor force
may be constant, declining or rising with rising value-added92.
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Exclusionary Capitalist Accumulation

As the preceding analysis shows, accumulation of capital may take place with constant,
rising or even falling capitalist value-added, organic composition of capital and number
91

“[M]achinery becomes in the hands of the capital the objective means, systematically employed for
squeezing out more labour in a given time.” (Marx, 1912: 450).
92
The effect on the hourly wage rate is complicated. The hourly wage rate is determined by the historical
context. But here we will consider only two of the determinants of the hourly wage rate, holding all other
factors constant. The productivity and the intensity of labor have opposite effects on the hourly wage rate.
If the productivity of labor increases (in V-commodities department), the unit-values of V-commodities
decline and the hourly wage rate goes down (rate of surplus value increases), the quantity of means of
subsistence required to reproduce unit labor-power remaining constant. When intensity of labor increases,
the quantity of means of subsistence required per unit labor-power and hence the hourly wage rate
increases, unit-values of wage-goods remaining constant. When both productivity and intensity of labor
increase, the net effect on the hourly wage rate depends on the relative strength of the two determinants.
The hourly wage rate may decline, remain constant or even increase.
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of productive workers. The rate of accumulation, the rate of change of organic
composition of capital, the rate of technological change and the rate of change of total
income (equals total value-added) are all related but conceptually distinct variables.
There is no necessity for any of them to move in any specific direction with any other.
Let us consider the possibility that with a positive rate of accumulation there is a decrease
in the number of productive workers. This may occur as a result of an increase in
technical productivity or intensity of labor. In fact, except for Case I (the Smithian case),
such a possibility exists in all the other cases. It is further possible that not only total
capital, but total income, i.e. value-added, increases with a decline in the number of
productive laborers.93 This happens when intensity increases along with productivity.
Even as the productive labor force declines, more labor is squeezed out of each worker in
a given work-day so that more living labor and hence more value-added is secured with
less number of workers. The mass as well as the rate of surplus value increase with
decreasing productive labor force. It is perfectly reasonable for the capitalists to engage
in such types of accumulation where the productive labor force declines, as long as
surplus value increases.
In all cases of accumulation, social wealth, i.e. the total mass of different use-values,
increases. Therefore, the capitalist class structure enables increased production of social
wealth at the same time that the number of workers producing that wealth decreases,

93

The number of productive laborers may fall with rising accumulation when, for example, machines
replace workers. Total capital increases while variable capital falls absolutely—i.e. organic composition
rises very rapidly—not only because the hourly wage rate falls due to increase in productivity of labor in
V-goods industries, but also because the number of productive laborers falls. Value-added actually falls
with accumulation in this case! When intensity increases, variable capital may rise because the wage rate
increases, but the number of productive workers may actually decrease. In this case, the value-added will
increase, if the effect of a rise in intensity outweighs the effect of fall in number of laborers.
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i.e.

dL KP
< 0 . However, even though accumulation may require less number of
dt

productive laborers, it might still require greater number of unproductive laborers.
Increased capitalist output requires more merchanting, insuring, banking and advertising,
as well as more managerial supervision, more clerical activity, more research and
development, more tax collection etc. Therefore, unproductive laborers may increase in
the capitalist economy at the same time that productive laborers decline. However,
unproductive labor processes may themselves be subjected to labor-saving innovations.
ATMs and credit card technology decrease the labor force in credit and banking
enterprises; electronic surveillance systems reduce the demand for security personnel in
capitalist enterprises; e-mails reduce the demand for courier personnel within capitalist
enterprises etc. We consider the social conjuncture where the growth rate of total labor
force sustained by the capitalist value-added is non-positive, i.e.

dL KP dL KU
+
≤ 0.
dt
dt

In contemporary dissident discourses on capitalism, one often hears of the phenomenon
of “jobless growth”. This is also relevant to the study of Indian economy, which we
present in the next chapter. This is a new kind of unemployment scenario that is seriously
disruptive of social cohesion in any society—rising wealth and rising joblessness. This
problem is “new” because previous analyses of unemployment focused on lack of
accumulation or growth as the cause of rising unemployment. As I tried to show, in the
preceding analysis, the strict proportionality between accumulation and employment is a
Smithian idea. Marxian value theory can account for rising accumulation with rising,
stagnant or declining size of the total labor force sustained out of the capitalist valueadded. I argue that in many economies, including India, “jobless growth” may be
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occurring because increased rate of capital accumulation is accompanied by rising
organic composition of capital and increasing mass and rate of capitalist surplus value
due to increasing technical productivity and intensity of labor. Capitalist value-added is
increasing with a declining size of productive labor force and total social wealth is
increasing with a declining size of the labor force with claims on that wealth.
But there is another dimension of accumulation that assumes particular significance in
this scenario. Along with the mass of use-values, the total means of production used in
capitalist industries, including land, increases with accumulation. As the capitalist claim
on ‘scarce’ land increases with accumulation, additional land is secured by expropriating
ancients and enclosing the ancients’ land. Here lies the crux of the problem of surplus
population. Capitalist accumulation involves primitive accumulation in so far as
expanded reproduction of capital requires greater share of the ‘scarce’ means of
production. However, such primitive accumulation releases dispossessed ancient
producers along with enclosed land and the former stands in relative excess to the
“average needs for the self-expansion of capital” (Marx, 1912: 691). Therefore,
accumulation of capital is also accumulation of means of production on its side and
accumulation of ‘separated’ and surplus labor power on the other side, i.e. outside94.
Moreover, if the capitalist share of the labor force declines with accumulation of capital,
then surplus labor power expands not only because of dispossession, but also because of
94

“The law by which a constantly increasingly quantity of means of production, thanks to the advance in
the productiveness of social labour, may be set in movement by a progressively diminishing expenditure of
human power, this law, in a capitalist society—where the labourer does not employ the means of
production, but the means of production employ the labourer—undergoes a complete inversion and is
expressed thus: the higher the productiveness of labour, the greater is the pressure of the labourers on the
means of employment, the more precarious therefore, becomes their conditions of existence, viz., the sale
of their own labour-power for the increasing of another’s wealth, or for the self-expansion of capital”
(Marx,1912: 708).
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“repulsion” of labor power by capital. Primitive accumulation, in such a context, plays a
role very different from that in the classical context of transition. The objective of
primitive accumulation is the freeing of means of production rather than securing “freed”
labor power.
It should now be clear that the assumption of constant labor force was merely an initial
theoretical step to highlight the basic processes at work in the production of surplus
population. We now relax the initial assumption and let the labor force grow— say, at the
rate N.
N=

dL KP dL KU dL A dL UA−A
+
+
+
dt
dt
dt
dt

Even if the labor force in the capitalist economy grows at a positive rate, i.e.
(

dL KP dL KU
dL
dL
) > 0 , as long as N > ( KP + KU ) , the labor force of the ancient
+
dt
dt
dt
dt

economy will grow too at a positive rate.
We may now relax some of the more restrictive conditions under which surplus
population is produced. No restrictions on the types of capitalist accumulation need to be
assumed here as long as total labor force grows in excess of the “average needs for the
self-expansion of capital”, i.e. N > (

dL KP dL KU
) . Further, let us relax the assumption
+
dt
dt

of a fixed supply of land. Instead, let the availability of land grow at some positive rate µ .
Corresponding to a rate of capitalist accumulation Ω, let the capitalist claim on land as a
means of production increase at the rate α .If α > µ , the capitalists engage in primitive
accumulation, usurping ancient land at the rate ( α - µ ). This implies a dispossession of
the ancients at a rate P. The rate of establishment of new ancient enterprises is therefore
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equal to (P +

dL A
). Let β be the rate of growth of the ancient claim on land as a means of
dt

production sufficient to sustain the growth of ancient producers at the rate

dL A
, which
dt

implies that ancient economy falls short of its required land at the rate β + (α − µ) .
The dispossessed ancients as well as the additional labor force turn to the ancient
economy for their sustenance. Dispossession occurs with an increasing number of the
ancients. The expansion of the ancient economy masks the flow of scarce means of
production from the ancient to the capitalist economy. The ability of the capitalists to
engage in primitive accumulation in this form is of course determined by the entire social
context. If and when such a conjuncture arises, we can say that the ancient economy acts
as a residual sector that absorbs the “surplus” population on residual means of
production. Therefore, the ancient economy accommodates a part of the labor force in
excess of employment in the capitalist sector. Since the growth of this “excess” labor—
surplus population, in our terminology—is partly due to dispossession of ancients, we
have the paradoxical result that dispossessed ancients in one branch of commodity
production may be transformed, not into wage-labor, but ancients in another or even the
same branch of commodity production. When, in the 1970s, economists first took notice
of the explosion of urban petty producing activities in developing countries despite rapid
capitalist growth, the urban petty producers came to be referred to as “peasants in the
cities” (McGee (1973). The paradox for the economists lay in the transformation of
agricultural petty producers into urban manufacturing petty producers and not into
capitalist laborers as conventional wisdom till then made us believe. It is this kind of
social conjuncture that the present study addresses.
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Contradictions of Capitalist Accumulation

The setting up of ancient enterprises by the surplus population requires access to means
of production which may be provided by money-lending capitalists. As far as land is
concerned, the additional ancients are accommodated mainly through fragmentation of
existing land under the ancients. This is for example the case with ancient farmers
whereby the family plot gets fragmented through inheritance into smaller plots—often
too small for farming to be economically viable. A second strategy for the ancients
involves transforming land as means of subsistence into land as means of production or
using land as both. This is the case of household production of commodities in both rural
and urban areas but more strikingly observed in urban slums. Another strategy for the
dispossessed is illegal encroachment and sharing of land under capitalist production. In
this case, the capitalists are directly affected since encroached land is their means of
production. In case of private capitalists, examples of certain encroachment include
piracy of books, DVDs, music CDs, branded clothes, electronic products etc. In case of
state capitalist enterprises (i.e. public enterprises), such encroachment may often take the
open form of occupation of geographical land—e.g. invasion of railways land. In the first
case, conditions of existence of ancient production are threatened. In the second case, not
only the conditions of reproduction of ancient enterprises, but also those of reproduction
of ancients’ labor power are threatened. In the third case, conditions of existence of both
capitalist and ancient class processes are undermined, to different degrees. It is obvious
that absorption of the surplus population as ancient producers requires that a part of the
means of production flow from the capitalist to the ancient economy in the form of land
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forcibly shared by or encroached on by the ancients—thus constituting a reversal of
primitive accumulation. Here is the contradiction for the capitalists. To secure their
conditions of existence, the capitalists need to engage in primitive accumulation and yet
the social outcome of such primitive accumulation is a surplus population whose
sustenance requires a reversal of primitive accumulation and which poses a threat to the
reproduction of the capitalists. Let us spell out the contradiction in terms of surplus.
Surplus value is disposed of in myriad ways—as subsumed class payments under
different headings— to secure the conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure.
A part of the SV(K) is used for accumulation of capital ( Ω ). The reserve army of labor is
one condition of accumulation and hence of reproduction of the capitalist fundamental
class process. The cost of maintaining the reserve army of labor is a separate cost and
involves a subsumed class payment, SSCP RA . The cost of primitive accumulation belongs
to the broader cost of securing a particular (politico-legal) condition of existence of the
capitalist surplus value—namely, a social pattern of private ownership of means of
production that exclude a section of the population from access to such means of
production. SSCP PA is singled out as the cost of expansion of such a regime of private
property rights over means of production. SSCP others is the sum of all other kinds of
subsumed class payments.
SV(K) = Ω + SSCP RA + SSCP PA + SSCP others
SSCP RA and Ω are inversely related. While the presence of an ancient economy allows

the capitalists to get rid of SSCP RA , at the same time it increases SSCP PA . This is
because the ancients “invade” the private means of production under capitalist control
and thus undermine some of the conditions of existence of the capitalists. Further, the
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reproduction of ancients requires “locking” some “scarce” means of production (land) in
ancient labor processes. Both outcomes require increased expenditure on behalf of the
capitalists to either defend or expand their exclusive access to means of production.
It is precisely here that David Harvey misses the contradiction of the whole process.
Harvey acknowledges an inescapable “outside” of capital, but he sees the “outside” as a
condition of existence of capital. In my understanding, the “outside” both enables and
undermines the reproduction of capital at the same time. This contradiction, which places
the reproduction of capital in a climate of radical contingency, also inscribes the aleatory
at the heart of society.

Primitive Accumulation and Ancient Surplus

Throughout the last section we have repeatedly hinted that the reproduction of the ancient
economy is threatened by primitive accumulation and the consequent production of a
surplus population. In this section, I will try to show how an expansion of an ancient
economy may go hand in hand with the undermining of the conditions of prosperity of
the ancients. We will however choose to focus exclusively on primitive accumulation and
its impact on the ancient economy, fully aware that all other processes occurring in the
society may add to or reverse the effects of primitive accumulation. More precisely, we
will seek to establish the following theoretical positions in the context of the specific
social conjuncture we are studying.
i)

Primitive accumulation enables a skewed distribution of surplus between
capitalist and ancient class structures.

ii)

Such skewed distribution, in turn, enables primitive accumulation.
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In other words, primitive accumulation and the resulting social distribution of surplus and
labor power across class structures overdetermine each other. This process of mutual
constitutivity further works as one condition of the dominance of the capitalist class
structure.
At the outset, I distinguish my position from two contending positions concerning surplus
in the ancient economy. One view holds that ancients are subsistence producers who
produce no surplus. This view is strongly held in the modernist theories of
development95. But even in the Marxian theoretical tradition, simple commodity
production is often represented as production for consumption as distinct from
production for profit96. A second view holds that simple commodity production is

characterized by production of surplus, but the production of surplus renders the simple
commodity production unstable, in so far as there is no rule of distribution of surplus in
the ancient economy analogous to the capitalist rule of distribution of surplus according
to a uniform rate of profit97. Therefore, the ancient economy can only reproduce itself by
losing its surplus to some external social sites—e.g., as tributes to the Asiatic state or

outflow of surplus to the capitalists through unequal exchange in the market (ancient
commodities selling at less than their values against capitalist commodities).
The position held in this essay is different. Processes related to surplus, i.e. class
processes, constitute the very entry point in the Marxian theoretical discourse and the
95

The entire literature on “dual economy” in development economics builds on this view. See Lewis
(1954) for the most well-known formulation of a dualistic underdeveloped economy consisting of a small,
capitalist modern sector and a large, traditional, non-capitalist subsistence sector.
96
This view is often substantiated by reference to Marx’s well-known distinction between the circuits of
simple commodity production (C-M-C) and capitalist production ( M − C − C′ − M ′ ). See the clearest
formulation of this view in Sweezy (1942).
97
See Chaudhury, Das and Chakrabarti (2000). The problem emerges in the context of heterogeneous
labor—i.e. different subsistence needs in different branches of ancient production. For homogeneous labor,
a uniform rate of self-exploitation is a sufficient rule for the distribution of surplus in the ancient economy.
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present essay, which is located within the former, is no exception. Class structures are
distinguished not by the production or non-production of surplus, but by the specificity of
the processes of production, appropriation and distribution of surplus. Having chosen
class—i.e production of surplus—as the entry point, Marxian theory further recognizes
that production of surplus in any class structure as well as the stability of any class
structure is conditioned by the entire social context, i.e. overdetermined by all other
processes occurring in the society. I understand stability of a class structure as its
contingent and provisional reproduction. Specific conditions must prevail if surplus is to
be produced and the class structure within which surplus is produced is to be reproduced,
the conditions themselves being specific to each class structure. The conditions for
reproduction of the capitalist class structure are different from those of the ancient class
structure.
Therefore, the present essay understands both ancient and capitalist production in terms
of surplus and focus rather on the different conditions governing surplus in the two cases.
Further, surplus and subsistence are seen as conditions of each other, rather than
independent goals in themselves. Production of surplus—and possibly also
accumulation—is crucial to the securing of subsistence by the ancients. In fact,
conditions of existence of ancient production and hence subsistence of the ancients, are
secured through distributions of surplus produced by the ancients. If sufficient surplus is
not produced, the subsistence of the ancients is undermined. The ancient class structure is
encapsulated in the following relation pertaining to ancient surplus— SV(A) can be
greater than, equal to or less than

∑ SSCP(A) . We have deliberately ignored other

sources of subsumed class (SSCR) and non-class (NCR) revenues obtained by the
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ancients and consequently expenditures (X and Y respectively) to secure them are
ignored.98
From the relation, we cay say the following.
1) The ancients perform and appropriate surplus labor. Surplus labor is appropriated
in the form of surplus value ( SV(A) ), i.e. ancients are commodity producers.
2) The ancients have to make a variety of subsumed class payments ( ∑ SSCP(A) )
to secure the conditions of production of their surplus value.
3) The sum of subsumed class payments may be greater than, equal to or less than
the surplus value appropriated by the ancients. Whenever, SV(A) ≥ ∑ SSCP(A) ,
the conditions of existence of the ancients are secure. The reproduction of the
ancients is threatened if SV(A) < ∑ SSCP(A) .
Let us now try to understand how primitive accumulation—as a process considered in
isolation—may affect both sides of the relation and hence the reproduction of the
ancients.

Primitive Accumulation and the Production of Ancient Surplus

Class, i.e. surplus, constitutes the entry point in the Marxian discourse. But
overdeterminist Marxian theory does not essentialize surplus, i.e. it recognizes that
surplus itself is overdetermined in its production, appropriation and distribution. The
production of surplus has certain conditions relating to the technical nature of production,
the productivity of the laborer, the availability of means of production, the social demand
98

See Fried and Wolff (1994) and Gabriel (1990).
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for the commodity etc. First, labor with a certain level of productivity must be combined
with means of production to produce specific use-values, which are sold as commodities.
In a given working-day, the laborer adds certain hours of living labor, i.e. value, to the
product. The production of surplus value assumes that the productivity of labor is such
that the laborer can produce the value of the means of subsistence customarily required to
reproduce his labor-power in less than the full length of the work-day. Whether the
laborer actually produces or realizes the potential surplus given by the productivity of
labor depends on several factors—e.g. the availability of required quantity of means of
production as well as the level of social demand for the commodity. Let us suppose the
work-day is 8 hours long and the productivity of labor is such that the value of the means
of subsistence required to reproduce unit labor power is 4 hours of socially necessary
abstract labor time (SNALT). Therefore, surplus value per laborer per work-day is 4
SNALT. This is the potential surplus per work-day of the ancient producer. Actual
surplus is less than or equal to this potential surplus. Let us consider two situations—
where actual surplus may fall below the potential surplus. Both these situations exemplify
the effectivity of primitive accumulation on the ancient surplus.

Access to Land and the Production of Ancient Surplus

We have noted how primitive accumulation involves a transfer of “scarce” means of
production—land—from the ancients to the capitalists. The expanded production of a
surplus labor force that accompanies primitive accumulation requires that the surplus
labor force be united with the dwindled mass of land in ancient class processes. In
agriculture, for example, this leads either to “fragmentation” of geographical land into
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smaller private allocations usually through inheritance or to “overcrowding” on the same
plot. In the first case, land commanded by an ancient on average is so small that actual
surplus is less than potential surplus. The production of surplus, i.e. the performance of
surplus labor, is conditional upon the availability of sufficient means of production. With
given technology and availability of means of production other than land, the size of land
may constrain the full performance of surplus labor time. Actual surplus falls below
potential surplus, if for example, the ancient farmer works with lower than the average
intensity of labor, given the length of the work-day or— which is another form of the
same thing—works with average intensity for less than the average length of the workday99 or both. This is equivalent to a shortfall of the absolute surplus value below its
potential level given by productivity. The rate of self-exploitation, i.e. the rate of ancient
surplus value, is less than what would have obtained if size of land was sufficient to
absorb the expenditure of surplus labor time for the average length of the work-day with
average intensity. In this case, we may have a situation—quite common among peasants
in developing societies—where SV(A) < ∑ SSCP(A) , which implies that the ancient is
unable to make subsumed class payments to secure conditions of existence of her surplus.
In such a situation, the ancient is often forced to forego a part of her customary
subsistence to meet the subsumed class payments.

99

In this case, the means of subsistence required to reproduce labor power of the ancient farmer may be
less than when the farmer works for the whole work-day with average level of intensity. Yet, there is a
minimum below which subsistence requirements cannot fall in a given historical context. This minimum
may be taken to be unemployment benefits decided by the welfare state, the minimum wage for agricultural
laborers or the official rural poverty level of income, whichever may be relevant in the specific context.
What this means is that there exists a certain floor to the necessary labor time, given the technology and the
historical context. If the surplus labor time is less than what is possible given the necessary labor time, then
the rate of self-exploitation is less than its potential level.
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This problem is not, in any sense, specific to agriculture or social scarcity of means of
production. This problem emerges whenever the ancient producer lacks access to some
means of production in sufficient quantity to fully absorb the ancient’s surplus labor at
the potential level, irrespective of whether those means of production are available to the
society in abundance or scarcity. The ancient manufacturer of garments may lack access
to clothing material; the ancient manufacturer of leather goods may lack access to raw or
tanned hide and so on. Hence, an almost universal complaint of the ancients, particularly
in developing countries, is the lack of credit for buying means of production.
Alternatively, we can see the problem of fragmentation as “overcrowding” on scarce
land. Overcrowding takes place when the size of land is too little compared to the size of
the labor force dependent on it. This is typically the situation, when, in the absence of
alternative livelihood opportunities and social security institutions, the family harbors
unemployed relatives. Suppose the plot of land can be farmed by one member of the
family. Then members of the family take turn at being unemployed. This phenomenon is
referred to, in the literature on development economics, as “disguised unemployment” or
“underemployment” characteristic of many populous poorer societies. In Marxian terms,
“disguised unemployment” exists when a laborer works with less than the average level
of intensity or less than the average number of hours per year.
Disguised unemployment thus normally takes the form of smaller number of working hours
per head per year; for example, each of three brothers shepherding the sheep every third
day…..It might also take the form of lower intensity of work with people “taking it easy”,
e.g. the peasant having time to watch the birds while working. If a number of labourers
went away, the others would be able to produce about the same output working longer and
harder. Sen, 1968: 5) 100.

100

See Nurkse (1957)
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In effect, only one person of the family may be considered to be working the average
number of hours per year with average intensity. The rest of the extended family
members may be considered as dependent unemployed. Even if the size of land is
adequate to bring forth a surplus sufficient to reproduce ancient farming, the presence of
a dependent labor force requires that a part of the surplus value be distributed as
subsistence to effectively unemployed members of the extended family. This “payment”
may even be considered a subsumed class payment to secure access to the family plot of
land and avoid its fragmentation. In such a case, it is possible that SV(A) < ∑ SSCP(A) .
One category of subsumed class payment—the amount that goes in reproducing the labor
power of the effectively unemployed family members, SSCPfamily —may be so large that
other subsumed class payments cannot be met and hence other conditions of existence of
ancient farming may be undermined. Whether we look at the problem as fragmentation or
as overcrowding is a matter of choice. In the former case, the effect is on the left hand
size of the inequality, i.e. on the production and appropriation of surplus value; in the
second case, the effect is captured by the right hand side of the inequality, i.e. subsumed
class payments out of appropriated surplus value.

Social Demand and the Production of Ancient Surplus

Let us consider the opposite situation where the ancients have easy access to means of
production. However, the level of social demand for use-values contained in ancient
commodities constrains the production of ancient surplus value. Here, instead of
overcrowding on means of production, we have overcrowding of the market. Too much
social labor is expended in a branch of production, regardless of the social demand for the
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particular use-values. This is possible when difficult access to the “scarce” means of
production drives ancients to those production activities where the “scarce” means of
production are minimally required, leading to overcrowding of the market.
Let us assume that dispossessed ancients—the victims of primitive accumulation—
shunned by capitalist industries, secure access to some means of production and set up
new ancient production units. The pressure of surplus labor force may lead to a
proliferation of ancient enterprises to such an extent, relative to the market demand, that
the resulting supply of use-values exceed market demand. Marx clearly mentioned that
one of the conditions of existence of surplus labor is that there must be a social demand
for the products of surplus labor.
But the use-value of the social mass of products depends on the extent to which it satisfies
in quantity a definite social need for every particular kind of product in an adequate
manner, so that the labor is proportionately distributed among the different spheres in
keeping with these social needs, which are definite in quantity.........The social need, that is,
the use-value on a social scale, appears here as a determining factor for the amount of social
labor which is to be supplied by the various particular specific spheres.…This point has any
bearing upon the proportion between necessary and surplus labor only in so far as a
violation of this proportion makes it impossible to realize the value of the commodities and
the surplus-value contained in it.(Marx, 1909: 745)

Due to excess supply of commodities in the market, market price deviates from unit
values and ancients can’t realize their “potential” surplus value when they are forced to
sell at lower market prices. This is often the case, for example, with pavement food-stalls
in urban areas in developing countries. Dozens of food-stalls selling the same commodity
are located side by side at the same street corner. Further well-known examples can be
mentioned—the line of shoe-shine boys, the row of typists with their type-writers outside
government offices etc. The effect in this case is same as in the case of fragmentation of
land—a lowering of realized rate of ancient surplus value below its potential level.
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In the first case, means of production were the limiting factor. In the second case, the
extent of the market is the limiting factor. Still other cases are possible. But the point is
made. The production of a surplus labor force and the consequent competition in the
ancient economy denies the ancients the ability to produce and/or realize potential
surplus, thus depressing the rate of surplus value.
It is thus that primitive accumulation enables such a skewed distribution of surplus and
labor force between the ancient and the capitalist economies. The capitalist economy
produces a larger share of surplus but sustain a lower share of the society’s labor force
while it is just the obverse for the ancient economy.

Primitive Accumulation and Distributions of Ancient Surplus

Let us now understand how primitive accumulation affects the right-hand side of the
inequality, SV(A) < ∑ SSCP(A) —i.e. how primitive accumulation affects the structure
and magnitude of subsumed class payments. Even though access of direct producers to
means of production is a condition of the ancient fundamental class process, the
conditions of such access have a crucial effect on the distribution of surplus value. Let us
consider the situation when ancients own their means of production or have direct, ‘free’
or‘open’ access to means of production. Primitive accumulation may take the form of
forcible separation of ancients from means of production without compensation. This is
frequently the case when ancients have insufficiently defined property rights—e.g.
usufruct rather than ownership rights—over means of production. Secondly, primitive
accumulation may take the form of an extension of the property rights regime by bringing
into its domain previously ‘free’ means of production—e.g. patenting traditional seeds in
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agriculture, enclosure of “wastes” etc. When dispossessed ancients engage in ancient
production after primitive accumulation, they have to gain access to the same means of
production—now privatized and of limited access—by making a new subsumed class
payment, ground rent. Thus, primitive accumulation introduces a subsumed class
payment where none existed before even though all other conditions of existence of
ancient production remain exactly the same. Nothing changes except that the intervening
moment of dispossession makes way for a new subsumed class payment to emerge. It is
this kind of process that Basu (2008) emphasizes.
On the other hand, for all the reasons mentioned before, the surplus value produced by
the ancients may be very low making standard subsumed class payments infeasible. One
way the ancients manage to survive is by forcefully evading certain subsumed class
payments, often with formal or tacit social consent. For example, in many cases ancients
may not pay ground rent for access to land. This is most common in urban areas where
ancients encroach on public and even private lands, e.g. slums, squatter settlements by
railway tracks etc. They often do not pay taxes or mandatory fees to the government.
Sometimes they are unable to pay back their loans. It is not uncommon for the stateowned banks to write off peasant loans. Sometimes they do not pay for use of electricity,
water or copyright fees. In poor countries, ancients belong to what is known as the
“informal sector” that survives on “tolerated” illegality resulting from society’s
acceptance of their right to survival. However, the ancients have to make other kinds of
subsumed class payments to secure their conditions of existence—like membership
and/or entry fee to trade associations, payments to political parties to secure policies that
protect the ancients against eviction and dispossession, bribe to police to allow them to
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secure illegally their conditions of existence, payments to the mafia for protection etc.
The balance of all these forces—the relative strength of each being determined by the
entire social context—determines the quantitative relation between appropriated surplus
value of the ancients and the sum of the subsumed class payments on the other. The
reproduction of the ancient class structure assumes a complex form and primitive
accumulation has a direct bearing on the reproduction of the ancients through its
effectivity on production and distribution of surplus value.
For all of these reasons, it is likely that net surplus of ancients is non-positive, i.e. SV(A)-

∑ SSCP(A) ≤ 0. Net surplus is the discretionary fund of surplus value in the hands of
ancients—after making all kinds of subsumed class payments—which may be used either
for accumulation of means of production or additional “luxury” consumption to raise
individual standard of living above the customary level. If net surplus is zero, then the
distribution for accumulation may become zero or the prosperity of the ancients may be
undermined. Thus primitive accumulation not only supports a skewed distribution of
surplus value and surplus labor power between the two class structures, but also
differential rates of accumulation. Indeed if net surplus is negative, then it is possible that
the ancient will reduce personal consumption to increase the gross surplus so as to meet
subsumed class payments. In this case, not only conditions of prosperity but conditions of
existence of the ancient may be undermined.
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The Distribution of Surplus across Class-structures and the Conditions for
Primitive Accumulation

Let me turn to the second theoretical problem which is to show how such a skewed
distribution of surplus and labor force—between capitalist and ancient class structures—
in turn, enables primitive accumulation. In the Marxian literature on primitive
accumulation, force—particularly as embodied in the coercive stance of the state—is
identified as the main instrument of dispossession. This is one of the reasons why
primitive accumulation has so often been identified as an “extra-economic”—more
precisely, political—process in the Marxian literature. As we have argued earlier, I depart
from the classical Marxian understanding of dispossession as a purely “extra-economic”
process. In my understanding, dispossession of ancients may also accompany the
reproduction/expansion of the capitalist class structure as an outcome of economic
processes. The distribution of surplus and labor force between class structures enables
such economic outcome of dispossession without any coercive involvement of the state.
We understand “enclosures” not as the definitive form of primitive accumulation, but as
the limiting case of a more general process by which direct producers’ access to means of
production is dissolved. It is quite possible that economic conditions are such that
economic processes dissolve the unity of direct producers and means of production and
enable a flow of the latter from the ancient to the capitalist economy without involving
any coercion. In the next two subsections, I first show how such a skewed distribution of
surplus and labor force allows the capitalist class structure to engage in dispossession via
force (often involving the coercive apparatuses of the state). Then, I show how the same
processes of dispossession may take place through economic mechanisms—without
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involving force—as a result of differential conditions governing capitalist and ancient
surplus.

State and Primitive Accumulation

A Marxian theory committed to overdetermination would admit that the political process
in which state actions facilitate dispossession is itself overdetermined by all other
processes in the society. Specifically, one goal of the Marxian theory is to show how one
particular set of economic processes—class processes—affects the political process of
policy formation in question. Our argument that the skewed distribution of surplus and
labor force between class structures enables primitive accumulation is precisely one
answer to the problem thus posed in Marxian theory.
According to Marxian theory, the state, like any other social site, is overdetermined by all
the different processes occurring in the society. The state relates to class structures in a
social formation by providing certain natural, cultural, political and economic conditions
unique to each class structure. A part of the cost of provision of such conditions is
defrayed from subsumed class payments—in the form of taxes, fees and other mandatory
payments by business enterprises to the state—out of surplus produced in each class
structure. To the extent that a skewed distribution of surplus emerges across class
structures, the class structures have differential effectivity in securing their conditions of
existence in general and state policies in particular. Wherever there is conflict between
conditions of existence of different class structures, the class structure with command
over greater surplus and hence capable of greater subsumed class payments to the state
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are in a better position to secure state policies in its favor. In our case, the capitalist class
structure has this relative effectivity vis-a-vis the ancient class structure.
In particular, in every social formation, ancient and capitalist class structures contest over
state policies—related to tax, production subsidies, credit, environment, property regimes
etc.— which may have the effect, intended or unintended, of dispossessing the ancients.
When the expansion of the capitalist class structure involves the process of dispossession,
the social conflict over dispossession is often resolved in favor of the capitalist class
structure when the subsumed class payments by the capitalist class structure secure state
policies in favor of dispossession. The ancients’ opposition to such policies is
undermined by their inability to produce potential surplus and influence state policies
through subsumed class processes. Moreover, subsumed class payments by the capitalist
class structure also secure cultural conditions of primitive accumulation through
production and dissemination of economic discourses that devalorize petty production
and represent capitalist class structure as the vehicle of economic progress.
Of course, the outcome of the social conflict over dispossession is only partly determined
by the subsumed class payments to the state. Many other processes have their own
effectivity over state policies which may modify, slow or even reverse the process of
dispossession. Direct political agitation by ancients against such state policies may erect
effective barriers to primitive accumulation. Moreover, cultural discourses emerge—
particularly in social formations with a large surplus labor force—that assert and support
moral rights to livelihood of the people in the face of predatory capitalist accumulation.
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Market and Primitive Accumulation: Ground Rent

Land as a scarce means of production yields ground rent to its owner, the landlord.
Ground rent is a payment out of the produced and appropriated surplus value to the
landlord for access to a monopolized means of production—land. The size of ground rent
is determined by competition among appropriators of surplus value and between them
and the landlords. But since ground rent is a payment out of the surplus value, its size is
constrained by the mass of surplus value. As surplus value increases, so does rent as a
component of it. Marx makes this point in the context of capitalist production.
To the same extent that the production of commodities develops as a capitalist production,
and as a production of value, does the production of surplus-value and surplus-products
proceed. But to the same extent that this continues does property in land acquire the faculty
of capturing an ever increasing portion of this surplus-value by means of its land monopoly.
Thereby it raises its rent and the price of the land itself (Marx, 1909: 747-748)

We have already seen how primitive accumulation has the effect of depressing the rate
and mass of ancient surplus value. It follows then that rent on land on which a capitalist
enterprise stands will be higher than the rent on land on which an ancient enterprise
stands. Suppose both capitalists and ancients are vying for access to “scarce” land as a
condition of existence of their respective surplus values. Since, the rate and mass of
surplus value is higher for the capitalists compared to the ancients, the anticipated rent
from capitalists is greater than the anticipated rent from ancients, other things being
equal. The price of land is anticipated rent capitalized at some “notional” rate of interest.
The price of land is higher if it is sold to the capitalists than the ancients. At the same
time, the capitalists can outbid the ancients in purchasing land.
Thus the class structure has its own peculiar effectivity on the determination of the price
of land. The price of land under ancient production is reflective of the conditions of
ancient production—actual surplus being less than potential surplus—, which in turn is
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an effect of ceaseless dispossession due to capitalist accumulation. The same pricing
process yields a higher price for land under capitalist production due to the production of
greater surplus value in the capitalist enterprise. This has the further implication that
capitalist accumulation has contradictory effects on the price of land in the two
economies. On the one hand, capitalist accumulation—by enabling production of greater
surplus in capitalist enterprises—leads to a steady increase in the price of land under
capitalist production. The same process of capitalist accumulation, through dispossession,
continues to depress ancient surplus value below its potential level and devalorize land
under ancient production. The price of land in the capitalist economy continues to
increase vis-à-vis land in the ancient economy. Thus, the skewed distribution of surplus
and labor power results in a cheapening of land in the ancient economy vis-à-vis land in
the capitalist economy, thus making the latter an easy target of primitive accumulation.
Consequently, capitalists accumulate by bidding out ancients from access to “scarce”
land.

The Contradictory Effects of Surplus Population on Capitalist Surplus Value

We have so far seen how primitive accumulation and the production of a surplus
population affect the conditions governing ancient surplus. But the same processes also
affect production and distribution of capitalist surplus value. We have already noted one
such contradiction in terms of the “enclosure” costs of primitive accumulation. Let us
explore further contradictions in this context.
It is an immediate consequence of overdetermination that conditions governing ancient
surplus will affect capitalist surplus. We have seen how primitive accumulation may have
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the effect of driving down the net surplus of the ancients to zero. This means little or no
accumulation by the ancients and hence insignificant growth of productivity of ancient
labor. The most dominant view of the ancients in developing countries is that they are
technologically stagnant. Suppose, ancients produce the chief means of subsistence, food.
Unless unit values of food articles decline, the value of labor power cannot be cheapened
to any significant degree in capitalist enterprises. Expenditure on food will continue to
dominate the workers’ budget and hence workers’ demand for capitalist means of
subsistence (non-food items) will be constrained. Thus the expansion of capitalist Vgoods production will be undermined, or what is the same thing, the emergence of the
“great consuming middle class” will be thwarted. Moreover, the most important of the
capitalists’ strategies to increase the rate of surplus value—the cheapening of the value of
labor power—will be constrained. Thus capitalist surplus value and hence rate of
accumulation of productive capital may be adversely affected by the low accumulation
and low productivity of ancient farmers. Capitalist accumulation maybe severely
hampered if rising demand for food against a stagnant supply pushes up the food prices
above their values and hence raise the value of labor power, thus reducing the
appropriated surplus value of the capitalists and hence the amount of that surplus value
available for accumulation. This has always been a major concern for strategists of
economic development in developing countries.
In such a case, the capitalists may have to take actions to increase the productivity of
ancient farmers. Capitalist C-commodities specially produced to improve productivity of
ancient farmers may be introduced. These include laboratory-produced high-yielding
variety of seeds, chemical pesticides and fertilizes etc. While an increase in productivity
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of ancient farmers and a fall in unit-values and hence prices of food articles are secured,
this strategy of productivity improvement might further deteriorate the condition of the
farmers. While originally the ancient farmers would use traditional seeds, manure and
irrigation methods which they procure as use-values by themselves, the new production
methods require farmers to purchase produced means of production as commodities in
the market. Suppose, the increased outlay on means of production is secured by the
ancients through credit obtained from banks. This introduces a new subsumed class
payment of the ancients—interest on loans. While the ancient surplus increases because
rate of ancient surplus value increases—along with rate of capitalist surplus value—the
new subsumed class payment nevertheless may rob the ancients of the benefits of a rise
in rate of surplus value. If market price suddenly drops below the values, so that ancients
do not realize their surplus value, the ancients may in fact get caught in the “debt trap”—
hence, the widespread indebtedness of the peasants in developing countries.
In general, if the ancients do not accumulate, then the market for some capitalist C-goods
cannot expand either—e.g. the market for agricultural machinery and equipment
manufactured by capitalists cannot expand if the ancient farmers do not accumulate. Thus
accumulation in some capitalist C-goods industries may be arrested because of a lack of
market. We have already seen that the market for capitalist V-goods (non-food means of
subsistence) cannot expand unless unit-values of food items fall. In such a situation, it is
not unusual to find a “luxury” goods sector develop within the capitalist economy, the
market for the luxury commodities being provided by a class of unproductive laborers in
both capitalist and ancient economies—e.g. landlords, managers, merchants etc.
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There are other effects of the ancient class structure on capitalist surplus that may help
capitalists raise the rate of surplus value above what they would otherwise obtain in the
absence of the ancients. The customary means of subsistence, according to Marxist
theory, is determined by the historical context. One of the determinants of the customary
means of subsistence is the class structure itself with its particular political, cultural and
economic conditions of existence. For ancients with a stagnant and often precarious
standard of living over a considerable time and a cultural discourse of poverty which
shape their world-view, the notion of what constitutes a customary standard of living may
well be lower than that of the workers in capitalist enterprises101. This is particularly true
in case of ancient farmers who belong to a rural society with distinct social organization
of life.
We assume that there is a single labor market in the economy. Therefore, there is a single
average value of labor power of workers in the capitalist enterprises. Due to the existence
of a surplus population, there is always a mass of potential migrants—ancients whose
reproduction of labor power is threatened and who seek entry into the capitalist economy
with a lower private customary standard of living— to the capitalist labor market. The
average value of labor power of the workers in the capitalist economy will be determined
partly by their own notion of a customary standard of living and partly by the ancients’
customary standard of living. Thus the average value of labor power of the workers in the
capitalist economy will be lowered in the presence of ancients under the specific
conditions considered here. Further, in the presence of a surplus population, there is
always an oversupply of laborers in the labor market—thus lowering the price of labor
101

See Safri (2006) for how private notions of value of labor power may differ between workers coming
from different cultural background.
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power below the lowered average value of labor power. All of these factors may increase
the rate of surplus value of the capitalists. On the other hand, workers in capitalist
industries may get unionized to resist any fall in the price of labor power below its value.
It is obvious that such a social formation will be ridden with inequality, possibilities of
social disintegration, crime and violence. Particular political and cultural processes are
bound to emerge that work to minimize these tendencies towards instability and
disintegration. The state in particular may be forced to address the conditions of the
ancients in welfarist terms. The state may tax the capitalist profit and subsumed class
incomes to subsidize health, housing and education to the ancients. This may lower the
cost of reproduction of labor power of the ancients and allow a larger ancient surplus to
emerge. Even capitalist C-goods used in ancient production may be subsidized by the
state. Thus a non-class revenue may accrue to the ancient enterprises. Further certain
subsumed class payments to the state may be waived for the ancients—e.g. bank loans by
state-owned banks to farmers may be written off, license fee and other taxes applicable to
business may be waived for ancients etc. All these expenditures may leave the state with
less money to finance infrastructure projects crucial for capitalist accumulation. This is
often the reason why chambers of commerce and corporate media are so vocal against
fiscal imprudence and populist policies of the state in poorer societies.

Conclusion

The kind of social formation considered here is typical of many developing countries. In
analyzing the complexity of the interaction of different class structures at a most abstract
level, I have introduced several simplifying assumptions at various stages. If we relax
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those assumptions, other constitutive processes with their unique determinations will
come into being, reversing, reinforcing or modifying several outcomes considered here.
The idea has been to assume away many such determinations precisely to isolate and
trace the effects of primitive accumulation and the production of a surplus population
through the social formation. Even in such a simplified model and with such a narrow
focus, we have been able to uncover many sides of a contradictory totality which is what
a social formation is. The analysis in this chapter can only claim to outline a general
approach to the study of social formations where a particularly exclusionary form of
capitalist accumulation is going on. Any concrete analysis has to take into account the
specificity of the social formation. I will offer such an analysis in the next chapter,
choosing Indian capitalism as the object of study.
However, the analysis presented in this chapter carries elements of a Marxian theory of
poverty that is applicable to the kind of social formation considered here. Needless to say,
there are as many forms of poverty as there are forms of capitalism. Here a specific form
of poverty associated with the proliferation of a particular class structure under specific
conditions is considered. The proliferation of the same class structure under different
conditions—for example, in the absence of the dominance of capital—may be a solution
to poverty! The proliferation of ancient class structures under the dominance of capital
may lead to poverty, but poverty in this context takes the form of a social response to the
problem of surplus population. Only by sharing poverty, can the surplus population
subsist in the face of exclusionary capitalist accumulation.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTRADICTORY DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL
INDIA: PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND SURPLUS POPULATION

Introduction

In many ways, economic development in India constitutes the stylized economic hi(story)
of many Third World countries in the discourse of development. According to this story,
Third World countries embarked on a rapid process of industrialization after the WWII in
an effort to “catch up” with the advanced industrial economies of the West. In the initial
decades of development—roughly till the end of the 1970s—the ‘developmentalist’
nation-states of these countries followed an autarkic development policy based on
import-substitution in a more or less ‘planned’ economy with regulated markets and
significant state ownership of the means of production in the economy. This dirigiste
regime ran out of steam and encountered serious crises in the 1970s, which led to its
abandonment, for good or for bad. Industrialization now proceeded under a different
(and a competing) policy regime characterized by reliance on free international and
domestic trade, non-interventionist state and unregulated private capitalist enterprises—
the regime popularly referred to as the neoliberal regime (Bhagwati (1993).
In the context of economic development in India, two distinct policy regimes are
identified—the first one covering the period since independence to the end of the 1980s
and the second inaugurated by the New Economic Policy of 1991. Import-substitution
was one of the main components of the first regime, while a greater reliance on exports
marks the second policy regime. The first policy went much beyond conventional importsubstitution in promoting industrialization in India. It supported an overwhelming
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presence of the government in the Indian economy—the nature and degree of which was
remarkable outside the so-called socialist economies of the time. It suppressed markets
and regulated private economic decision-making to a significant extent and sought
progressively to replace private sector with the state capitalist sector. On the other hand,
despite the emphasis on free international trade in the new economic policy, India’s
contemporary economic policy is much broader than what is known as export-led
industrialization. Hence, the distinction between the two regimes has to be drawn based
more on the three features of an economy—a) the nature of markets, b) ownership of
means of production of the society and c) the scope of private decision-making. The
dirigiste regime is characterized by a) a heavily regulated market with economic planning

determining to a large extent the flow of means of production, commodities and capital b)
significant and steadily enlarging state ownership of means of production of the economy
and c) an elaborate policy framework that guided, circumscribed and directed private
decision-making. The laissez faire regime is characterized by a) free markets as the main
institution for allocation and distribution of means of production and capital b)
privatization of means of production of the economy and c) a policy framework that
facilitates rather than directs private decision-making.
The distinction between the two policy regimes also supported a popular view that the
political ideology of the state and the nature of the economic organization under the
dirigiste regime were influenced by socialism and that under the neoliberal laissez faire

regime by capitalism. To a Marxist, however, industrialization under both regimes is an
attempt to expand the productive circuit of capital (industrial capitalist class
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processes)102. The difference lies in the relative strength or domination of various forms
of capitalist enterprises under the two regimes—more precisely, the relative strengths of
state-capitalist versus private capitalist enterprises and within private capitalist
enterprises, between monopolistic and competitive markets. The debate on the relative
merits of the two regimes boils down to debates on 1) public vs. private capitalist
industries and 2) free market vs. planning. This debate on the relative merit of the two
regimes is not a Marxian debate in so far as it fails to acknowledge the uniquely Marxian
insight that expansion of the productive circuit of capital, whichever form it takes, is also
the multiplication of capitalist class exploitation and the choice between its forms is not a
Marxist’s choice. Yet, neoliberalism has also forced Marxists to get involved in the
debate and make their targets of criticism not class relations, but unfortunately, markets
and private property.
Critics of neoliberalism often emphasize certain desirable social outcomes of the dirigiste
regime—a better provision of public goods and a relatively more egalitarian distribution
of income. A case in point is the debate over the role of the state in promoting
employment, reducing poverty and keeping inequality in check. The roll-back of the state
from the economic space in the neoliberal era—starting as a policy stance in 1991—was
seen by many as an abandonment of these social objectives by the Indian state. The
Indian state has increasingly been described as a stooge of global corporate interests—
submissive to the dictates of International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade
Organization and US-led global geo-political strategies. In comparison, it is argued, the
Indian state had greater flexibility to respond to domestic economic problems in the
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See Patnaik and Chandrashekhar (1998), Sanyal (2007), Chakrabarti and Cullenberg (2003),
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dirigiste regime (Swaminathan, 2000; Chandrashekhar and Pal, 2006; Patnaik, 2007;

Selvaraj and Karan, 2009). On the other hand, critics of the dirigiste regime point out the
inefficiency of the state in running the economy, the failure of the regime to engineer
sustained high growth of the economy, the dismal performance of poverty-eradication
policies and the stifling of domestic business and hence domestic livelihoods-creating
opportunities (Kruegger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982, 2001; Bardhan, 1984; Ahluwalia, 1985).
Both adherents and critics of the dirigiste regime focus on similar sets of economic
problems—growth, employment, poverty etc., but they differ on the relative effectiveness
of the state and the market in achieving those objectives.
Within Indian Marxism, class103 has been replaced by concerns with poverty, livelihoods,
macroeconomic performance and growth104. The famous “modes of production” debate
had petered out by the 1980s and the neoliberal turn in state policy has riveted the Indian
Marxists’ attention to the state rather than class. In this chapter, I intend to bring class
back into the discourse on Indian capitalism. I claim that the theoretical arguments
presented in the preceding chapters can be used to construct not only a unique history of
capitalist development in India, but also a Marxist analysis of enduring poverty and
unemployment in India cutting across different regimes. More precisely, I argue that a
focus on surplus-based notions of class and primitive accumulation can account for the
specificities of Indian capitalism in general and poverty and crisis of subsistence in India
in particular. In this chapter, I only present a broad outline of how such a history and
understanding of Indian capitalism may be constructed. A full and detailed account will
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It must be stressed that class as surplus labor (Resnick and Wolff, 1987) rarely informed Indian Marxist
discourse on capitalist development in India.
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See Bagchi (1999), Patnaik (2007), Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2002).
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require a separate work by itself. My purpose here is to underscore the contradictions of
Indian capitalism and add to the exploitation-focused critique of capitalism another
political critique in terms of dispossession.
If capitalist development was the raison d'être of both regimes, they were both haunted by
the specter of surplus population. Even as both regimes struggled to facilitate capitalist
development in India, they had to grapple with the problem of surplus population that
was often expanded by the same policies undertaken to facilitate capitalist development.
The existence of surplus population is generally attributed by Marxists to insufficient rate
of capitalist growth and consequently attention has been given to imperialist and feudal
relations that obstruct capitalist development in postcolonial societies like India. What is
absent in the Marxian literature is the recognition of how capitalist growth itself thrives
on primitive accumulation and may in turn exacerbate the problem of surplus population
and how the latter in turn may peculiarly constrain capitalist accumulation. In general, the
discourse on economic development in India has portrayed capitalist accumulation as a
solution to the problem of surplus population. I argue that once we take into account

primitive accumulation as a process constitutive of reproduction of capital, the
problematic of surplus population gets complicated—capitalist growth may have
contradictory effects on the surplus population, incorporating and excluding it at the same
time, the net outcome being crucially dependent on the social context in which capitalist
development occurs. In India, surplus population has expanded along with capital
accumulation through both regimes. Hence, as we argued in Chapter III, non-capitalist
class structures proliferated along with the expansion of surplus population. The
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postcolonial history of India is a history of the unstable dominance of capital in a social
formation with a large non-capitalist economic space.

Political, Cultural and Economic Conditions of Postcolonial Capitalist Development
in India

India at the time of independence in 1947 was, in many ways, the product of the great
transition in Europe and particularly, England. Primitive accumulation had ravaged both
India and England and prevalent pre-capitalist class structures have been largely
dissolved or modified by the transition to capitalism in England and class-transformations
under its impact in India. However, at the end of the colonial period, the English and
Indian social formations also differed in significant ways—first, capitalist class structures
had developed to a far greater degree in the English compared to the Indian social
formation and second, the surplus population in England had taken the form of a “reserve
army of labor” by the early twentieth century, while India, in 1947, harbored a surplus
population, the size of which dwarfed the working class in India’s capitalist industries or
any ‘notion’ of a reserve army of labor105. The nature of colonial relations imposed
unique conditions on the dynamics of social formations in the two countries and lies at
105

Surplus population emerged in both England and India in the course of transition to capitalism in the
former and class-transformations under colonial impact in the latter. The British experience illustrates the
classic and the most visible form of primitive accumulation. The social context in which primitive
accumulation took place in England enabled the most virulent forms of “enclosures” in the history of
capitalism—matched only by the annihilation of indigenous populations in some colonies like North
America and Australia. Not surprisingly, surplus population emerged in England even as it was emerging
as the factory of the world and the most powerful and the richest imperial country in the world. In rapidly
industrializing England, the prisons were overflowing with incarcerated unemployed, vagabonds and petty
criminals. Even trade unions were assisting emigrating laborers to the settler colonies of USA, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa etc. (See Clements, 1955; Richards, 1993, 2004; Robinson, 2002. Along with
the emigration of the surplus population, the process which produced it in the first place—primitive
accumulation—was exported to the colonies, as the emigrants ‘cleared’ lands for settlement. In nineteenth
century England, the surplus population subsisted much in the same way as the working poor subsist in the
informal economy in India today—in small, “ancient”, barely remunerative economic activities (Benson,
1983).
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the heart of this great divergence. To understand the evolution of Indian capitalism in the
postcolonial period, we must begin by specifying the particular economic, political and
cultural conditions that prevailed in India at the time of independence and how they
changed over time.

The Social Context at the Time of Independence

The historical experience of colonial rule and the nationalist movement shaped the views
of the new sovereign Indian state in matters of economic policy. The idea behind
economic planning was to reverse the effects of colonial rule—namely, to industrialize
the Indian economy and reverse the long process of deindustrialization under colonial
rule, to develop an indigenous capital goods industry and thus reduce dependence on
Western countries for technology and capital goods and to break out of the colonial
pattern of trade. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, and a Fabian
socialist, was greatly influenced by the experience of Soviet industrialization106. While
choosing not to take sides with either the Soviet or the Western camp during the Cold
War, he nevertheless adopted Soviet economic planning as the vehicle of economic
development in independent India. The role of the state would be to directly undertake
capitalist industrialization to achieve social objectives like eradication of poverty and
generation of employment opportunities. In fact, the state could and did replace, restrain,
regulate and circumscribe private capitalists in order to achieve its goal.
It must be remembered that it was Gandhi rather than Nehru who was the iconic leader of
the struggle for independence; Gandhi mobilized the passion and energy of the Indian
106
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masses against British rule by privileging tradition over modernity and by explicitly
rejecting the modern Western industrial future for India. Gandhi’s economic views were
the exact opposite of Nehru’s; Gandhi was an anti-modernist, liked Ruskin, Thoreau and
Tolstoy, shunned modern capitalist industries and labor-displacing technology, favored
decentralized economically self-sufficient village republics and was a quasi-anarchist in
his opposition to the strong state107. Planning was initiated against these divergent and
opposed views of economic development, which threatened to undermine the possibilities
of any consensus on economic development.
Certain effects of the colonial rule shaped Gandhi’s views and in turn helped him harness
popular energy in the struggle for independence. First, the colonial rule severely
dislocated the traditional economy of India consisting of stable, self-sufficient village
economies, with its population ordered by the caste system and a village-level division of
labor, largely dominated by non-market production and allocation of goods and services
and a unity of agriculture and industry that had previously shielded them from the
corrosive impact of trade. Second, the introduction of private property rights in land by
the British led to erosion of many of the customary rights enjoyed by the peasants as well
as the traditional social security systems that alleviated the misery of the peasants in
times of crises in the pre-colonial social formation of the Indian sub-continent108. On the
other hand, the nationalization of forests in the name of scientific forestry and declaration
107

See Bhattacharya and Basole (2009)
The characterization of the prevalent class structure in pre-colonial Indian social formation has been a
contentious issue among Marxists. Much of the controversy swirled around the concept of the Asiatic mode
of production—a name Marx gave to the prevalent mode of production in India as well as much of the
Orient and which he distinguished from the feudal mode of production that prevailed in Western Europe.
See Sen (1982). The controversy surrounding the notion of the Asiatic mode of production (See Wittfoegel,
1957; Melotti, 1977; Bailey and Llobera, 1981) is not relevant to the subject of this dissertation and hence I
will refrain from engaging with the debate. See Guha (1962) for the intellectual history of the British
attempts at introduction of private property in colonial India.
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of ‘wastes’ and ‘commons’ as state property for raising state revenues unleashed
processes of primitive accumulation that undermined many traditional economic
activities (Gidwani, 1992; Guha and Gadgil, 1989). Third, the very processes that led to
the emergence of capitalist industries in Britain also led to destruction of Indian
industries—for example, protective tariffs in Britain enabled capitalist industries to
develop there while free imports of British manufactured goods undermined traditional
non-capitalist and capitalist products of India. India was gradually inserted into the
colonial pattern of trade—a supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured
goods. This phenomenon is most starkly illustrated in the case of textile industries in the
two countries. This colonial pattern of trade was further strengthened by the development
of the railways. Fourth, with the fall of the pre-colonial surplus appropriators and
subsumed classes, urban Indian industries patronized by them also declined (Habib, 1975,
1984). Luxury consumption by the Mughal imperial court and the maintenance of the
army supported a large urban craft industry. With decline in the royal power, such
demand for the whole range of urban manufactures declined leading to urban
unemployment. Palace-factories (karkhanas) which were established to cater to the
demand for the royal court and the urban nobility were closed down (Bhattacharyya,
1972). The new Indian elite during the colonial period—including the new agrarian
feudal class emerging after the Mutiny of 1857 and the end of the Company rule in
1858—tried to emulate the British lifestyle and consumed imported British goods. On the
other hand, the new middle class, a product of English education, developed a taste for
British goods.
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The colonial period had left a large population dependent on agriculture and an extremely
low land-man ratio that hampered productivity of agricultural labor. By the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, deindustrialization of India under colonial rule was complete.
Modern capitalist industries were set up by both Indians and British starting from the
second half of the nineteenth century. However, if we look at the occupational structure
of India over the period 1901-1931, we find that industrial growth made little or no
inroads into aggregate employment of the country109. In fact, from Table 1, we see that
agricultural share of the labor force increased between 1901 and 1931 and total industrial
labor force in modern industries increased only marginally, much less than required to
offset the decline of labor force in traditional industries.
The pressure of labor force on agriculture lead to a steady decline in land-labor ratio and
agriculture became the reservoir of surplus population as poor peasants desperately held
on to rapidly fragmenting land as their only means of production in conditions of surplus
population. At the time of independence, therefore, “there was much scope for further
primitive accumulation” (Byres, 2005: 84).
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Tirthankar Roy arrives at the following conclusions based on the existing literature on occupational
structure of colonial India.
1. In the period of the censuses, the proportion of male workers engaged in industry
declined, from about 10.6 per cent in 1881 to about 8.4 per cent in 1931.
2. The proportion of women workers in industry declined somewhat more rapidly.
3. If industry and trade are considered together, the proportion of male workers
engaged in these sectors fell from 15.5 per cent in 1881 to 14.1 per cent in 1931.
Thus, while trade and commerce did employ an increasing proportion of workers, the
increase was not sufficient to offset the fall in industry.
4. In absolute numbers, the male industrial workforce fell between 1881 and 1901, was
constant between 1901 and 1921, and rose between 1921 and 1931.
5. The number of women industrial workers was in continuous decline.
6. Between 1901 and 1931, both relative share of industry and absolute numbers
engaged in industry changed very little. (Roy, 1999:16).
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Three years before independence, in 1944, seven leading Indian capitalists, aided by an
economist, prepared “A Brief Memorandum Outlining a Plan of Economic Development
for India”—a document that came to be known as the Bombay Plan. The Bombay Plan
unequivocally called upon the sovereign Indian state (foreseeable in the very near future)
to intervene in the economy in promoting industrialization (Chibber, 2003). Though wary
of state ownership and management of business, big business nevertheless asked the state
to have rigorous and extensive control over the economy. India was probably the first
country outside the Soviet Bloc to experiment with comprehensive and extensive
economic planning and it is interesting to note that economic planning—usually
associated with socialist economies— was actually asked for by business houses in India
(Sen, 1982: 92)110. At the same time, two alternative plans of national development were
drafted by the Gandhians and the Communists (Patnaik, 1998). The pre-independence
National Planning commission furiously debated the nature of economic development in
independent India. Heated debates led to the resignation from the Commission of the sole
Gandhian voice—J.C.Kumarappa—who questioned the authority of the Commission to
debate future industrialization of India when the country was evidently galvanized into
the struggle for independence by the Gandhian critique of British rule and modern
industrialism. It is in this context that economic planning emerged as a solution to
ideological differences.
[T]he very institution of a process of planning became a means for the determination of
priorities on behalf of the “nation”. The debate on the need for industrialization, it might be
said, was politically resolved by successfully constituting planning as a domain outside
“squabbles and conflicts of politics. (Chatterjee, 1995: 202).
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In a recent book, Vivek Chibber comments that “virtually all commentators also agree that there is a
direct line of continuity from the Bombay plan of 1944-45 to the First Five-Year Plan in 1950” (Chibber,
2003: 88).
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Chatterjee’s very influential neo-Gramscian account of the Indian state and economic
planning singled out the most important and socially disruptive process associated with
capitalist development—primitive accumulation—and that too in a poor country that had
recently rode on mass popular movement to independence. The problem was that of
legitimation of capitalist accumulation and hence primitive accumulation in a
representative democracy and with a colonial history of unconstrained dispossession111.
According to Chatterjee, planning was the instrument of ‘passive revolution’ by the
Indian state, ideologically representing capitalist interests.
The notion of ‘passive revolution’ captures the nature of class–transformation in
transitional societies where the classical revolution has failed to materialize. Instead of
historical change by which the capitalist class takes over power and establishes its
hegemonic rule and order, passive revolution refers to the case, where capitalist class
manipulates the transformation in its favor through ‘molecular’ or incremental change. In
the process, the capitalist class has to incorporate many non-capitalist elements in its
social order. The hegemonic ideology is not the ideology of the bourgeois extended over
the civil society, but rather the construction of a new ideology that represents the social
order as standing for the entire society or nation. The socialist rhetoric or economic
planning in India is seen as an exercise in ‘passive revolution’ by the Indian bourgeoisie,
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Chatterjee (1995: 205-208) quotes the noted Indian economist Chakravarty (1987) to uncover the
contradiction in the process of planning.
These two objectives—accumulation and legitimation—produced two implications for
planning in India. On the one hand, planning had to be “a way of avoiding the unnecessary
rigours of an industrial transition in so far as it affected the masses resident in India’s
villages”. On the other hand, planning was to become “a positive instrument for resolving
conflict in a large and heterogeneous subcontinent”.
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where interests of different class structures in the Indian society were sought to be
balanced in order to secure the conditions of slow yet advancing capital accumulation112.
While appreciative of Chatterjee’s insights, this dissertation rejects any essentialized
notion of the state as the agent of any particular class interests. The state, like any other
social site, is an overdetermined and ever-changing entity. The specific economic,
political and cultural conditions prevailing in India determine the concrete manifestation
of the state in terms of economic policies. The policy documents of the Indian state are
fraught through with contradictions and tensions that promoted and inhibited capitalist
and non-capitalist class processes at the same time. To understand the policies of the
Indian state in class-terms, one must look at the existing class-structures of India at the
time of independence and their transformations over time. However, economic, political
and cultural conditions did impose a particular contradiction on the nascent sovereign
Indian state—a contradiction between accumulation of productive capital as the main
engine of economic growth and the promotion of livelihoods for India’s surplus
population—a contradiction that resulted in the accommodation of capitalist and noncapitalist class structures in national plans. Indian planning was an exercise in selective
accommodation of different class structures—a utopic adventure in promoting
harmonious economic growth by balancing different class structures. The failure of
planning is testimony to the inescapable contradictions that beset it from the very
beginning. Marxian theory can account partly for such failure by pointing to the absence
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“The specific form in which this twin problem of planning—accumulation and legitimation—was
initially resolved, especially in the Second and Third Five-year Plans, is well known. There was to be a
capital-intensive industrial sector under public ownership, a private industrial sector in light consumer
goods, and a private agricultural sector. The first two were the “modern” sectors, which were to be financed
by foreign aid, low-interest loans, and a taxation of private incomes mainly in the second sector. The third
sector was seen as being mainly one of petty production…” (Chatterjee, 1995: 211).
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of class in the official discourse on planning. Despite the best of intentions, planning
failed in India, partly because it did not take into account class contradictions in
visualizing a future for India.

The Two Regimes of Capitalist Development in Postcolonial India

A useful way to construct a history of postcolonial India is to distinguish between two
different “regimes” with markedly different economic, political and cultural conditions—
in effect, two different social contexts within which capitalist development proceeded in
India. Economists agree that the New Economic Policy, announced by the central
government in 1991, is a watershed in India’s economic history. It marked the transition
from almost four decades of an uninterrupted “planning” regime to an increasingly
liberalized, globalized and privatized economic regime. While, in class-terms, in both
regimes, there was an expansion of capitalist class structures, important economic,
political and cultural changes after 1991 required a reorientation of the Indian society to a
new life under private capitalism as opposed to state capitalism. Such transformations
had important consequences for non-capitalist class structures too.
At the political level, significant changes distinguish the period since the late 1980s from
the earlier period. The most important of these changes was the erosion of the hegemonic
one-party rule of the Indian National Congress (hereafter, simply Congress) and the birth
of an era of coalition politics—with shifting and unstable alliances between many smaller
regional and major national political parties. For the first twenty five years after
independence, a relatively patient electorate remained politically loyal to the Congress
whose political morality and legitimacy, derived from its role in India’s independence
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movement, went largely unchallenged. Congress represented a “rainbow political
philosophy”—i.e. a political philosophy that accommodated political views on the right,
left and center under a single umbrella, displaying all the colors of the political spectrum
(with the notable exception of the Communist Parties of India). Congress’s rainbow
politics was an effective barrier to political crystallization around issues like caste,
religion, ethnicity, autonomy etc. Congress was the parliament. The heady days of
Nehruvian planning coincided with the overarching ideological stance of the Congress
founded on socialism, modernization, secularism and development.
In the late 1960s and the 1970s, the regime of economic planning and the political
hegemony of Congress faced a series of crisis. After two decades of impressive growth,
the five-year planning strategy ran out of steam in mid-60s with resulting industrial
deceleration, food crisis and soaring unemployment. Politically, the Congress hegemony
faced parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary challenges in several states113. The
Congress Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded by launching a nation-wide poverty
eradication program in 1971. In 1975, she declared national emergency—for the first and
the only time—in India and tried to crush opposition. During the emergency, in 1976, the
constitution of India was amended and the words “socialist” and “secular” were added to
the Preamble. None of these could save the Congress. In the elections of 1977, after
Emergency was lifted, Congress is routed in the national elections and the first nonCongress coalition government is formed in India.
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The Maoist leftist movements in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh and the social justice
movements in Tamil Nadu shook the Congress in late 1960s. Further, there was an internal split of the
Congress into Right Congress and Left Congress in 1967. By 1974, there was nationwide mobilization, led
by one of the most respected political leaders, Jay Prakash Narayan against the Congress Prime minister
Indira Gandhi.
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Though Congress and Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the small interregnum of
coalition rule changed Indian politics forever. The breakaway fractions from that
coalition developed into many of the smaller regional and national parties of India that
secured political importance over succeeding decades. Early 1980s saw the first attempts
at deregulation of the Indian economy leading to an economic environment for private
capitalists to become economically powerful vis-à-vis state capitalist enterprises.
Furthermore, growth rate of the economy picked up after a decade of slowdown.
Since 1991, neoliberal policy has actually helped the fracturing of politics. The fact that
the central government no longer allocates capital investment between states or control
private capitalist investment through licensing and other regulations as before means that
states have to compete with each other to attract domestic and foreign investment. As a
result, regional aspirations often provide the material motives to formation of regional
parties. Moreover, the weak economic role of the center means a single hegemonic party
is not an essential political condition of local development. More important is strategic
alliance with one of the major Parties to form a coalition government at the center in
order to secure for the region a larger share of Central funds. However, this could happen
with whoever emerges as the major party in the elections and hence is the best choice to
enter into a coalition with. The shifting allegiance of smaller parties, often viewed as
“opportunism” and portrayed as a decline of ideology and morality in Indian politics is in
fact partly explained by two phenomenon—the neoliberal policy and the fractured
political space.
Two significant political and cultural developments in the 1980s changed the Indian
society in radical ways—the rise of lower castes as a particular political force and the rise
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of Hindu nationalist Right. One of the most significant events under the coalition
government of 1977-1980 was the setting up of the Mandal Commission in 1979 with the
mandate to “identify the socially or educationally backward”. The Commission’s report,
submitted in 1980, recommended “a positive discrimination” in favor of lower castes
with a certain percentage of government jobs and educational seats reserved for them.
This immediately led to a controversy as upper caste people protested against
reservations which took away some of their social and economic privileges. Over the next
decade, the lower caste people mobilized around new political parties who focused on the
caste issue. The implementation of Mandal Commission’s recommendations in 1990 was
a watershed event that brought caste into the center of Indian politics and it has remained
central after that.
The rise of Hindu Right in the 1980s and the communal tension that it created through its
aggressive assertion of Hindu nationalist identity and its attacks on the Muslim minority
provides another traumatic experience in India. The Hindu right combined aggressive
military posturing with laissez faire economic policies favoring private capitalists and at
the same time promoted a conservative culture that asserted Hindu identity in an
increasingly Westernized middle class. Even as they asserted the Indian identity at the
cultural level, their economic policies undermined the same through rapid spread of
global consumerist culture across Indian middle classes which undermined many of the
traditional Indian cultural norms.
In the words of Yogendra Yadav (1999), the period since the 1990s has been dominated
by three Ms—Mandal (caste), Mandir (temple, in English, i.e. religion) and Market
(globalization). At the same time, class-based politics have weakened in India over the
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last two decades. This is surprising, since movements against loss of livelihoods,
dispossession through markets and displacement of traditional communities by state and
private capitalist industrial projects have increasingly come into prominence over the
same period.
If one has to demarcate the regimes—always at the risk of oversimplification—one can
highlight the following differences. The period from 1947 to 1991 was a regime that
combined centralized economic planning with one-party hegemonic rule of the Congress
and social cohesion based on relatively controlled inequality of income and an inclusive
culture of accommodation and appeasement of religious, ethnic, caste and class
contradictions. The period since 1991 is a regime of free-market private capitalism with a
fractured, uncertain and contested political space, cultural ambivalence due partly to the
clash of global consumerism with an assertive Hindu chauvinism and a society in general
torn apart by rising inequality, jobless economic growth and clashes around caste,
religion, ethnicity and autonomy114.
The period since 1991 is also unique in the sense that the contradictions of capitalist
development are brought into sharp relief since an economically powerful, paternalistic
and populist state is replaced by a state subjected to all the contradictory pulls and pushes
of capitalist and non-capitalist class structures as well as other non-class processes, even
as it increasingly loses its economic power to intervene in the society to maintain social
cohesion. One particular manifestation of this contradictory development of the society is
what is often referred to as a “radical disjuncture” between economics and politics in
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These changes were gradual, rather than discontinuous and hence the choice of the year 1991 as the
point of discontinuity is purely arbitrary—being significant only to the extent that the formal change of
policy regime was a “statement” of how things were to move in the coming decades, an official
acknowledgement of a new vision of capitalist development.
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India today, pulling the population in opposite directions. In the sphere of economic life,
more and more people are excluded from the benefits of economic growth under the
neoliberal regime—with jobless growth, increasing inequality and widespread
dispossession brought about by accelerated capitalist accumulation—yet the same
marginalized groups are included in the political processes of electoral democracy. “The
rich dominate the economy now more than earlier, but the poor have a strong voice in the
polity more than earlier. And there is a mismatch." (Suri, 2004: 5405).
More and more people are voting and participating in the broader electoral processes in
India in the recent times. Interestingly, oppressed and marginalized groups are voting in
increasing numbers115. Despite state-level differences, at the national level, participation
of women, dalits (lower castes), and adivasis (tribals) has increased. As Palshikar and
Kumar (2004) observe, "in spite of all the limitations of the electoral process, people
have succeeded in instituting their own democratic meaning in this process." (Palshikar
and Kumar, 2004: 5417). Given the fractured political space since 1990s, the deep
tensions that threaten social integrity and the fundamental uncertainty of global markets,
it is surprising that both a vibrant democracy as well as rapid capital accumulation have
characterized the new regime—providing one of very few examples of capitalist
development within a democratic regime in world history. The current regime also lay to
rest the long-standing idea that capitalist class structures are too weak in India to develop
independently without state assistance or that a strong state is necessary to manage the
contradictions of capitalist development in a heterogeneous society like India or for that
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Rural participation exceeds urban, and hence poorer sections of Indian society are voting in greater
numbers than the richer. In the 1991 national elections, 61 % of the rural and semi-urban electorate voted
as against 53% of the urban electorate. In 2004 national elections, 60% of dalits (lower castes) voted as
compared to 56% of upper-caste voters. (Palshikar and Kumar, 2004)
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matter, the idea that premature democracy is bad for development. When Prime minister
Nehru laid the foundation stone, in 1948, for the Hirakud Dam, one of the earliest large
dams built in postcolonial India he addressed the villagers displaced by the dam in the
following words—“if you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the
country”116. And they did! When we come to 2006, in the same state of Orissa, tribal
people demonstrated, with bows and arrows, against the setting up of a giant steel plant
by a multinational company—the largest FDI project in the world in that year. The plant
is yet to take off.

The Dirigiste Regime: The Dilemma of Planning

The economic history of postcolonial India is often written around the dominant theme of
capitalist development—its failures, successes and reversals. Scant attention is paid to
non-capitalist class structures in the process of transformation of Indian economy. Yet,
once we take our gaze away from the dominating image of capital, we uncover a new
history of postcolonial India—how different class-structures existed and continue to exist
in Indian society and how non-capitalist class structures shaped and continue to shape the
Indian society as much as the capitalist class structures. In fact, the moment we recognize
this, we will find that the characterization of economic development in India as capitalist
becomes problematic—it rather appears as a representational strategy that privileges
certain processes over others and hence suppresses certain kinds of political responses to
the emerging contradictions of the Indian society.
Yet, economists and planners were always forced to accommodate non-capitalist class
structures in their plans of economic development, even as these plans were meant to
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See Bhattacharya and Basole (2009: 117, n. 20).
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promote capitalist production in India. The Industrial Policy Resolution (1948) presented
the first outline of the allocation of production between state and private capitalist
enterprises. Certain industries were reserved for the exclusive monopoly of the state
enterprises. In certain industries all new enterprises would be established solely by the
state. While existing private enterprises were allowed to function, it was emphasized that
the state had the right and could exercise it to acquire any private enterprise in these
industries. In the rest of the industries, business was normally left to private initiatives,
though the state enterprises were supposed to progressively participate in those industries
and the state could intervene in any industry if the performance of private business was
unsatisfactory. The Second Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 expanded the sphere of
state ownership and categorically declared that all industries of basic and strategic
interest and public utilities, should be in the public sector. More significantly, it declared
that the industrial policy goal is to create a “socialistic pattern of society”.
The Soviet-style Five-Year Plans went into effect in 1951, but it was with the second
Five-Year Plan covering the period 1956-1961, that the distinct path of capitalist
development in India was laid. 117The second Five-Year Plan—based on the Mahalanobis
model—was a ground-breaking project that radically shaped the future of Indian
economy; it put industrialization through rapid capital accumulation at the heart of the
process of economic development in India. Yet, there were Gandhian challenges to
modernist industrial paradigms from the beginning. We have already seen how the
freedom struggle was animated by the misery heaped on India’s working people by the
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The architect of the second plan was Prashanta Chandra Mahalanobis, an eminent statistician from
Calcutta and the founder of the Indian Statistical Institute. The second Plan is often referred to as NehruMahalanobis-Feldman model. See Bhagwati and Chakravarty (1969).
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destruction of traditional industries in India under the impact of British transition to
capitalism and colonial relations. One way the Gandhian opposition was neutralized was
through the setting up of the Khadi and Village Industries Commission to protect
handicraft and traditional industries (Tyabji, 1984b). But more importantly, the protection
of village and handicrafts was deemed important for providing livelihoods in laborintensive production and the supply of non-agricultural wage goods, so that the state’s
investment of productive capital could be concentrated in capital-goods industries. In
these maneuvers emerges an enduring contradiction of postcolonial India’s experiments
with capitalist development—the contradiction between capital accumulation and
employment generation, or in other words, the contradiction between capitalist
accumulation and surplus population that the particular social context produces. This
contradiction cuts right through the entire Planning process. The Mahalanobis model was
opposed by some economists118, who presented an alternative development model
focused on employment and expansion of wage goods. The protection of urban and rural
handicrafts was a response to these mounting criticisms of the Mahalanobis model.
To counter criticism from all quarters, the Second Five Year Plan document deviated from
the Mahalanobis framework, but only by sweeping the problem under the carpet. It was said
that the cottage and village industry sectors would be responsible for supplying the nonagricultural wage goods. Since these were labor-intensive, i.e. low productivity, by a
miracle the problem of unemployment was also thereby solved (Ahluwalia and Little, 1998:
44-45).

Village and cottage industries were pre-dominantly characterized by ancient class
structures. Whenever family labor was utilized in these industries, ancient class processes
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See C.N. Vakil and P.R. Brahmanand (1956). Bhagwati (1998 :25) argues, however, that accumulation
in the Plans was conceived not in opposition to employment, but rather as the only possible way to
eradicate poverty and create employment.
The key strategy that defined the resulting developmental effort was the decision to target
efforts at accelerating the growth rate……Accelerated growth was thus regarded as an
instrumental variable; a policy outcome that would in turn reduce poverty, which
constituted the true objective of our efforts. (Bhagwati, 1998: 25. Italics in the original )

187

were articulated with household feudal class processes. The (male) head of the family
appropriated not only his surplus labor but also the surplus abort performed by members
of his family and made subsumed class payments to the merchants, moneylenders or
banks, etc. Thus, non-capitalist class processes figured very prominently in the national
plans otherwise designed for rapid capitalist accumulation, though they were hardly
understood and debated in class terms.
Along with village and cottage industries, relatively modernized small-scale industries—
both capitalist as well as ancient—were also promoted because of their capacity to
generate livelihoods. Certain industrial products were specifically reserved for production
in the small-scale industrial sector119. The number of products reserved for small scale
industries rapidly increased over time, particularly under the non-Congress coalition
government during 1977-1980120.
It will not be an exaggeration to say that under the dirigiste regime, the overall state
policy was to promote state-capitalist enterprises and small-scale competitive capitalist
enterprises at the cost of oligopolistic capitalist enterprises121. The vision of the state in
curbing large, powerful business houses in India was not to restrict capitalist
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The Karve committee on small-scale and village industries proposed in 1956 a policy of reservation of
certain products for small-scale units.
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“The policy of reserving items for production in the Small Scale Sector taken as a whole had begun with
the reservation of dhotis and sarees of specific kinds for handloom units in the early nineteen fifties. In the
case of those industry groups which lay within the purview of' the Central Small Industries Organisation,
reservation had been made by 1967, for 46 items. By 1977, this had increased to 504 items. In 1980, the
number was apparently increased to a total of' 807, but closer scrutiny shows that in the majority of cases,
the existing items had been more carefully defined at the level of eight and nine digit national industrial
classification codes” (Tyabji, 1984b: 1426).
121
Oligopolistic enterprises yielding some degree of monopoly power in the market would be able to price
their commodities above their values and would thus secure either non-class revenue from consumers or
subsumed class payments from both state capitalist and small competitive private capitalist enterprises as
well as ancient enterprises, thus undermining accumulation in these enterprises. Such an outcome was
deemed undesirable for a broad-based capitalist development. On the other hand, a check on the growth of
corporate power would establish the image of the new independent postcolonial state as the guardian of its
people—workers, capitalists and ancients—against private corporate “greed” and “manipulation”.
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development, but rather to facilitate capitalist transition “from below”, i.e. the emergence
of competitive capitalism relying on individual entrepreneurial capitalist. It was expected
that such broad-based capitalism, will balance the economic power of large oligarchic
business houses on the one hand and at the same time facilitate a differentiation of the
ancients into capitalists and wage-workers. According to the 1951 census, more than 58%
of the industrial labor force was ancient producers (Tyabji, 1984b). It was expected that
protection for small scale industries would actually help capitalist class structures to
develop through a process of differentiation of the ancients and in the absence of
monopolistic strangulation of the incipient capitalist initiatives. It must be remembered
that by the time of independence, there had already emerged large business houses—both
productive and unproductive capitalists—which controlled the lion’s share of society’s
total productive and unproductive capital. The concentration of economic power in the
hands of a small group of business houses meant that while “while independence meant
the transfer of "political" power to the Congress, it also meant the transfer of "economic"
power to the big Indian industrialists and agricultural landlords” (Tyabji,1984a:36).
Popular desire for democracy stirred up by the freedom struggle meant that such
concentration and inequality of wealth and income would destroy social cohesion in an
emerging nation-state. The growth and expansion of small capitalist class structures
would sustain the democratic image of capitalism—i.e. small property holders and
freedom and opportunity of enterprise.
What is of interest in the Indian case, however, is that these requirements could be skillfully
matched to the popular support for small industrialists and small enterprises which had been
generated by democratic currents within the Congress itself in the pre-Independence period
(Tyabji, 1984 a: 37)
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On the other hand, the development of state capitalist industries in areas where massive
doses of initial capital investment and long “gestation” periods are involved actually
helped the growth of large private enterprises—by providing crucial C-commodities as
well as market for private capitalist products (Patnaik, 1979; Desai, 1975) 122. On the
other hand, the compulsions of rapid growth of capital-goods industries meant that actual
Plan expenditure on village and traditional industries and small-scale industries was
insignificant compared to that on modern industries. As we can see from Table 2, starting
from second Five-Year Plan, the plan outlays on modern industries has dwarfed that on
village and traditional industries, clearly illustrating the bias of the planners towards
modern versus traditional industries. Therefore, the Nehruvian policy regime had
contradictory implications for large as well as small private capitalist enterprises as well
as traditional and modern ancient enterprises.
Of course, the leading business houses asked for government intervention in the economy
to secure certain conditions of their existence and expansion as productive and
unproductive capitalists. But they never liked the nationalization of society’s means of
production or reservation of products for state capitalist and small capitalist and ancient
enterprises. Squeezed between these two “sectors” of the economy, the oligopolistic
productive and unproductive capitalists had “either to remain where they were in terms of
industrial assets, or to subvert the strategy, by making inroads into the sphere either of the
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In terms of Keynesian macroeconomics, public investment doesn’t “crowd out “private investment,
rather, it “crowds in” private investment in the Indian context.
Public Investment, therefore, was effectively to play a dual role: it was to eliminate to some
extent the serious gaps in the production structure which the private sector, would have
been reluctant to overcome on its own and to provide a stimulus to private investment by
extending the markets of private industrialists directly and indirectly (Patnaik,1979: 6).
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public sector or of the small scale sector” (Tyabji,1984b:1427). They tried to
systematically subvert the policy regime by encroaching on both the reserved sectors. It
was found by the Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (1969)
that economic concentration and degree of monopoly has increased among the private
capitalist sector throughout the planning period. Specific anti-monopoly laws were
brought into effect; foreign exchange and foreign investment were put under strict
control; banks, insurance companies and coal mines were nationalized.123 These moves
had often led private capitalists to accuse Indian state of destroying capitalism and
promoting socialism124. Nationalization of means of production on a significant scale was
equated with socialism. The Marxists criticized the Indian state for not destroying private
capitalism fully or for being complicit with private capitalist interests despite socialist
rhetorics. Class understood in terms of production, appropriation and distribution of
surplus labor—as opposed to class-as-property-relations—did not inform Marxist debates
on India’s economic development.
The expanding control and regulation of the state of private capitalist enterprises
provoked a response of the latter in terms of a severe critique of Nehruvian planning in
terms of economic performance (e.g. ridicule expressed by reference to a “Hindu rate of
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Indira Gandhi nationalized major banks in 1969, the insurance sector in 1972 and the coal industry in
1973. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act went into effect in 1969. The Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA) was passed in 1973, which put into place numerous restrictions for foreign
investment and the operations of foreign companies in India.
124
Till that period, Indian National Congress was the hegemonic political party at the national level. In the
1967 elections, the Congress party received a major setback in the centre and particularly in the states.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took a radical stance which led to a split within the Congress. India turned
more towards Soviet Russia in international relations and internally the congress under Indira Gandhi
moved closer to Communist parties of India. By that time, the Indian political landscape was getting
fractured into slowly emerging regional political parties. At the same time, radical agrarian movements
threatened the legitimacy of the central government. In 1971, Dandekar and Rath’s (1971) study showed
that after 3 five-year Plans, poverty had not decreased in India. If one looks at per capita expenditure,
poverty appeared to have increased over that period. Indira Gandhi launched the Garibi Hatao (eradicate
poverty) slogan and adopting socialist rhetoric, got a landslide victory in 1971.
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growth”) and inefficiency of state-capitalism in India as well as state-regulation of private
capitalism in India125. Therefore, by the early eighties, a reversal of the earlier policy
regime was gradually but steadily under way leading to its formal abandonment in 1991
and adoption of private capitalism as the privileged engine of economic growth in India.
Four decades of planning had generated significant growth of capitalist industries in
India, most notably in domestic capital goods and basic goods industries supplying Ccommodities to both state and private capitalist industries. The Nehruvian regime was
successful in installing state capitalist industries at the commanding heights of the
economy. Table 3 shows that in terms of net capital formation, the public sector and
private sector were close in 1950-51, but by 1990-91 the public sector clearly dwarfs the
private corporate sector. Table 4 shows that the share of the public sector in the GDP of
different sectors of the economy increased continuously over the entire planning regime.
However, if we look at the occupational structure of Indian labor force, we find the
striking result that it had hardly changed since the beginning of the century under colonial
rule. Industrial employment continued to be stuck at a very low percentage of the labor
force and agriculture continued to hold on to a very high share of the labor force. In 1991,
66.7% of the work force was still employed in agriculture, 3% in modern industry, 7.2%
in traditional industry and construction and 20.5 % in services (Roy, 1999). The growth
of industrial output and expansion of industrial state and private capital was not matched
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The Nehruvian policy regime is referred to as the license raj, where industrial expansion or investment
required a formal license from the state. A vast literature exists on the resources spent by private capitalists
in obtaining those licenses (a scarce commodity under restricted imports and regulated investment regime).
In the Indian case, these expenditures of business have been termed as “directly unproductive, profitseeking activities (DUP) by Bhagwati (1982) or competitive rent-reeking activities (Krueger, 1974). The
cost of such bureaucratic control of private capitalists emerged as a major category of subsumed class
payment to the state or political parties—as formal license fees as well as informal bribes—by private
capitalists to secure conditions of accumulation. The reaction of private capitalists was partly fueled by
their desire to get rid of such subsumed class payments to the state. For an overview of debates on
liberalization in India, see Ghosh (1998).
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by the growth of industrial employment. Therefore, there is a disjuncture between
capitalist accumulation and employment generated by such accumulation. As Table 5
shows, per capita GDP in agriculture continuously declined relative to that in nonagricultural sectors over the entire planning period. This is reflected in the overall decline
in employment elasticity in the Indian economy.
Employment elasticities, measured as the ratio of employment growth to the growth
of value-added have declined from around 0.65 in the 1960s to 0.55 per cent during
the 1970s and around 0.38 during the 1980s. This decline has occurred due both to
the technology and composition effect. Changes in technologies of production in
industrial sectors, subsectors and products have tended to reduce the labour
requirement per unit of output. At the same time, the share of products and sectors
with high labour-output coefficients in total output has declined and that of products
and sectors with high capital-output coefficients has increased (Papola, 1992: 308309).

In class terms, we find that the surplus population continued to be engaged as ancients in
agricultural as well as non-agricultural production after four decades of planning. Hence,
the vision of the planners that capitalist class structures would slowly replace noncapitalist class structures did not materialize and contradictory effects of the planning
regime were felt not only by the state and private capitalists, large and small capitalist
enterprises, but also by non-capitalist class structures, whose conditions of existence were
simultaneously undermined and strengthened by the state policies. For example, state
subsidies on capital equipment as well as underpricing of domestically produced state
capitalist C-goods allowed both state and private capitalist industries to adopt higher
organic composition of capital.
Meanwhile, expansion of capitalist production destroyed conditions of existence of other
non-capitalist production units—leading to dispossession of direct producers from their
means of production on a massive scale. One of the major forms of dispossession was the
development of infrastructure, including dams, highways, but also through acquisition of
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natural resource base for growth and expansion of new industries. The dispossessed
people are often referred to as the “internal refugees” (Cernea, 1990) or “development
refugees” (Mahapatra, 1991). According to Fernandes (2007), over the period 1947-2000,
more than 60 million people have been deprived of their customary access to means of
production by “development”—i.e. infrastructural and industrial—projects. Majority of
the displaced persons are tribal and lower caste people (ibid). One of the main
instruments of dispossession is the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which did not
allow for “rehabilitation of the displaced” (Guha, 2005). The colonial Act was used by
independent Indian state to engage in primitive accumulation with as much impunity as
the British colonizers126.
State interventions as well as rising pressure of population on land have led to depletion
of “commons” and “wastes”. The commercialization and monetization of the economy
has eroded traditional natural and common property resources. Technological changes in
agriculture have created massive environmental degradation of natural resources and with
it the means of production for many non-capitalist class processes. As agricultural inputs
came to be industrially produced with intense application of science, many of the
traditional modes of agricultural practices have vanished. Rao and Storm (1998: 235)
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The Land Acquisition Act of 1894—which was legislated into existence during the colonial era—is an
infamous example of how the concept of “eminent domain” is misused by the state, whether colonial or
postcolonial. The government can acquire any land—privately or communally owned—in the name of
“public purpose”.
Once the government notifies any land for acquisition under the Act, the acquisition
itself or its purpose cannot be challenged in court. Projects like dams, mines, private
industries and SEZs can always be interpreted as being in “public purpose” since
they are considered imperative for development and industrialization. There is no
mechanism to determine whether this “public purpose” actually translates into
“public interest” or not. Only compensation amount for the land can be urged upon
and decided in such cases in courts” (Perspectives, 2008: 7).
In independent India, no central government has made any serious attempts at amendment of the
Act until 2004, though certain sate governments did come up with some rehabilitation laws since
the 1980s (See Guha, 2005)
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claim that 30 to 50 percent of common property resources have been depleted in the last
four decades127.
Primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation with sluggish rates of growth of
productive workforce have expanded the surplus population of India throughout the
planning regime. The classic location of surplus population in India has always been
agriculture. Let us now look at the dilemma that agriculture posed for the planners in
such a context.

Surplus Population and the Agrarian Dilemma

Surplus labor power was trapped in agriculture since colonial times, when destruction of
Indian industries and the erosion of traditional social security mechanisms forced people
to fall back on land as the last means of production and subsistence. A rapid increase in
population in the twentieth century led to a steep fall in per capita availability of land.
Due to the pressure of population on land, rents increased and ate away most of the
peasants’ surplus where ancient class structures existed. Money-lenders and traders also
dominated ancient farmers through exorbitant claims on surplus. Under feudal class
relations, feudal exploitation intensified under absentee landlords who had no personal
ties with land and often claimed rent that exceeded the surplus produced by the serfs, thus
threatening serfs’ subsistence. At the time of independence, agriculture was stagnant with
peasants immersed in deep misery and economic crisis.
Writing in 1961, Sundaram estimated that “about 40% of India’s population now engaged
in agriculture should be removed from farming so as to make cultivation more economic”
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See NSSO (1999), Jodha (1985, 1989, 1990, 2000).
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(Sundaram, 1961: 131). The guiding model of economic growth in poor countries with
large surplus labor power was that provided by Arthur Lewis (1954) who argued that
capital accumulation can proceed by withdrawing surplus labor power from agriculture at
subsistence wage. At the end of the process, expanding capitalist economy will absorb
the entire surplus labor power and both the traditional pre-capitalist economy and surplus
labor power will disappear. 128
However, deep doubts persisted in the minds of even those economists who believed in
the Lewisian growth process. Let us read a neoclassical text to uncover contradictions
that plagued the modernist vision of capitalist transformation of agriculture and
accumulation and expansion of industrial capital in the presence of surplus population. I
will use a single text in illustrating the dilemma—an article by V. M. Dandekar in 1962.
Dandekar writes this article on the issue of appropriate agrarian reforms in the context of
an economy undergoing capitalist industrialization in the presence of over-population or
“superfluous” population (Georgescu-Roegen, 1960:12). Consider a Lewis-type process
occurring in the non-agricultural sector. A small capitalist nucleus is expanding, by
reinvesting its profit and drawing laborers from the agricultural sector. The agricultural
sector is overpopulated with labor whose marginal productivity is zero or at least much
below subsistence level. What should be the appropriate agrarian reforms in such a
context? The dominant view, in those days, at least in the non-communist countries, was
that individual peasant holdings was the best choice. This, in fact, led Georgescu-Roegen
to argue for a “double negation”—not capitalism, not socialism—in agrarian reforms.
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The Lewis model provided the intellectual vision for the planning models in India. See Chakrabarti and
Cullenberg (2003).
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Dandekar analyzes the merit of this argument. While the Lewis-type process is occurring
in the modern industrial sector with growth in investment and output, employment
growth in the industrial sector is constrained by the principle of capitalist profitmaximization whereby labor is employed up to the point where marginal product of labor
is equal to the real wage rate. In conditions of over-population, the entire residual labor
force is thrown onto the agricultural sector to absorb and feed them while the Lewis
process is occurring. Moreover, agricultural output has to be maximized, too, in order to
siphon a food surplus to the industrial sector to feed the industrial proletariat129.
Capitalism in agriculture cannot be a solution to this problem, since it would introduce
the capitalist employment principle (MPL = Real wage rate) into agriculture and would
thus fail to absorb the surplus labor. Can co-operatives be a solution? Not the way they
are usually operated, because once individual peasant holdings are put in the form of a
cooperative, the marginal productivity principle comes into play and even family
members of the peasant families in the cooperatives may not be employed. This is
because the managers of cooperative farms, trained in modern economic theory and
coming mostly from the urban educated literate classes, will have imbibed the capitalistentrepreneurial spirit. Moreover, the cooperatives will function in an economy where the
modern non-agricultural sector is run on capitalist principles and hence the efficiency
calculus of the capitalist firm will inform any evaluation of the performance of the

129

“Conceived as a part of the problem of economic growth, the agrarian problem consists in holding on to
this population until an increasing part of it is withdrawn to the non-agricultural sector and in the
meanwhile in employing it usefully so as to maximize the total output of the agricultural sector”.
(Dandekar, 1962: 70).
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cooperatives.130 Hence, there will be a pressure on the managers to run the cooperative on
capitalist principles.
If neither capitalism nor socialism can provide a solution to the agrarian problem, can the
traditional agrarian mode of production, feudalism, provide a solution? GeorgescuRoegen and Dandekar argue that traditional feudalism did provide a solution to the
problem of employment of the surplus population. The feudal landlord does not receive
profit-rent, but a tithe, which is a fixed share of the output of land. Given a constant share
of the tithe in output, the landlord’s tithe can be maximized by maximizing employment
and output, i.e. by employing labor up to the point where its marginal product is zero,
beyond what capitalism would permit. However, in contact with capitalism, feudalism
changes its character. Feudal lords become more interested in non-agricultural activities
and try to leave traditional societies. This leads to absentee landlordism, rack-renting and
all the horrors of rural exploitation. Hence feudalism doesn’t work either.
The solution is to be found in individual peasant holdings. In conditions of surplus labor,
opportunity cost of labor is zero and family labor will be employed to the full extent of
zero MPL. Labor will be employed without any reference to marginal productivity and
output will be maximized. Thus the surplus labor is employed and fed by sharing of the
total produce within the family. Agrarian reforms, according to Dandekar, which attempt
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This fear is not unfounded. We have seen this in the debate over reforms of the public sector in the
1990s in India. The critics of the public sector policy have incessantly pointed out the dismal performance
of the public sector in terms of profitability, productivity and quality of goods and services. The defenders
have in vain fought back arguing that the public sector enterprises were not run according to private
business criterion, but had several “social objectives” to achieve in addition to productivity and
profitability. The critics seem to have won, since today public sector units either have to prove themselves
to be competitive with the private sector or else they suffer privatization or disinvestment. Consequently,
the public sector follows the same cost-cutting, productivity-raising competitive strategies as the private
sector.
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to break up feudalism and redistribute land to individual peasant families, actually restore
the old feudal formula in a better form.
Note, that this agrarian arrangement is only for a temporary period, until the nonagricultural sector sufficiently weans away the surplus labor in agricultural. Also, note
that the Lewis-type process and the strategy of rapid capitalist growth are never
questioned. But, when it comes to ensuring the employment and livelihoods of the
people, the same capitalist principles are rejected. In effect, non-capitalist class
structures—mainly ancient—are promoted precisely to tackle the problem of surplus
population while enabling expansion of capitalist class structures.
This is not the end of the story, however. Dandekar realizes the limitations of individual
peasant holdings in generating rapid growth and capital accumulation in agriculture.
Individual peasant holdings work as a solution only up to a point. Beyond that they
hinder economic growth. This nagging contradiction between requirements of growth and
requirements of livelihood now pushes Dandekar in a new and opposite direction.
Dandekar finally argues for large land-holdings “feudal in theory, modern in technology
and oriented to a socialistic purpose”. The entire paper of Dandekar takes you through a
dizzying sequence of negations. Dandekar arrived at individual peasant holdings by
negating socialism, capitalism and feudalism-in-presence-of-capitalism as all of them
failed to employ the surplus population. Then he negates individual peasant holdings
because they fail to generate growth in agriculture and fail to maximize output and
release enough food to fuel the growth of the industrial sector. Therefore, individual
small plots of land are to be consolidated into large holdings under a “feudal overlord
who will collect the tithe and hand it over to the non-agricultural sector” (Dandekar,
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1962: 80). He argues against any redistribution of land to landless laborers or permanent
settling of farmers on lands with proprietary rights, since they must be available for
withdrawal when the expanding industrial sector needs them. People are to be loosely
settled on the large tracts of land and the feudal overlord has to ensure that output is
maximized using all the resources, but most importantly using all the labor resources,
while waiting for the industrial sector to absorb the rural surplus labor. Thus, the only
way Dandekar can find a solution to the problem of over-population in the presence of
capitalist development, without hindering the latter, is to revert to a feudal type of
arrangement. Also, what is interesting in his analysis is the idea that surplus population
should not have secure access to means of production—i.e. there should not be a reversal
of primitive accumulation by the policies undertaken to manage surplus population.
“Free” labor power must be available for withdrawal by the capitalist industries.

Land Reforms and Surplus Population in Agriculture

Of course, Dandekar’s ideas were never put into practice. But, to a certain extent, the
state undertook land reforms with varying degrees of success. While no radical
redistribution of land took place in India and peasants continued to be subjected to feudal
class exploitation in various pockets of India, Indian agriculture was transformed from its
late colonial feudal form to a predominantly ancient form with some capitalist and feudal
farms. The idea of the planners was to get rid of feudalism in agriculture and promote
ancient class structures (peasant family farms) with the hope that capitalist agricultural
entrepreneurs would emerge through the process of differentiation of the ancients and
accumulation of capital. On the other hand, agriculture had also to act as a “sink” for
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surplus labor power. Therefore, processes of dispossession or differentiation cannot be
allowed to destroy the “sink”. These led to same contradictory policy interventions in
agriculture as in industry. The following rather long quote admirably captures the
contradictions and the compulsions that drive state intervention in agriculture.
Indeed the problem of India’s agriculture lies outside agriculture, namely that the other
sectors did not grow fast enough to withdraw sufficient population out of agriculture.
………………………………………………The non-agricultural sector is in part an
‘organized’ sector and entry into that sector is highly restricted. That sector does not take in
any more people than it can remunerate at the relatively high level. All the rest must stay
behind in agriculture and share whatever may grow there. Agriculture is a parking lot for
the poor.
Underlying this fact is the agrarian reform and policy pursued in the last four decades. It
failed to make a distinction between abolition of feudal elements and elimination of
enterprises. For instance, not only were intermediaries abolished but lease and sale market
in land also abolished. Ceiling limits on landholdings were imposed with the ostensible
purpose to distribute the surplus land to the landless. Whatever the success of these
measures, they tended to freeze the situation in agriculture and inhibit movement in and out
of agriculture. Special agencies were created called Small Farmer Development Agency
(SFDA) and Marginal Farmer and Agricultural Labourer (MFAL) development agency to
administer programmes initiated to make essentially non-viable small and marginal farmers
and agricultural labourers viable by providing them with credit. Subsequently, thee were
supplemented by the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) to provide them
with additional self-employment. There were also programmes providing additional wage
employment, such as the Cash Scheme for Rural Employment (CSRE), Pilot Intensive
Rural Employment Programme (PIREP) and the Food for Work programme. The intention
had been to give to the surplus population, which agriculture could not support, some
succour, without withdrawing it from agriculture (Dandekar, 1992:54-55, Italics mine).

Land reforms in India had the following components—
i)

Abolition of intermediaries, i.e. the Zamindars (who had developed into a
feudal class by late colonial period), so that the state could directly collect
revenue from the cultivators.

ii)

Reforms aimed at tenancy relations—security of tenure, reduction of rent,
conferment of ownership rights to tenants.

iii)

Ceilings on the size of landholdings

iv)

Cooperativization of agriculture
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Only the first component of land reforms was implemented with relative success. The
second and third components were only partially successful, while the fourth never really
took off. The peasants’ anger against the zamindars, the anti-nationalist role of the
zamindars in the freedom movement and their alienation from the rural community made

the abolition of zamindari politically feasible and desirable. The zamindars as a class,
however, fought back, delayed and obstructed the process through endless litigations. But
their power as a class was broken by the mid-fifties. The abolition of zamindari
transformed twenty million erstwhile tenants into landowners (Chandra, Mukherjee and
Mukherjee, 1999). This directly transformed former tenants into ancient farmers, though
the richer strata of these peasants also became landlords in turn. Tenancy declined after
reforms, partly as a result of increase in self-cultivation and partly as a result of evictions
of existing tenants by landowners at the time of reforms. Loopholes in the legislation
were used by the zamindars to resume land by claiming to perform ‘personal cultivation’
on land. Even “absentee landlords” made a show of labor expended in direct cultivation
and assumed large areas of land under personal cultivation. At the same time, they also
resorted to eviction of tenants on a large-scale in order to keep for ‘personal cultivation’
as large a proportion of their lands as possible. A section of the erstwhile rent-earning
zamindars turned to capitalist farming. And the evicted tenants became landless

proletariat. Large feudal ‘estates’ were gone, except in some pockets of India.
The second part of land reforms—concerned with tenancy reforms—had three basic
objectives—1) security of tenure, 2) reduction in rent and 3) ownership rights over land
cultivated by tenants, subject to certain restrictions. The reforms had a legal provision for
the resumption of entire land-holding by small landowners—who were no better off than
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their tenants—for self-cultivation. This legal provision was manipulated by large
landlords who transferred lands in the name of number of their relatives as “small
landowners” and evicted existing tenants on a large-scale. Thus the very reforms aimed at
protecting tenants and small landowners were used by landowners as an instrument of
primitive accumulation. Delays in implementation of land reforms offered ample
opportunity for such acts131.
Tenancy reforms were carried to its farthest in states where Communist Parties were in
government, e.g. West Bengal and Kerala. But, even in these states, the pressure of
population on land was so high that egalitarian distribution of land beyond a point
became infeasible.
As it has been noted that in West Bengal, where over time the overwhelming majority of
the cultivators were small cultivators controlling less than five acres, a further redistributive
thrust was difficult. ‘The “class enemy” [the feudal landlords] had dissolved into a sea of
small landholdings’. The dilemma was the same as the one that was faced in other parts of
India. (Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2000:382)

The pressure of population on land was such as to push up the rent and eat away a large
part of the surplus of the direct producers. Legal ‘fair’ rents in such a situation could only
be enforced in case of tenants with occupancy rights. The partial success stories like
Kerala and West Bengal notwithstanding, the practice of unsecured and underground
tenancy continued, partly fueled by the high rents.
131

“Even after the tenants got legal protection against eviction, large-scale evictions occurred. For example,
the Planning Commission’s Panel on Land Reforms noted in 1956 that between 1948 and 1951 the number
of protected tenants in the State of Bombay declined from 1.7 million to 1.3 million, i.e. by more than 23
per cent; in the State of Hyderabad between 1951 and 1955, the number declined by about 57 per cent.
Another detailed study of Hyderabad showed that out of every 100 protected tenants created in 1951, after
four years, i.e. by 1954, only 45.4 per cent maintained that status; 12.4 per cent became landowners by
exercising their right to acquire land; 2.6 per cent were legally evicted; 22.1 per cent were illegally evicted
and 17.5 per cent ‘voluntarily’ surrendered their claims to the land. Voluntary surrenders by tenants was
really an euphemism for illegal eviction as most often the tenant was ‘persuaded’ under threat to give up
his tenancy rights ‘voluntarily’. So common was the practice that the Fourth Plan was constrained to
recommend that all surrenders should only in favor of the government, which could allot such lands to
eligible persons. However, only a handful of states acted upon this recommendation.” (Chandra, Mukherjee
and Mukherjee, 2000:380).
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Another component of land reforms was the imposition of ceilings on the size of land
holdings with the objective of attaining an equitable distribution of land. The limited
political consensus on this issue and the legal provisions of exemptions allowed many to
manipulate the laws and avoid ceilings. In the wake of political and economic crises of
the mid-sixties, agrarian radical movements in late sixties and early seventies—
spearheaded by communist parties—took the form of ‘land grab’ by the landless in many
parts of the country. The movement was itself was brutally crushed. But it forced the
government to implement ceiling laws more strictly. More than four million landless
peasants did receive some land, however small its size may be. But more importantly, the
ceiling laws, by restricting concentration of landholdings, had killed the land market. The
law prevented “the possible dispossession of numerous small and marginal holders which
would probably have occurred through a competitive process in the land market in the
absence of a ceiling on landholdings” (C.H. Hanumantha Rao quoted in Chandra,
Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2000:391). Thus, while conditions for development of
capitalist class structure in certain branches of production were being created, the
management of surplus population required that the same conditions be prevented from
emerging in other areas of production. We have already seen how reservation of
commodities for traditional non-capitalist industries prevented private and state capital to
make inroads into the production of those commodities. In the same way, land reforms
policies led to a “freezing” of agriculture as a sector dominated by small “ancient” farms.
Tables 6 and 7 show the steadily increasing preponderance of small and marginal farms
in Indian agriculture. Marginal and small operational holdings (i.e. for land holding sizes
less than 2 hectares) constitute 85.9 % of all holdings in agriculture in 2002-2003
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compared to 61.7% in 1960-61. Marginal and small farms command 42 % of total
operated area in 2002-2003 as compared to 19.2 % in 1960-61. On the other hand, large
and medium land holdings command 35.6 % of total operated area in 2002-2003, a large
decline from 60.2 % in 1960-61. Despite continuing inequalities in land holdings, it is
clear that the trend is towards fragmentation and subdivision of land and Indian
agriculture has increasingly come to be dominated by small and marginal farms by
numbers132. Extreme fragmentation of landholding is captured by the steadily declining
average size of operational landholding in India. As Table 8 shows, from 2.63 hectares in
1960-61, the average size of landholding has declined to 1.06 hectares in 2002-03.
This freezing of agriculture constrained accumulation of industrial capital in other ways.
First of all, ancient farmers cultivated small landholdings with primitive technology and
hence technical productivity of labor was very low. Secondly, the high rents to landlords,
usurious interest charged by money-lenders leading to perennial indebtedness of the
peasants and the exorbitant “merchant fee” left the peasants with little or no surplus to
accumulate and invest in productivity-enhancing techniques and inputs. Thus, food prices
could not fall enough and hence continued to dominate the budget of not only the
peasants, but also the industrial workers. Hence, the market for capitalist non-agricultural
wage goods could not expand. Thirdly, capitalists could not cheapen labor power and
hence increase rate of surplus value because conditions of ancient farming erected
absolute barriers to cheapening of the main wage good, food. Fourth, markets for
capitalist C-goods could not expand either because peasants continued to farm with
132

“Also, though the opportunity to acquire large areas of surplus lands for redistribution was missed
because of defective and delayed ceiling laws, in the long run the high population growth and the rapid
subdivision of large holdings over several generations (in the absence of the practice of primogeniture for
inheritance in India) led automatically to little land remaining over the ceiling limits” ((Chandra,
Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2000: 391).
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traditional implements and could not afford costly capitalist commodities as inputs or
machines.
By the mid-sixties, a food crisis had developed in agriculture as the thrust on industry in
the Five-year plans and neglect of agriculture took its toll on agricultural output and
productivity. The state had to respond with a massive program for increasing agricultural
productivity—an initiative that came to be known as Green revolution in agriculture. It
consisted of the application of laboratory-produced High-Yielding Variety seeds,
chemical fertilizers and pesticides to Indian agriculture and mechanization on the larger
farms. This led to a significant increase in yield per unit of land, initially in wheat, but
later in other crops too and India achieved self-sufficiency in food. However, by the end
of the eighties, the effect of the green revolution petered out and productivity once again
came to a standstill. Meanwhile, in the north-western state of Punjab, where Green
revolution was most successful in wheat, capitalist agriculture emerged and was
facilitated by Green revolution.
Despite these efforts, productivity of agriculture remains very low in India even in
comparison with other developing countries and Indian agriculture is still dominated by
“ancient” farms. It is fair to say that by the end of the Planning regime, agriculture was
exhausted as a “sink” of surplus labor power. There was no more land to distribute to the
landless and industrial growth was unable to absorb the landless rural labor force. The
only viable option was to distribute homestead land, encourage animal husbandry that
required minimal land and ancient production of non-agricultural wage goods133.
133

“Perhaps the only viable programme left for the landless was the one which has been to some extent
taken up in recent years, of distributing homestead lands or even just home sites, ensuring the payment of
minimum wages, as well as providing security of tenure and fair rents to sharecroppers and tenants. Other
answers are to be found in increasing off-farm employment in rural areas, in increasing animal husbandry
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The Neoliberal Regime

In 2001, one of the foremost social scientists of India wrote that “inside every thinking
Indian, there is a Gandhian and a Marxist struggling for supremacy” (Guha, 2001:6). This
observation may be an exaggeration, but it does reflect a turn among radical thinkers in
India today. Yet, postcolonial India had attempted to get rid of Gandhi’s ideas in its
discourses on nation-building and economic development as soon as it became
independent. Then, how can we understand the resurgence of Gandhian ideas in the late
twentieth century? I argue that the political economy of India’s capitalism has something
to do with that. We have seen how capital accumulation and rapid industrialization have
been paralleled by the enduring problem of surplus population and crisis of subsistence
for the majority of the population confined to a non-capitalist space whose conditions of
existence and prosperity are subverted by the thrust of capitalist accumulation, including
primitive accumulation of social means of production. It is this disappointment with
capitalism in independent India that have made radical thinkers increasingly interested in
the Gandhian critique of modern industrialism, machines and the resulting unemployment
of laborers and the virtues of traditional handicrafts and agriculture in providing
livelihoods for the surplus population throughout the period of capitalist expansion.
The neoliberal regime has exacerbated all those contradictions that had plagued the
planning regime and unleashed new contradictions that derive from the ascendance of
private capitalism over state capitalism, freer international trade and a more enhanced
role of market-driven economic decisions. In one sense, the neoliberal regime has

and other activities associated with cultivation but not requiring land.” (Chandra, Mukherjee and
Mukherjee, 2000: 391-392).
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brought visibility to the problem of surplus population and the limits of capitalist
development in the Indian economy. The existence of surplus population was always
attributed to low rates of growth and the weakness of the Indian bourgeoisie and/or the
inefficiency of state capitalism. Starting from the 1980s, India has achieved high rates of
growth and capital accumulation: Indian private capitalists are becoming increasingly
powerful domestically as well as globally. Yet at the same time, job-creation in both state
and private capitalist industries has slowed down markedly, even as productivity is
increasingly rapidly (Kannan and Raveendran, 2009). It is this social conjuncture that
prompted thinkers to finally locate surplus population within capitalism rather than
outside it (i.e. as a pre-capitalist residue that survive obdurately).

Under the neoliberal regime, previous allocation of production spheres among state
capitalist, large private capitalist, small competitive capitalist enterprises and noncapitalist (i.e. ancient) enterprises were uninstalled. Large business had the opportunity to
expand, as the roll-back of the state meant fresh areas of investment and de-reservation
opened up new areas for expansion of large capitalist enterprises at the cost of state
capitalist enterprises and small scale capitalist and ancient enterprises. So, the new
economic policy reverses the trends in the structure of the industry established by the
dirigiste regime. On the other hand, there were new opportunities for expansion of small

capitalist industries and ancient enterprises under sub-contracting relations with larger
capitalist enterprises. The entire discourse on informalization is testimony to the
phenomenal expansion of subcontracting and outsourcing of production to small
capitalist, ancient and even feudal enterprises by larger capitalist enterprises. Even
independent ancient and small capitalist enterprises could and did expand by exporting its
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cheap commodities in the international markets. The expansion of ancient enterprises is
also partly due to expansion of surplus population who set up ancient enterprises to
sustain themselves, failing to get jobs as wage-workers. Several factors lead to an
explosion of surplus population in the neoliberal era. First, globalization and
liberalization of trade means both private and state capitalist enterprises in India have to
compete in both domestic and international markets with capitalist enterprises from other
countries. Since, there are no protected domestic markets, competition forces them to
raise productivity and lower prices or face the threat of extinction. Cost-cutting measures
have increasingly taken the form of massive labor retrenchment through rationalization of
production and labor-serving technology. As a result, intensity and productivity of labor
is increasing, while number of productive labors is either stagnant or only sluggishly
growing. In the state sector, productive and unproductive workforce as a whole is
actually declining. From Table 9, we can see that organized sector employment (which
includes public sector productive and unproductive employment and employment in large
corporate private sector) has actually declined in absolute numbers between 1999 and
2004. On a longer time span, Ghosh and Chandrashekhar (2007) show that total
employment in the organized sector has declined between 1981 and 2003, while labor
productivity (net value-added per worker) has almost tripled over the same period.
Secondly, neoliberalism has undermined those barriers that protected non-capitalist
enterprises from capitalist competition. The dissolution of these non-capitalist units
released fresh waves of laborers to the already tight wage-labor market, forcing them to
return to some form of self-employment. Thirdly, rapid capital accumulation has also
unleashed new forms of primitive accumulation and accelerated the existing forms.
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The liberalization of trade in agricultural commodities, the long-run ecological impact
and the short-run economic impact of capitalist commodity inputs (new varieties of
seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) have pushed the “ancient” farmers of India to the edges
of an economic disaster (Patnaik, 2003). On the one hand, because of unequal subsidy
structures in the world—developed countries subsidize their agriculture much more than
developing countries—and differences in productivity, free trade in agricultural
commodities leads to falling unit prices domestically. At the same time, farmers are
forced to replace traditional non-capitalist inputs by agricultural inputs sold by
multinational giants like Monsanto and Cargill which raise the cost of production. At the
same time, productivity on land is declining, requiring more fertilizers and more
expenses. New varieties of seeds are more prone to pest attacks requiring more expenses
on pesticides. Similarly, the new varieties of HYV seeds require more irrigation and
hence higher costs of production. As a result, in the event of any crop failure or adverse
market outcomes, farmers are trapped in indebtedness. They are forced to sell their land
at throwaway prices. In many cases, farmers are committing suicides. Between 1993 and
2003, 100,000 indebted farmers committed suicide in India, often consuming the same
pesticide they used on their fields134.
Another prominent form of primitive accumulation is through the establishment and
extension of private property rights. The most controversial form of this is the new Patent

regime or Intellectual Property Rights Regime that seeks to impose private property over
world’s bio-diversity or gene pool (Shiva, 1997, 2001). In many instances, use-values
that have been procured directly and freely from nature for thousands of years are sought
134

Newman (2006). Also see Vaidyanathan (2006), Mishra (2006), Jeromi (2007) etc.
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to be converted into industrial commodities protected by patents. This patent regime will
prohibit traditional uses of these natural resources in production and consumption and
constitute a unique moment of primitive accumulation.
At the same time, intense international competition leads the capitalists to evade or
dismantle all the social regulations that may constrain its competitiveness or
accumulation—this capitalist response has taken its most spectacular form in the concept
of SEZs (Special Economic Zones) which are literally described as “countries within a
country”. These SEZs are created by the state for capitalist industries with specific tax
exemptions, subsidized infrastructural support, absence of labor laws and cheap land.
These are literally foreign lands within the boundaries of a nation in the sense that the
laws of the land do not apply here (Samaddar (2009), Basu (2007)). In the name of job
creation, the capitalists are able to get rid of or substantially reduce many of the
customary subsumed class payments to the state. The insane rush to set up hundreds of
SEZs all over the country has unleashed a spectacular drive towards acquisition of land,
in the process dispossessing many non-capitalist (predominantly “ancient” farmers)
producers. The first decade of the twentieth century has seen numerous such projects
announced by the government and resisted by the peasants and tribals135. Rapid industrial
expansion, construction of highways, dams and power plants, expansion and
gentrification of metropolitan cities etc, have translated into a frenzied conversion of
agricultural lands into industrial lands or residential lands (Perspectives (2008). In many
cases, such acquisition of agricultural lands is done by force or through market by land
speculators at cheap prices because of the agricultural crisis.
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Basu (2007), Chandra and Basu (2007).
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The political instability, the democratic assertion of the poor and the absence of
hegemonic political parties at the center mean that the people are often able to force the
state to roll back its industrial projects. Democracy and capitalism are fighting out a bitter
battle in contemporary India. The accelerated process of dispossession and the furious
resistance to it inscribe a bloody moment in the history of postcolonial India.

The Dilemma of the Informal Sector

If we look at the labor force of India, a striking fact emerges, which is increasingly
dominating official, academic and radical discourses. Of the total labor force of India,
more than 90% work in the so-called “informal” or “unorganized” sector, which covers
enterprises outside the regulatory framework of the state. Almost the whole of agriculture
belongs to it. The dominant class nature of “informal” production is self-employment. In
the neoliberal regime, the rapid expansion of the informal economy casts doubt on the
assertion that whatever is happening in India is capitalist development. Let us focus on a
recent report by a Commission set up by the Central Government (NCEUS (2007))136.
From Table 10, we can see that employed labor force in India increased from 396.8
million in 1999-2000 to 457.5 million in 2004-2005. The informal sector absorbed 86%
of the increase in employed labor force. Given the preponderance of self-employment, we
can say that “ancient” class structures are the fastest growing class structure in terms of
share of the labor force. “Ancient” producers constitute 56% of the total workforce—
64% of the agricultural workforce and 46 % of the non-agricultural workforce in 20042005 (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009). In agriculture, after a steady decline in the 1990s,
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the number of self-employed farmers has increased between 1999-2000 and 2004-2005.
As neoliberal policies begin to have their impact on agriculture, self-employment seems
to be on the rise in agriculture. Over the same period (1999-2000 to 2004-2005) the
agricultural wage-labor force has actually declined. India is home to the largest mass of
surviving small farmers in the world (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009).
Given the dismal conditions of Indian agriculture, the labor force in agriculture is
desperate to get out of agriculture. This is reflected in the steady decline in the share of
agricultural workers in the rural workforce. Agricultural has finally hit its limits as a
“sink” of surplus population, forcing workers to set up “ancient” non-agricultural
enterprises in the rural areas or migrate to urban areas where they are predominantly
employed in the urban informal sector (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009).
Within the informal non-agricultural sector, there are two kinds of enterprises—ownaccount enterprises (OAEs) where production is done by the owner-operator, largely
assisted by family labor but without any hired workers and “establishments” where the
owner-operator works along with family labor and “hired” workers. In case of OAEs, we
have predominantly ancient enterprises as well as enterprises where ancient fundamental
class processes are often combined with feudal class processes (whenever labor of
members of feudal household are used). This situation is similar to the dominant form of
peasant farming in India. In case of “establishments” ancient, feudal and capitalist
fundamental class processes are often combined. OAEs constituted 87% of all nonagricultural informal enterprises and 73% of the informal non-agricultural labor force in
1999-2000 (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009). This clearly shows the preponderance of
non-capitalist class structures in the “informal” sector.
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It is evident that the so-called “informal” sector has always been and is, at present, the
major source of livelihoods. Yet this presents a new dilemma for capitalist accumulation.
Being outside the regulatory framework, the informal production units often operate on
the borders of illegality—by encroaching on land, by illegal producing and selling cheap
copies of capitalist commodities violating all copyright laws, illegally using public
utilities, violating environmental norms etc. In order to ensure the conditions of capitalist
accumulation, the informal sector have to be brought into the regulatory framework of the
state for policing, surveillance and disciplining. However, the legal framework will “kill”
these production units and thus destroy the source of livelihoods of the surplus
population. This dilemma is most eloquently articulated in the now-famous Report to the
International Labor Conference, 1991, by the Director-General of International Labor
Organization (ILO).
The dilemma, put simply, is whether to promote the informal sector as a provider of
employment and incomes, or to seek to extend regulation and social protection to it and
thereby possibly reduce its capacity to provide jobs and income for an ever-expanding labor
force (quoted in Schlyter, 2002: 2).

There is a striking similarity between the agrarian dilemma during the planning regime
and the dilemma of the informal sector as it has come to be formulated in recent times.
Both illustrate a social contradiction between the hegemonic/ privileged sector in the
economy (the “formal” capitalist sector) and the livelihood of a large number of people.
In case of the agrarian dilemma, we have seen how the contradiction results in an
abandonment of the class structure of the hegemonic capitalist sector in agriculture. In
case of ILO, the entire regulatory framework (economic, political and cultural conditions
of existence of capitalist class process—including the sanctity of private property rights)
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corresponding to capitalist development has to be evaded, avoided or suspended in order
to secure the conditions of livelihood of people 137.
In the context of contemporary political fragmentation, where political parties face
uncertain electoral outcomes, it is fairly easy for these informal producers to find some
political party taking up their cause. “Vote bank” politics allows these informal producers
some leverage in resisting dispossession. The mass of people engaged in informal
activities constitute a huge electoral constituency and hence important to all political
parties in their politico-electoral calculations. Strict enforcement of property laws (for
example, eviction of hawkers from city pavements or demolition of illegal squatter
settlements on public or private lands), is often strongly resisted by political parties.
Moreover, many civil society organizations offer resistance to such state programs on
grounds of human rights, right to livelihood etc. Nationwide alliances and associations of
informal labor force in particular trades are powerful pressure groups that apply pressure
on state and central governments through political mobilization and legal battles. In the
137

Typically, for “informal” ancient enterprises, SV± NCR ≤ Σ SSCP. The terms included in the left and
right hand sides differ significantly between “formal” capitalist enterprises and “informal” ancient
enterprises. Ancient enterprises are often set up on encroached land or within the household premises, for
which the ancients do not pay ground rent. Similarly, in case of pirated products, the ancients routinely
violate copyright and patent laws and thus avoid payments of ground rent. Similarly, they do not pay
license fees and other taxes to the state and thus these terms characteristic of subsumed class payments of
the “formal” capitalist enterprises do not apply to the “informal” ancient enterprises. Further, managerial
salaries as subsumed class payments do not exist for the latter. They often use water, electricity etc. without
paying for them, which may leave a non-class revenue term on the left hand side. On the other hand,
ancient commodities, for reasons discussed in Chapter 4, often sell at prices les than values and thus lose
NCR to consumers. The “informal” ancients have to pay bribes to the police for tolerance of illegality,
payments to the mafia for protection and monetary contributions to political parties and organizations to
fight for them against eviction by the state—all of which are important components of subsumed class
payments featuring on the right hand side. Furthermore, they have to pay the merchants exorbitant
merchant fees and they are most often charged usurious interest by “informal” money-lenders, since the
ancients are excluded from the “formal” banking system. All these subsumed class payments may exceed
the left hand side, thus threatening the reproduction of the ancients’ labor power. In general, even if
reproduction of the ancients’ labor power is ensured, very little is left for accumulation by the ancients.
Very often ancients have to accumulate and invest by depressing their consumption below the customary
standard of living.
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Indian political system, where no single political party could claim absolute majority of
seats in recent parliamentary elections and many different political parties carve out the
electorate among them, a huge vote-bank like the informal labor force can have
significant bearing on the electoral outcome. The following rather long quote captures
the complexity of the social context in which “informal” street vendors in Mumbai secure
their conditions of existence. Its shows how religion, regional chauvinism, political
calculations and class overdetermine the conditions of existence of “ancient” food stalls
on Mumbai’s pavements.
Given the limited scope of jobs in the organized sector and the decline of industry in the
Mumbai region, the Shiv Sena concentrated on politically mobilising the poor in the
unorganized sector. A few years back, as a part of this localised politics, it decided to set
up ‘regularised’ food stalls on the footpaths of BMC lands, ostensibly to provide cheap
food to the city poor. Regular pucca shops – measuring 60 to 80 sq ft or more – were
constructed on the footpaths. This involved removing those already using the space, and
not unexpectedly, many were non-Maharashtrian hawkers………….
The control and direction of land use in Mumbai, or any other economically strategic city
in the country, vests with the capitalist class with the state pitching in as a facilitator.
However, it is also true that local political power operates with its own logic. This is well
illustrated by the ‘zunka-bhakar’ politics of hawking space in Mumbai city. The Shiv
Sena has for years played the ‘sons of the soil’ card to mobilise the local population as its
support base. It has openly advocated a policy of restricting jobs and other economic
opportunities in Maharashtra to the ‘local’ population. This paid dividends when poor
Maharashtrians seeking relief from deprivations, as also middle class Maharashtrians in
search of better prospects, voted the Shiv Sena to power. Since then, the party has
consolidated its hold in Mumbai by openly discriminating against nonMaharashtrians…….
The proposal of the BMC to create ‘hawking zones’ is another example which illustrates
the contradictions faced by the state in allocating space for social consumption vis-a-vis
its role in serving monopoly capital. Be it the collection of illegal money (hafta) by local
politicians and concerned public officials (including the police), or the occasional
‘eviction’ operations against hawkers from public lands – both actions can be explained
by the same logic, of the state catering to multiple interest groups in the city. In such a
situation, who supports the cause of hawkers and who doesn’t often become
irrelevant…………
Today, hawking in high growth cities like Mumbai is no more confined to a struggle for
survival by the ‘lumpen proletariat’ but involves multiple actors, including bureaucrats,
local politicians and muscleman. Their struggle for a share of urban space has to be
understood in a proper perspective (Sharma, 2000).
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Moreover, the social crisis of survival of the surplus population often promotes cultural
responses that recognize human being’s inalienable right to livelihood that has moral
primacy over all other rights138. Such a social context constrains the conditions of
existence of capitalist class structures by creating barriers to primitive accumulation and
enabling non-capitalist class structures to survive on humanitarian grounds.
The contradictions of capitalist development in India are such that securing the conditions
of existence of capitalist class structures unleashes processes—primitive accumulation
and the expansion of surplus population—which in turn undermine the very conditions of
existence and expansion of capital. The particular social context has contradictory effects
on all class structures, including capitalist class structures. In capitalocentric notions of
non-capital, essentialism precludes the visibility of this contradictory nature of a
particular social conjuncture.

The Contradictions of “Inclusive Growth”

India’s 11th five-year (2007-2012) plan presents a vision of “inclusive growth” for
India—an official response to processes of economic exclusion underway in the Indian
138

Consider the following Supreme Court verdict in the Sodhan Singh Vs. NDMC case, 1989138. Sodhan
Singh used to sell garments at Janpath in New Delhi and was evicted by New Delhi Municipal Corporation.
Sodhan Singh filed a Public Interest Litigation that this act of NDMC violated his fundamental right,
namely his right to carry on trade.
In a very significant judgement, the Court ruled that, "if properly regulated according to
the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders on the side walks can considerably
add to the comfort and convenience of the general public, by making available ordinary
articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. An ordinary person, not very
affluent, while hurrying towards his home after a day's work can pick up these articles
without going out of his way to find a regular market. The right to carry on trade or
business mentioned in Article 19(1)g of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly
regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for
passing or re-passing and no other use." (Bhowmick, 2003: 1544).

217

economy. For the official discourse, exclusion is about poverty and the unequal sharing
of the expanding wealth of the society. In class terms, we can discern a different meaning
of exclusion—the expansion of a non-capitalist “outside” that can always and already
does, in many different ways, though hardly in class-terms, threaten the dominance of
capital.
This concern with inclusive growth reminds one of Polanyi’s “double movement”139 in
capitalist market economies. Polanyi interprets the history of industrial society in the 19th
and 20th centuries in terms of a pendulum-like "double movement". One side of that
movement was toward free and flexible markets that enabled the material and
technological gains associated with the Industrial Revolution. The other side was a
reaction to the disruption that these markets imposed on people’s lives, threatening nature
and society on a large scale and prompting the society to take steps towards selfpreservation. The current era of globalization mirrors that of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries in many ways. Markets are being established, liberalized, and deregulated
throughout the world. Commodities, capital and means of production are moving within
and across frontiers at an ever-accelerating pace. And people’s lives are caught in the
anarchy of the market. Severe dislocations, real and potential, urge people to look for
alternatives to their increasingly chaotic and insecure lives. Neoliberalism and inclusive
growth, therefore, constitute the two halves of the pendulum’s oscillation140. “Inclusive
growth” is an emerging discourse specifically to address the contradictory development
of capitalism that threatens to dissolve it.
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See also Resnick and Wolff’s argument about oscillation between state and private forms of capitalism
in capitalist as well as so-called “socialist” economies like Soviet Union (Resnick and Wolff (2002).
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As Samir Amin pointed out141, three billion peasants exist in the world today with the
ratio of productivity of large, mechanized capitalist farms to that of those peasant farms
with lowest productivity—i.e. those farms who have not benefited from green revolution
technology—being 2000:1. The entire economy of three billion peasants can be replaced
by twenty million large and efficient capitalist farms. Then why does petty commodity
production exist? I argue that they exist partly as “sinks” for surplus population.
Agriculture in India has always acted as one such “sink”. So did cottage and village
industries and urban and rural non-agricultural “informal” sector enterprises.
There is continuity of a particular contradiction across the two economic policy regimes
in India – the planning regime and the neoliberal era—articulated as a contradiction
between employment and accumulation, but which in Marxian class-terms, is a result of
uneven and contradictory development of different class structures which provide and
undermines each others’ conditions of existence at the same time.
The deplorable economic conditions of the Indian labor force—with its gigantic size of
surplus population—subsisting in a predominantly ancient economy whose conditions of
existence are threatened by the pressure of surplus population and the forces of primitive
accumulation—have always been a concern for economists and policy makers. Poverty
alleviation programs and protection to small industries, including reservation of products
for small scale industries have been staple components of economic policy during the
planning regime.
How does the discourse of “inclusive growth” differ from these earlier attempts? Firstly,
the problem of poverty in the 1960s and the 1970s were formulated in the context of
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inadequate economic growth. The persistence of these conditions in a handsomely
growing economy since the 1980s is what makes the problem of exclusion theoretically
challenging. Secondly, in the days of planning, the state was in a better position to
influence the direction of the economy than today. The notion of inclusive growth
becomes significant if we consider the problem as one of devising economic policies that
try to achieve certain targets that are not automatic outcomes of a free market economy,
yet where the state is committed increasingly to a non-interventionist stance with respect
to the same free-market economy. Thirdly and most importantly, in the context of the
contradictions between livelihoods and capital accumulation, one major constraint on any
strategy of inclusive growth is posed by the preservation of the ‘sinks’ for surplus
population of the economy. The objective of inclusive growth, in this context, is to
achieve capitalist growth and increase the standard of living of the masses keeping the
‘sinks’ intact, at least for the foreseeable future. This is the new utopic vision of the
neoliberal development discourse.
Let us consider then the model of market-led inclusion advocated by the World Bank.
One of the major campaigns of the Bank is aimed at labor market reforms. The following
quote summarizes well the arguments of the Bank.
Restrictive labor laws thus end up creating a bias to protect already employed formal
workers at the expense of creating more and better jobs for workers outside the formal
manufacturing sector or encouraging firms to enter the formal sector. These laws create
massive inequality. They divide a tiny enclave of relatively better-paid salaried formal
sector workers, who have good job security and benefits, from the vast majority of
informal or unorganized sector workers, who work for much lower wages and with little
or no social protection. (World Bank. 2006: 123)

This is an argument for a single labor market. The argument seems to rest on the
assumption that capitalist accumulation will lead to rising demand for labor power which
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will lead to increase in real wages and employment. This is the Smithian vision of
capitalist growth and increasing prosperity of a society. But this vision, of course, misses
the Marxian insights on the many forms of capitalist accumulation, with very different
implications for the size of productive labor force, as well as the insights offered by the
particular notion of primitive accumulation developed in this dissertation. Specifically,
the World Bank approach rests on the assumption that the capitalist sector expands by
drawing labor from the “ancient” economy—obviously by offering a wage higher than
the average income in the latter (and more decent conditions of work). But in order for
this process to work, the workers will have to be withdrawn incrementally leaving the
whole “ancient” economy intact during the process of withdrawal. This is similar to how
the “traditional” sector plays outs its role in the Lewis model. But, and this is important,
capitalist class structures do not expand in vacuum. We have argued that primitive
accumulation is constitutive of the capitalist class processes and thus capitalist
accumulation may often involve dissolution of the “ancient” economy and dispossession
of large numbers of “ancient” producers. This may happen either due to market
competition as capitalist commodities destroy the markets for “ancient” commodities or
due to processes of primitive accumulation involving appropriation of “scarce” means of
production. This will dissolve the ‘sink’ and more people will join the labor force than
can be absorbed by the capitalist sector. This will depress wages and work conditions and
defeat the very policy of raising the standard of life of the workers. Given that the
employment generation in the capitalist economy has been lagging behind its rate of
accumulation, the dissolution of the “ancient” economy means that number of people
‘dispossessed’ of their means of subsistence in the latter will be many times the number
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of people absorbed in the capitalist sector. This process will have the effect of increasing
the “dependency ratio” of the economy since dispossessed petty producers will simply
live on charity adding to the beggars, vagabonds and the criminals.
A second strategy might be to preserve the “ancient” economy, i.e. to restrict the spread
of capitalist economy and to engage in redistribution of income (partly financed by taxes
on capitalist surplus value) as non-class revenues to ancient producers or by using the
subsumed class receipts from capitalist enterprises to provide certain conditions of
existence of non-“ancient” enterprises and thus secure political and cultural conditions of
existence of capitalist enterprises in an otherwise explosive social context. Alternatively,
the state could provide for “free” or “subsidized” housing, education and health for
“ancients” by using the subsumed class payment from capitalist enterprises, thus reducing
the necessary labor time of the ancients and allowing a larger “ancient” surplus to
emerge. This surely would complete the “double movement”, but go against the
fundamentals of neoliberal capitalism. Moreover, given the size of the “ancient”
economy, this will seriously undermine some of the conditions of existence of capitalist
enterprises, including capitalist accumulation.
A third possibility involves strategies that increase productivity of “ancients” and hence
raise the “ancient” rate of surplus value. The policy of inclusive growth, in this case, may
require provision of subsidized credit, technological services, establishment of secure
markets, etc. Firstly, a particular class structure requires many conditions of existence—
not simply credit or technology; what is required is an entire social context that provides
particular economic, political and cultural conditions for the expansion of surplus in a
class structure. These economic, political and cultural conditions that favor “ancient”
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surplus must exist alongside a dominant capitalist class structure. But most importantly,
again, the expansion of “ancient” surplus will raise the possibilities of accumulation and
differentiation within the “ancient” economy and the policy will have to ensure that
productivity growth and accumulation of “ancient” surplus does not dissolve the
“ancient” economy. Differential outcomes across many different producers with varying
talents and personal circumstances are only natural in a market economy. The processes
that lead to some winning and some losing out in the game have to be arrested such that
the ancients do not differentiate into capitalists and workers. In the latter situation, the
problem of exclusion will reassert itself with full vigor.
These are only a few of the contradictions that unsettle the utopian vision of “inclusive
growth”. A Marxian overdeterminist perspective, building on the notion of
“contradiction”, recognizes that such management of contradictions is epistemologically
ruled out. The new experiment with inclusive growth is riddled with as many
contradictions as the planning experiment and which therefore threaten it with its possible
failure from the very beginning.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This dissertation develops a notion of primitive accumulation that unmasks the violent
face of capitalism and at the same time points to its fragility—the fragility of a social
formation where the dominance of a class structure (capitalist, in this case) is always
provisional and vulnerable to revolutionary transformations. It is unfortunate that this
fragility is often lost to the Marxists. The essentialist and teleological framework of
historical materialism has crippled Marxian politics in many ways. The telos of historical
materialism posits an inevitable—even if delayed—destruction of pre-capitalist class
structures. This telos underlies the two-class image of capitalism—the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat being the two great antagonistic classes in “mature” capitalism—that
informs much of Communist politics. This enduring image of capitalism makes
Communist activists and thinkers ambivalent about other class structures—for example,
ancients and communist class structures (self-employed peasants and manufacturers,
tribal and primitive communist societies). They are devalorized as pre-capitalist residues
in an “immature” capitalist social formation. Yet, all over the world, ancients (peasants as
well as urban “informal” producers like slum dwellers) and primitive communist
societies are at the forefront of the most spectacular mass resistance movements against
capital. Yet, the Communists have hardly any theory of class struggle that can enable
them to engage in Marxist interventions in these struggles that continuously threaten the
hegemony of capital—even more than the much more prominent “crises” of capitalism.
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I argue that this lack is theoretical—a blindness of the Communist activities and Marxist
thinkers to the inescapable heterogeneity of class in a capitalist social formation—in any
social formation. It’s not a matter of “delayed” transition—it’s a basic ontological view
that accepts heterogeneity and ubiquitous contradictions between different class
structures in any society and understands the development of any social formation as an
uneven development of different class structures constituting it.
The present work is emoted by the ethical questions that many societies are currently
facing and struggling to resolve, in the wake of large-scale threats to stable livelihoods—
i.e. to reproduction of life in general— for majority of the world’s population living
within global capitalism. In the last three decades, starting with the Reagan-Thatcher era,
the hegemonic representation of capitalism is not that of a social system more “efficient”
or more “promising” than the alternative “socialist” society—as used to be the case
during the Cold War days. Rather, the capitalist system has secured a representation for
itself as a system that has no alternative142. I do not mean to say that those social systems
that were represented as alternatives to capitalism—the “really existing socialisms” —
during much of the 20th century, can be regarded as an alternative to capitalism in the
Marxian sense143. However, at the level of representation in dominant discourses, there
was a strongly perceived alternative to capitalism in the “really existing socialist”
societies. With the fall of those “really existing socialist” societies, the last three decades
have witnessed a unique process of expropriation of all alternatives at the level of
representation in discourses on economic development and future of societies.
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For those who are trapped in this hegemonic representation of capitalism-without-analternative, the “inevitability” of capitalism calls for a social sanction of the violence that
accompanies growth and expansion of capitalism. More specifically, for many in
developing countries, this brings to mind the violence associated with capitalist
development in 17th and 18th century Britain and the uncomfortable realization that
developing societies will still have to pass through similar “rigors of transition”—
something, these societies admittedly have always been doing since colonial times. Thus,
we face the following dilemma—capitalism is represented as the only solution to poverty
and yet, to have capitalism is to reenact the entire bloody history of pauperization,
dispossession and expropriation of millions of peasants, petty producers and communities
in developing societies. This history has been eloquently sketched in Marx’s chapters on
“primitive accumulation” at the end of Volume 1 of Capital. It is not therefore surprising
that a long-buried concept like “primitive accumulation” suddenly acquires such
eminence, in this peculiar world-historical context.
This dissertation argues that we should appreciate the (non-exploitative) “others” of
capital if we are to imagine the alternatives—i.e. make capital’s “others” a part of our
lived experience and an object of our theoretical concerns. We must rescue
capital’s “others” from history—i.e. de-historicize them, break the theoretical mold that
can make sense of capital’s “others” only as pre-modern residues (pre-capitalism) or
futuristic visions (socialism) borne out of the perennial Hegelian “unhappy
consciousness”. The concept of primitive accumulation, as worked out in this
dissertation, brings into the domain of Marxian political economy an understanding of
how capital’s “others” are subjected to violence and devalorization at the level of the
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economic and how that economic process sustains the expropriation of the alternative at
the ideological-cultural level.
By presenting a disaggregated picture of the social formation and by emphasizing the
contradictory nature of development of such a social formation, this dissertation claims to
unsettle the dominant representation of such a social formation as undergoing capitalist
development. As my account of the development of Indian capitalism shows, Indian
social formation is dominated by the capitalist class structure in terms of surplus,
accumulation and growth, but it is dominated by the ancient class structure in terms of
livelihoods of the labor force. Such a representation opens up the space for anti-capitalist
interventions by highlighting the limits or fragility of the dominance of capital. I argue
that this dissertation contributes to a new approach to writing history of economic
development of developing countries—a new approach that eschews any kind of telos in
favor of contingencies, dissolves all stable outcomes into provisional “encounters” and
recognizes uneven development at the heart of the process of change of a social
formation. In the process, this dissertation dissolves the notions of transition and the
dominance of a particular class structure inherited from the essentialist structure of
historical materialism.
I would like to point out some political implications that flow from this dissertation.
Marxists had always been interested in the problem of poverty. But in the absence of a
sustained class theory of poverty, the urgent problem of poverty in certain societies has
often compelled Marxists to engage in struggles around poverty from a non-Marxian
perspective—involving the debates on state versus market or private versus state
capitalism. Thus, for example, neoliberal policies are often blamed for the increasing
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poverty of the majority of the population while enabling rising wealth of a minority. Even
when the notion of primitive accumulation is employed by the Marxists to account for the
processes of dispossession, exclusion and marginalization, they place undue emphasis on
neoliberal policies to account for the onslaught of primitive accumulation. In
emphasizing one particular form of capitalism, namely free market private capitalism—
which is what “neoliberal” capitalism stands for—many writers in recent times seem to
imply that state-guided or state-regulated capitalism is not guilty or less guilty of the
crime of primitive accumulation. This, I strongly assert, is at variance with the Marxian
class-focused understanding of the concept. In fact, such an identification of primitive
accumulation with neoliberalism invites the dangers of a possible interpretation of
primitive accumulation as a policy problem and a target of capitalist governance. Hence,
one objective of the present work is to dissociate and distance my understanding of the
notion of primitive accumulation from those associated with the critics of globalization
and neoliberalism, despite the many useful contributions of the latter to an understanding
of contemporary capitalism and even primitive accumulation itself. I believe that this
work will add to the Marxian exploitation-focused critique of capitalism, another political
critique in terms of the contradictory relations between capitalist and non-capitalist class
processes—captured in the Marxian notion of “primitive accumulation”— which is
germane to the ethical concerns of the society over threats to reproduction of life for
majority of population living within or alongside capitalism. Thus, one purpose of the
present work is to show that not only is labor within the capitalist fundamental class
process exploited in the Marxian sense, but even labor outside capitalist class structures,
in other non-capitalist class processes like ancient and communistic class processes, are

228

threatened with systematic disruption of their conditions of existence, as a result of the
expansion of capitalist class structures. The reformulation of primitive accumulation,
presented in this work, is the crucial concept that unmasks the latter process.
Further, the analysis presented here allows the Marxists to intervene in struggles around
dispossession as well as class struggles around capitalist exploitation of workers. I have
tried to show, in the Indian context, that despite rapid capitalist accumulation, the size of
the productive labor force in capitalist industries is growing only sluggishly or may even
be declining. For the Marxists, the shrinking size of the “only revolutionary class”—the
industrial proletariat—makes them despair of revolutionary possibilities in such a
society.
Moreover, in such a social context, the balance of power in the class struggle between
capitalists and workers often tilt in favor of the capitalists. This leads to a decline of the
strength of workers’ movements. I argue that the analysis presented above presents a new
understanding of how the dynamics of the social formation benefit the capitalists in their
class struggles against their workers. Specifically, I have argued that, in a social
conjuncture, where the surplus population expands along with the capitalist class
structure, the following peculiar situation may prevail—the dissolution of non-capitalist
class processes through primitive accumulation and a simultaneous expansion of the
same—in fact, almost as a parallel movement. This is because dispossessed people would
secure their subsistence, however precariously, in non-capitalist (mainly ancient) class
structures, if they do not get employment in the capitalist factories. The simultaneous
expansion of capital and non-capital has the following implications for Marxists
interested in class struggles in the society. First, emergence of these new spaces of non-
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capital also and at the same time implies that they may become targets of fresh waves of
primitive accumulation. Conditions of existence of these non-capitalist class processes
are therefore continuously subverted by the primitive accumulation of capitalism even as
they are simultaneously expanded through the expansion of the surplus population.
Hence, livelihoods of labor in alternative non-capitalist class processes are continuously
destabilized. Second, continuously expanding “ancient” class structures under conditions
of depressed “ancient” surplus enable capitalists to tap the former for their requirement of
labor power, which in turn, allows capitalists to be unscrupulous, in many different ways,
with respect to workers they employ and exploit—by denying them secure contracts, by
depressing their wages, by increasing exploitation or breaking up workers’ resistance
movements etc. Thus, for the majority of the laboring population and cutting across class
processes, reproduction of life remains insecure and uncertain. However, I must hasten to
add, that such a social conjuncture may benefit capitalists vis-à-vis their workers, but
they constrain capitalists in other ways—for example, capitalists have to struggle against
the ancients to secure their conditions of existence, including access to “scarce” means of
production like “land”. The analysis presented in this dissertation allows Marxists to
understand how capitalist and non-capitalist class structures overdetermine each other—
particularly how the condition of “ancients” affects the workers in capitalist class
processes.
To be fair, Marxists have always recognized such problems posed by non-capitalist class
processes for workers’ movements. But, they have always taken an essentialist view of
the interaction between capital and non-capital. First, they have assumed that the
presence of non-capitalist class structures can be explained by inadequate rates of
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expansion of capitalist class structures (i.e. low rates of growth or capital accumulation).
Hence, with faster capital accumulation, the non-capitalist class structures would
disappear and hence the problem itself would disappear. In this dissertation, I have
argued why it is perfectly reasonable to expect an expansion of non-capitalist class
structures with rising capitalist accumulation once we take into account primitive
accumulation as a condition of existence/expansion of capitalist class structures and when
the forms of capitalist accumulation are such that, in conjunction with primitive
accumulation, a surplus population expands along with capitalist accumulation. Thus, the
Marxists have to rethink their class politics in a social context where non-capitalist class
structures proliferate alongside a rising, stagnant or even declining proletariat. Second,
Marxists have assumed that non-capitalist class structures adversely affect only the
workers in the capitalist factories while the capitalists benefit from such a situation by
increasing the rate of exploitation of their workers. I have argued that expansion of
ancient class structures both benefit and harm capitalists—for example, enabling the
capitalists to increase the rate of exploitation while constraining their ability to
accumulate capital. Thus, capitalist accumulation itself is overdetermined by the ancient
class structures. One cannot posit capitalist accumulation as a process independent of
whatever is happening to the ancient economy—the conditions governing ancient surplus
both enable and constrain capitalist surplus, as I have argued in Chapter IV.
Thus, this dissertation points to the complexity of the working class struggles, even as the
analysis builds on a highly simplified “model” involving only two class structures—and
thereby ignoring others—and focusing on only primitive accumulation, which is just one
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process belonging to the space of a complexly overdetermined interaction between
capitalist and ancient class processes.
In the process of such a reformulation and application of the concept of primitive
accumulation, I claim that the present work faces the possibility of transcending the
current boundaries of the dissertation. Though I restrict myself to a discussion of
postcolonial India and a simplified representation of class structures in postcolonial India,
I believe the theoretical arguments presented in this dissertation will break new grounds
in understanding the class-dynamics of developed countries as well and offer an entirely
new perspective on the question of historical transition to capitalism. Primitive
accumulation is not specific to developing countries and its class-effects can be similarly
ascertained in the context of developed societies. In fact, one of the main contributions of
the contemporary literature is to locate primitive accumulation not at the peripheries of
capitalism, but within the metropolitan centers of capitalism. One possible extension of
the current work consists of applying this analysis to developed societies and mark out
the similarities as well as differences in the social conjunctures in developed and
developing societies.
Secondly, the arguments presented in this dissertation offer elements for a Marxian classtheory of poverty. Poverty has so far been theorized within capitalist class structures in
terms of Marx’s notions of reserve army of labor, rising rate of exploitation coupled with
stagnant or falling real wages and crises. This dissertation allows a peek into the
possibilities of a theory of poverty associated with non-capitalist class structures and how
the latter overdetermines the poverty associated with capitalist class structures and how
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both forms of poverty support and undermine capitalists at the same time. Such an
analysis enables Marxists to engage in struggles around poverty from a class-perspective.
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APPENDIX
TABLES

TABLE 1
Occupational Structure in India, 1901-1931 (in Percent)

Agriculture and allied Activities
Modern Industry
Traditional Industry and Construction
Services
Others (Mining and Unspecified

1901
67.8
0.4
10.1
14.4.
7.3

1931
71
1.2
7
15
5.8

Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Table 2.4), Statistical Abstracts of
India, various years. Reproduced from Roy (2002:113).

TABLE 2
Plan Outlay on Industry 1951-1990 (in Percent)

Plan/Year
First Plan (1951-1955)
Second Plan (1956-61)
Third Plan (1961-66)
Annual Plans (1966-69)
Fourth Plan(1969-74)
Fifth Plan(1974-79)
Annual Plans (1979-80)
Sixth Plan (1980-85)
Seventh Plan (1985-90

Village and small
industries
2.1
4
2.8
1.9
1.5
1.5
2.1
1.8
1.5

Source: Kapila (1993: 245)
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Industry and
minerals
2.8
20.1
20.1
22.8
18.2
22.8
19.6
13.7
11

TABLE 3
Net Capital Formation (at Current Prices in Rs.Crores)

Item
Net Capital Formation
Public Sector
Private Corporate Sector

1950-51
511
203
207

1960-61
1665
973
469

1970-71
4648
2106
726

1980-81
15228
8057
2176

1990-91
86520
32507
17163

Source: CSO, Government of India 2010, Statement 11.

TABLE 4
Share of Public Sector in the GDP of Different Sectors of the Economy
(Per Cent at Current Prices)

Item
Administration and defence,
railways and communications
Other services, mainly, health and
education
Mining and quarrying,
manufacturing (reg.), electricity,
gas, etc., Construction, banking &
insurance

1960 - 61

1970 – 71

1980 - 81

1988 – 89

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

21.12

33.62

39.09

46.46

11.29

23.68

39.99

53.42

All other sectors

1.41

2.12

4.15

4.57

All sectors (Total GDP)

9.99

13.84

19.74

27.12

Source: Dandekar (1992:57)
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TABLE 5
Per Capita GDP in Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors
(Rs. at Constant 1980-81 Prices)

Per Capita GDP

Year

Proportion of
Population in
Agriculture

Total

Agriculture

1
1950-51
1960-61
1970-71
1980-81
1989-90

2
67.5
69.5
69.5
66.5
64.9

3
1194.18
1449.40
1671.46
1800.09
2430.84

4
860.83
956.17
955.60
940.48
1117.69

NonAgriculture
5
1886.52
2573.32
3302.69
3506.47
4858.87

Ratio of
(5) to (4)
6
2.19
2.69
3.46
3.73
4.35

Source: Dandekar (1992:53)

TABLE 6
Changes in the Size Distribution of Operational Holdings Shown by Different Land
Holding Sizes

Category of Holdings
Marginal
(< 1.000 hectares)
Small
(1.001-2.000 hectares)
Semi-medium
(2.001-4.000)
Medium
(4.001-10.000 hectares)
Large
(> 10 hectares)
All Sizes

Percentage of Operational Holdings
2002-03
60-61
70-71 81-82 91-92
Kharif Rabi
39.1

45.8

56.0

62.8

69.7

70.0

22.6

22.4

19.3

17.8

16.3

15.9

19.8

17.7

14.2

12.0

9.0

8.9

14.0

11.1

8.6

6.1

4.2

4.4

4.5

3.1

1.9

1.3

0.8

0.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: NSSO (2006: 18)
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TABLE 7
Changes in Percentage Distribution of Operated Area by Category of
Operational Holdings

Percentage of Operated Area
Category of Holdings
Marginal
(< 1.000 hectares)
Small
(1.001-2.000 hectares)
Semi-medium
(2.001-4.000)
Medium
(4.001-10.000 hectares)
Large
(> 10 hectares)
All Categories

2002-03
Kharif Rabi

60-61

70-71

81-82

91-92

6.9

9.2

11.5

15.6

22.6

21.7

12.3

14.8

16.6

18.7

20.9

20.3

20.7

22.6

23.6

24.1

22.5

22.3

31.2

30.5

30.1

26.4

22.2

23.1

29.0

23.0

18.2

15.2

11.8

12.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: NSSO (2006:20)

TABLE 8
Average Area Operated per Holding (in Hectares)

Year
1960-61
1970-71
1981-82
1991-92
2002-03

Area
2.63
2.2
1.67
1.34
1.06

Source: NSSO (2006: 16)
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TABLE 9
Organized Sector Employment:
Estimates of Employment in Organized Public & Private Sectors

Lakh (=100,000) Persons on March 31
Year

Public

Private

Total

1999

194.15

86.98

281.13

2000

193.14

86.46

279.60

2001

191.38

86.52

277.89

2002

187.73

84.32

272.06

2003

185.80

84.21

270.00

2004

181.97

82.46

264.43

2005

180.06

84.52

264.58

Source: Planning Commission, Government of India. 2009.

TABLE 10
Employment by Sector (in Millions)

Informal
Formal
Total

1999-2000
342.6
54.1
396.8

Source: NCEUS (2007:3)
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2004-2005
394.9
62.6
457.5
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